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“If patterns of political outcomes are acknowledged to be rule dependent, and if rules that
describe the inclusive political process are themselves considered to be variables, subject
to change by deliberative reform, more attention to the causal chains of relationships
between rules and outcomes is surely warranted.”
– James Buchanan
Institutions shape society as a whole and play a crucial role in the general economic
environment through the structuring of economic incentives. Acemoglu et al. (2005) place
institutions, along with geography and culture, as one of the main factors explaining differ-
ences in economic performance. This book focuses on a specific set of institutions, political
institutions, to study their relevance for a number of economic and political outcomes and
behaviors. Despite the large amount of literature on political institutions that take these as
predetermined and exogenous when assessing their impact on policy choices, recent contri-
butions emphasize the endogeneity of institutions (Aghion et al., 2004). Studies show that
institutions themselves evolve in response to societies’ drives and needs. Hence, evidence
obtained on the premise of historical and static institutional contexts may misrepresent
the mapping of institutional rules to policy outcomes (Besley and Case, 2003).
This book starts precisely by contributing to this emerging literature on endogenous po-
litical institutions by providing evidence on the manipulation of local political instruments
by the established political class. It then continues in pursue of the causal relationship
between rules and outcomes called for in Buchanan (2008). For the purpose, all chapters
rely on electoral reforms used as natural experiments that induce exogenous variation on
the institutional context and incentives coming therefrom, allowing for the identification
of causal treatment effects. In particular, the identification strategies rely at least partially
on one of the two following electoral reforms: the Hessian Kommunalwahlreform from
1999 and the recent introduction of term limits in Portuguese municipalities. By combin-
ing these institutional reforms and state of the art quasi-experimental methodologies, it
∗This chapter heavily borrows from the abstracts of the paper versions of Chapters 2-5, Baskaran and
Lopes da Fonseca (2016), Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca (2014), Lopes da Fonseca (2015b) and Lopes da
Fonseca (2015a), respectively.
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is possible to measure the causal impact of political institutions not only on electoral but
also economic outcomes. Additionally, in the last chapter, the exogenous variation induced
by the electoral reform in Portugal is used to disentangle two important determinants of
voting behavior.
The empirical analyses rely on a total of three different methodologies: the difference-
in-differences (diff-in-diff) method, the regression discontinuity design (RDD) and the
difference-in-discontinuities (diff-in-disc) design. The latter being a combination of the
previous two. In general, the diff-in-diff methodology compares the period before and after
a reform in identifying its causal effects. Given a treatment year, the diff-in-diff estimator
calculates the difference in the change from the pre- to the post-treatment period between
affected and unaffected individuals to assess the impact of a reform. The RDD in turn, re-
lies on a discontinuity in treatment assignment to identify the treatment effect. By focusing
on locally randomized samples of individuals differing only on treatment status, the RDD
estimator measures the causal treatment effects. Finally, the diff-in-disc effectively com-
bines diff-in-diff and RDD by relying on both changes from the pre- to the post-treatment
period and a discontinuous treatment assignment. All following chapters provide compre-
hensive information on the empirical methods employed as well as the precise mechanics
and identification strategies intrinsic to the different contexts under study. Furthermore,
the assumptions underlying each of the methodologies are discussed and tested in order to
establish the internal validity of the different approaches.
The first reform under analysis, in Chapters 2 and 3, is the Kommunalwahlreform
dating back to 1999 that changed the rules governing local elections in the German state
of Hesse as of 2001. Among the different elements of the reform, the abolishment of a five
percent electoral threshold for the municipal council provides the core for the identification
strategy. Until 2001 an explicit five percent electoral threshold was in place preventing
parties that failed to overcome the threshold from gaining a seat in the municipal council.
Since 2001, every party can gain a seat in the local council provided they receive the
sufficient amount of votes. Given the absence of an obvious control group against which
the abolishment of the electoral threshold can be assessed, the empirical analysis makes
use of a state law mapping population size to council size in order to exploit heterogeneity
in the intensity of treatment. The abolishment of the explicit electoral threshold had, on
average, stronger effects on municipalities with larger council sizes since implicit electoral
thresholds are inversely correlated to council size. Relying on a diff-in-disc design, the
state law mapping population to council sizes, and a comprehensive dataset including all
426 Hessian municipalities for the period 1989-2011, the results capture the causal effect
of the reform on the outcomes under study.
The abolishment of a five percent electoral threshold is likely to benefit smaller par-
ties perhaps affecting the prevailing balance of powers among political representatives and
threaten the dominance of the more established parties. Chapter 2 investigates whether
the presumed increase in electoral competition coming from the non-existence of an explicit
threshold led to a counteracting reaction by the political forces in favor of the status quo.
In particular, the question is whether established parties change political institutions to
the disadvantage of new political actors if the latters’ electoral prospects improve. In the
2
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face of the electoral reform, local politicians from the large mainstream parties could ad-
just municipal political institutions in such a way as to counteract unwanted effects of the
reform. One such adjustment could be to reduce the size of the local council since a reduc-
tion in council size raises the implicit electoral threshold and thus disadvantages smaller
parties. Indeed, municipalities where the electoral competitiveness of smaller parties im-
proved more after the reform saw a larger reduction in council size. Hence, established
parties appear to erect entry barriers by adjusting political institutions once new political
actors become viable electoral alternatives.
Chapter 3 in turn, studies the impact of the reform on the following political outcomes:
seat and vote shares, council fragmentation and turnout. Ceteris paribus, the abolishment
of an explicit electoral threshold mechanically increases the seat share of smaller parties
for which the threshold used to be binding. Parties that generally enter the council would
therefore experience a reduction in the seat shares. Moreover, with more parties entering
the municipal council, council fragmentation is likely to increase. However, all else must
not be equal, as also indicated by the evidence in Chapter 2, and different responses to
the abolishment of the explicit electoral threshold are conceivable. Chapter 3 discusses
different scenarios and identifies the actual impact of the electoral reform on the different
political outcomes. Results are interpreted in light of the evidence in Chapter 2 with the
less than proportional increase in the seat share of small parties in relation to the gain
in vote share as indicative of the successful manipulation of council sizes by the more
established parties. In the long-run though, the success of smaller parties is apparent as is
an increase in council fragmentation. Very weak evidence also suggests a slight increase in
turnout, which was one of the objectives of the reform under study.
The second reform, explored in Chapters 4 and 5 of this book, involves a revision of the
Portuguese Constitution introducing term limits at the municipal level. Law no. 49/2005,
from August 29th 2005, establishing term limits for local officeholders was approved in
Parliament on July 25th 2005 and entered into force on January 1st 2006. According to
the law, mayoral positions at the municipal level are limited to a tenure of three consecutive
terms. Upon entering into force it established a stand-by period of one election, the 2009
local elections, in which all incumbent mayors were allowed to seek re-election. Term limits
were thus only first binding in the 2013 local elections for all mayors serving their at least
third consecutive term in office.
Term limits introduce an exogenous variation in eligibility for office that may have an
effect on short term electoral incentives. Lame ducks, or non-eligible officeholders, have
arguably different motivations and abide by different incentives in their last term in office
vis-a-vis re-eligible incumbents. The theoretical literature on the impact of term limits on
fiscal policy is divided into two different types of models dealing either with problems of
moral hazard or adverse selection. On the one hand, elections may act as a disciplining
device that keeps officeholders from opportunistic behavior but ceases to have an effect on
term-limited incumbents. These do not face re-election incentives and deviate from the
optimal policy choice (Barro, 1973). On the other hand, elections may distort incentives
instead, leading politicians to pursue distortive fiscal policies in an attempt to be re-elected.
Term limits can thus lead officeholders to pursue more truthful fiscal policies by eliminating
3
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re-election concerns and reducing the value of holding office (Smart and Sturm, 2013). As
a result, the electoral process would be more transparent enabling voters to better select
their representatives.
Empirical evidence on the impact of term limits on fiscal policy is sparse and almost
limited to the U.S. experience. With one exception, List and Sturm (2006), who provide
evidence of distortive policy choices by re-eligible incumbents, most of the empirical ev-
idence is interpreted bearing in mind the disciplining role of elections and opportunistic
behavior of term limited incumbents. Chapter 4 contributes to this literature by exploring
how the exogenous variation in eligibility for re-election affects fiscal policy choices at the
Portuguese local level. Relying on electoral and fiscal outcomes for the past three complete
electoral terms, the empirical analysis relies on a diff-in-diff quasi-experimental approach
to estimate how fiscal policy differs on average between re-eligible and term-limited incum-
bents. Results indicate that rather than engaging in opportunistic behavior, lame ducks
pursue more conservative fiscal policies. Term limited officeholders choose lower property
tax rates and reduced levels of current expenditure relative to re-eligible incumbents. Het-
erogeneous effects further suggest that ineligible mayors behave more truthfully and do not
engage in political business cycles, challenging previous results in the literature.
Finally, Chapter 5 relies on the reform introducing mayoral term limits as a natural
experiment that creates exogenous variation on the incumbency status of officeholders
while holding the incumbency status of the party constant to provide one of the first
causal estimates of both the personal and the partisan incumbency advantages. For the
purpose it uses data on six local elections, taking place during the last 20 years in 278
municipalities in Portugal, and a new methodology that combines two quasi-experimental
methods, the RDD and diff-in-disc design. Estimates from the two models are inputs in
a system of equations relating personal to partisan advantage in the spirit of Fowler and
Hall (2014). Results provide evidence of a significant personal effect and an insignificant
partisan incumbency advantage in a context of a proportional representation system for the
chief-executive position in a municipality. Hence, to the extent that incumbency affects
voting behavior, candidates appear to have more political power than the parties they
represent.
Taken together, this book offers a study on the effect of political institutions on eco-
nomic and political incentives. The principal-agent nature of representative politics pro-
vides the background for the mapping of rules to policy outcomes resulting from the in-
terplay between differently motivated groups in the society. All in all, results are a robust
evidence of the impact of institutions on several aspects of the local political and economic
environment. Moreover, by providing supportive evidence of the endogeneity of institutions
this book reinforces that taking institutional contexts for granted when analyzing different
societal questions may produce biased conclusions not suitable of causal interpretation.
Instead, relying on institutional changes introducing exogenous variation and appropriate
quasi-experimental empirical methodologies constitutes a better approach to identifying





Quasi-experimental Evidence from Germany∗
2.1 Introduction
Even if all constitutional authority is supposed to derive from the will of the people, elites
wield significant influence over the political process. In many countries, it is the political
elite that decides how electoral districts are shaped, how votes are translated into seats,
and how many seats the legislature has. Since the rules that govern the constitutional life
of a country, its political institutions, can be reshaped by those who currently hold the
reigns of power, it seems plausible that they would adjust these rules in an ad hoc fashion
to maintain their position at the top of the political order. The political elite, in short, may
change institutions in such a way as to erect additional barriers to entry for new political
actors once they become a credible electoral threat (Doron and Maor, 1991).
Anecdotal evidence indeed suggests that mainstream parties adopt measures to disad-
vantage new political actors if the latter become too successful. After the success of Ross
Perot’s Campaign in the 1992 U.S. presidential race, for example, third party candidates
were prevented by the Commission on Presidential Debates – which is controlled by both
the Republican and Democratic parties – from participating in future presidential debates,
a measure that likely diminished the electoral prospects of non-mainstream parties.
While such anecdotal evidence can be found easily, the question is whether it is indica-
tive of a general phenomenon. This paper is one of the first to offer quasi-experimental
evidence on whether established parties adjust political institutions to disadvantage new
political actors. To do so, we make use of a natural experiment in the German State of
Hesse: an electoral reform for local elections passed by the Hessian state parliament in
1999 and implemented in 2001 (when the first election after the reform was held). The
professed purpose of the reform was to increase the degree of political competition at the
∗This chapter originates from joint work with Thushyanthan Baskaran published in Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior and Organization, Volume 122, February 2016, Pages 43-61.
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local level. Its important aspects were (i) the abolishment of an explicit electoral threshold,
the so called “five-percent hurdle” and (ii) the introduction of a new voting system called
Kumulieren und Panaschieren (KUP), which entailed in particular a switch from closed to
open lists.
Before the reform political competition, both between and within parties, was limited
in various ways. Between-party competition was limited because the electoral threshold
prevented many smaller parties from receiving seats to which they were entitled to given
their vote share. Furthermore, voters might have been reluctant to vote for smaller parties
in the first place given the non-negligible chance that their vote would be “wasted” if
their preferred party did not overcome the electoral threshold. Within-party competition
was limited because voters could vote only for closed party lists, with the position of
candidates on the lists essentially determined by the local party leadership. Consequently,
candidates not closely affiliated with the local party leadership (for simplicity we refer to
such candidates as party rebels in the following) had few chances to gain a seat in the
council.
After the reform, both smaller parties and party rebels became a more viable electoral
alternative. First, smaller parties required, in general, a substantially lower vote share
than five percent to gain their first council seat and thereby legislative representation.
Second, party rebels, even if they had been placed at a low-ranked position on the party
list, could enter the council if they received sufficient personal votes to overcome the party
leaderships’ pre-ordering.
The question we ask in this paper is how the established political parties reacted to this
exogenous increase in the electoral competitiveness of smaller parties and party rebels: did
they change the prevailing local political institutions to put these new political actors back
at a disadvantage? We show that at least one municipal political institution was indeed
adjusted after the reform: the size of the local council. By reducing the number of council
seats, which can be done through a two-third council majority, the mainstream parties
raised implicit thresholds – the minimum vote share that a party has to gain to receive at
least one seat – and thus made it harder for smaller parties to gain their first council seat.
Furthermore, party leaders may have also used council size reductions to prevent party
rebels from receiving a seat following the switch to KUP. However, as we discuss below
in more detail, reductions in council size are arguably less effective in preventing party
rebels from entering the council than in preventing smaller parties. We therefore focus in
the following on the link between the abolishment of the explicit threshold, council size
reductions, and the competitiveness of smaller parties.
Since all Hessian municipalities were subject to the abolishment of the explicit electoral
threshold, there is no obvious control group against which changes in council size from
the pre- to the post-treatment period could be evaluated. Our identification strategy to
uncover the causal effect of the abolishment on council size relies therefore on differences
in the intensity of treatment. Municipalities that had a larger council were affected more
strongly by the abolishment of the explicit electoral threshold than those with smaller
councils because municipalities with smaller councils have higher implicit thresholds to
begin with. That is, the competitiveness of smaller parties is higher the larger the council
6
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after the reform. Therefore, the mainstream parties had a stronger incentive to reduce the
size of the council if the current council size in their municipality was large. They are,
however, not completely free in doing so. A state law relates municipal population sizes
discontinuously to minimum and maximum council sizes. We exploit the discontinuous
nature of the link between population size and council size to implement a variant of the
regression discontinuity design (RDD), the difference-in-discontinuities design (diff-in-disc).
This paper contributes to the literature on political institutions, and specifically to the
literature on their determinants. A strand of this literature assumes a historical perspective
and analyzes how secular changes in political regimes, most notably the shift to popular
democracy, were determined by conscious decisions of the elite (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2000; Aghion et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). On the other hand, the literature
on the determinants of contemporaneous and arguably less decisive adjustments of political
institutions within generally democratic societies is scarce. One of the few studies are Hayo
and Voigt (2010, 2013) who analyze with cross-country regressions why countries witness
constitutional change. They find that political factors, e.g. whether there is an internal
armed conflict, determine how countries transition from a parliamentary to a presidential
form of government (or vice versa). Another study is Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) who find
with cross-section regressions that countries with higher income inequality are more likely
to have majoritarian electoral rules.
Even rarer are studies on how political institutions are adjusted by established elites to
counter threats from new political actors. Drometer and Rincke (2014) find that in the U.S.,
states which were affected more strongly by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 tightened ballot
access restrictions to hinder new entrants into the political market.1 Similarly, Trebbi et al.
(2008) show that U.S. cities systematically changed electoral rules after the adoption of the
Voting Rights Act to limit minority representation.2 Our paper primarily contributes to
this small literature and is the first that looks at a setting other than the U.S.. It documents
that political institutions are indeed endogenous and thereby suggests that evidence from
studies that take political institutions as exogenous is questionable (Trebbi et al., 2008).
From a policy perspective, our results also suggest that adjustments of the wider political
system by established elites should be taken into account when designing reforms aimed
at increasing political competition.
Our paper is furthermore relevant for the literature that studies the consequences of
legislature size and legislative fragmentation for fiscal outcomes. Relying on common pool
theories, Gilligan and Matsusaka (2001), for example, find that larger U.S. state legislatures
spend more. Similar evidence for U.S. local governments is offered by Baqir (2001). The
related literature on legislative fragmentation and fiscal outcomes finds that increased
fragmentation leads to higher spending and deficits (Borge, 2005). However, most studies
in this literature operate under the assumption that the size of the legislature is essentially
1 Lee (2013) shows that U.S. House incumbents respond to the threat of third party candidates within
their constituency by adjusting how they vote in roll call votes. However, he does not study adjustments
of political institutions.
2Doron and Maor (1991) and Bellettini et al. (2014) offer relevant theoretical analyses, showing for
example how incumbent politicians can use bureaucratic red tape to disadvantage new entrants.
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exogenous. We show that legislature size responds to political developments. Our results
hence vindicate recent contributions on the effect of council size on fiscal outcomes that
attempt to exploit quasi-experimental variation in council size for identification (Egger and
Koethenbuerger, 2010; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012).
2.2 Institutional Details
2.2.1 Political Setting
The setting for our analysis is the German federal State of Hesse. This state has about six
million inhabitants who live in 426 municipalities. Municipal population sizes vary: there
are, on the one hand, municipalities with less than 1000 inhabitants and, on the other
hand, the city of Frankfurt with more than 600,000 inhabitants. Figure 2.1 shows a map
of Hesse and indicates the average population sizes of municipalities during the sample
period.
Inhabitants in every municipality elect a local council in elections held at the same
date throughout the state. The council is the most important political institution in a
Hessian municipality. It decides, inter alia, on various municipal taxes, user fees, and
on the provision of municipal public goods and services. The other important political
institutions is the mayor. The mayor used to be appointed by the council (council-manager
system), but as of 1993 she is directly elected by municipal inhabitants. Yet even after the
reform, Hessian municipalities do not employ a full fledged mayor-council system as the
competencies of the mayor remain limited (Hessami, 2014).3 We discuss the implications
of the reform in the electoral rule for mayoral elections for our empirical strategy in Section
2.6.1.
Several parties contest the local council elections. First, the center-right CDU and the
center-left SPD. These two parties typically receive 30 percent or more of the votes in both
national and state elections. Second, the Green Party and the FDP. The characteristic
feature of the Green Party is its emphasis on environmental issues. It is considered to
be left of center regarding economic and liberal regarding social issues (e.g. immigration)
and tends to form coalitions with the SPD. The FDP, on the other hand, emphasizes free
market economics. It is considered to be right of center with respect to economic issues
and liberal with respect to social issues. It tends to form coalitions with the CDU. The
3Specifically, the switch in how mayors were chosen in Hesse was part of a broader trend in the 1990s
leading several German States to switch from a council-manager (Norddeutsche Ratsverfassung) to a mayor-
council system (Süddeutsche Ratsverfassung). However, unlike other German States, Hesse made only a
partial switch to the mayor-council system. The Süddeutsche Ratsverfassung not only requires that mayors
are directly elected by the voters, it also gives the mayor a strong political position within the municipality,
making him the head of the administration and providing him with veto rights against council decisions.
Hesse, however, only introduced direct elections but left the political authority of the mayor otherwise
unchanged. The Hessian local constitution is therefore labeled Unechte Magistratsverfassung rather than
Süddeutsche Ratsverfassung.
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Fig 2.1: Average Population Size in Hesse for Sample Period.
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Green Party and the FDP used to receive up to ten percent of the votes during the sample
period.
In addition to the four large national mainstream parties, there are a number of smaller
parties that contest local elections. First, small national parties which can be either cen-
trist, far-left, or far-right with respect to economic and social issues. Second, municipal
specific free voters’ associations (Wahlvereinigigungen) which often contest local elections
by fielding a list of candidates. These free voters’ associations can be very influential, par-
ticularly in smaller municipalities, and often receive more than 20% of the seats. Thus, the
free voters’ associations are not always a “small” party as such. However, they typically
lack formal party structures and are largely a loose collection of citizens who agree on
certain issues that are specific to their municipality.
2.2.2 Electoral Rules and the Kommunalwahlreform
The rules governing local council elections in Hesse differed before and after 2001. Until
2001, local elections took place every four years. Each of the parties would field one closed
list and citizens were allowed to cast one vote for their favored party list. Parties would
then be allocated seats in the council according to the Hare-Niemeyer procedure. All
candidates placed sufficiently high on their respective lists would receive a seat. However,
even if a party had a sufficiently large vote share to gain one or more seats in the council,
it would not receive a seat if its vote share was below five percent, i.e. there was an explicit
electoral threshold.
In 1999, the state parliament passed a law that fundamentally changed the rules that
governed local elections from 2001 onward (Kommunalwahlreform). First, the length of
the legislative period was extended from four to five years. Second, the law introduced
a new voting system called Kumulieren und Panaschieren. In this system, voters may
cast as many votes as there are seats available in the council. Up to three votes can be
cumulated and given to individual candidates. Alternatively, voters are allowed to give
all their votes to a certain party list, but they can also drop individual candidates from
the list. Seats to which a party is entitled according to the number of total list votes are
allocated to candidates according to their number of personal votes. That is, the original
ranking of candidates on the party lists can be changed by voters through personal votes.
While KUP consists of many individual aspects, its main feature was arguably this switch
from closed to open party lists. Third, the five percent electoral threshold was abolished.
Parties could enter the parliament if they surpassed the implicit threshold, i.e. if they had
sufficient votes to gain at least one seat.4
4It may be surprising that the state government implemented the Kommunalwahlreform as it ostensibly
disadvantaged the established parties, including those forming the state government. The main reason for
the reform was that voter turnout at local elections was continuously declining in Hesse during the 1990s,
threatening the legitimacy of the political process at this tier of government. The Kommunalwahlreform
was intended to reverse this trend by giving voters more choices and thus motivating them to participate
in the local elections.
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The abolishment of the five percent threshold had decidedly heterogeneous effects across
municipalities. It affected municipalities that had large municipal councils more strongly
because they have smaller implicit thresholds. First, the abolishment made it easier for
smaller parties to enter the council. In a council with e.g. 100 seats a vote share of around
0.5 percent would be sufficient for a party to gain its first council seat if there was no
five percent threshold.5 But if the council has for example only 20 seats, a party has to
receive around 2 to 3 percent of the votes to get a seat even if there is no explicit five
percent threshold. Therefore, the abolishment of the five percent threshold mattered less
for municipalities with smaller councils. This heterogeneity in treatment intensity forms
the core of our identification strategy below.
In addition to the effects of the electoral threshold’s abolishment, the effects of the
switch to KUP may also vary at the population cutoffs. In particular, party rebels may
be more likely to gain a seat in municipalities with larger councils, i.e. smaller implicit
thresholds, because they require fewer personal votes to change the parties’ pre-ordering
such that they receive a council seat. However, while this is a possibility, it seems unlikely
that the leadership of the mainstream parties would adjust council size to keep out party
rebels. The link between council size and the propensity of party rebels entering the council
is tenuous. For example, highly popular party rebels will end up very high on the final
list and thus gain a seat irrespective of the size of the council. Adjustments in council size
may thus only help to keep out party rebels with limited popularity in their municipality.
Furthermore, council size reductions are an imprecise instrument to keep party rebels out.
As the final ranking is uncertain due to KUP, a reduction in council size may end up
preventing a candidate aligned with the party leadership from entering the council rather
than a party rebel. For these reasons, it is likely that council size reductions are primarily
a response to the abolishment of the explicit electoral threshold and intended to keep out
smaller parties.
Finally, the lengthening of the legislative period had in all likelihood relatively limited
effects across municipalities. That is, it is plausible that any change in local officials’ strate-
gic incentives due to the lengthening of the legislative period did not vary discontinuously
with council size.
With the reform of 1999, the state legislature intended to improve the competitiveness
of smaller parties and new candidates and thereby foster political competition. Indeed,
given fixed voting patterns and fixed council sizes, having no legal electoral threshold
should mechanically increase the seat shares of smaller and decrease the seat share of
larger parties. In addition, voting patterns must not remain fixed (Moser and Scheiner,
2004). They will likely change such as to increase the seat shares of small parties even
further. Prior to the abolishment, supporters of small parties might have chosen to vote for
one of the more established parties if there was a non-negligible chance that their preferred
small party would fail to overcome the five percent threshold. Once the threshold was
5The actual value of the implicit threshold for a given party is endogenous and depends inter alia on
the vote shares of all other parties. Typically, a vote share that is sufficiently large for half a seat entitles
a party to a full seat in the council. See http://www.wahlrecht.de/kommunal/hessen.html.
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abolished, voting for their preferred small party became more worthwhile for this subset of
the electorate (Perea, 2002). In short, the abolishment had in all likelihood, in addition to
any mechanical effects, what is called psychological effects in the political science literature,
making the abolishment even more beneficial for smaller parties (Duverger, 1954; Fiva and
Folke, 2014).6
The switch to KUP, on the other hand, may have reduced incentives to vote for smaller
parties because of the increased within-party competition in the established parties. If
voters can vote for candidates that are not closely aligned with the local party elite, they
may have fewer incentives to switch to smaller parties. However, it is unclear to what
extent increased within-party competition prevents a switch of voters to smaller parties.
Even candidates that are not closely aligned with the party leadership and thus receive a
low rank on the list still have to be voted onto the list by party members in primaries.
Thus, there is a limit to the extent a party rebel can move away from the core positions
of the party if she wants a spot on the list. Voters who hold unorthodox political views
may thus prefer to vote for a small party that has become politically viable due to the
reform than to vote for a candidate from the established parties even if she is not part of
the traditional party elite.7
2.2.3 Council Size
In each legislative period, municipalities can choose the size of their council for the next
legislative period within certain ranges depending on population cutoffs that are defined
in the Hessian local government code (HGO).8 These cutoffs were not affected by the
electoral reform in 1999. Table 2.1 notes the minimum and maximum council sizes for
each population bracket according to the HGO.9 Municipalities must choose a council
size within the bracket that is relevant for them. Hence, a municipality with e.g. 1-3000
6In general, voters may vote for either instrumental or expressive reasons (Fiorina, 1976). The above
discussion implicitly assumes that voters vote at least in part for instrumental reasons. If voters voted for
expressive reasons only, the abolishment of the electoral threshold would arguably have no psychological
effects since whether a particular party is represented in the local council should not matter to expressive
voters. However, at the local level at least, it is plausible that a large share of voters engage in instrumental
voting. Thus, the abolishment of the electoral threshold likely motivated many supporters of smaller parties
to actually vote for these parties. The switch to KUP, on the other hand, may have had substantive effects
also on expressive voters. In particular, since parties likely became less important with the introduction
of open list, the benefits from voting for expressive reasons may decline. It is, however, unclear how such
changes to the incentives of expressive voters will affect electoral outcomes.
7We study the consequences of the reform for vote and seat outcomes in a companion paper (Baskaran
and Lopes da Fonseca, 2014). The results suggest that smaller parties indeed benefited from the reform
(see Chapter 3).
8See See Art. 38 of Hessian Local Government Code (Hessische Gemeindeordnung, HGO)
9The law states that council size brackets are determined by the latest available population data when
the date for next local election is fixed. This population data is not the same as the annual data published
by the state statistical office. For the elections of 2006 and 2011, we obtained the relevant data from the
homepage of the statistical office. For the previous elections, we collected the data by hand from various
issues of the Hessian government gazette.
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inhabitants must have at least 11 and at most 15 council seats while a municipality with
3001-5000 inhabitants must have at least 15 and at most 23 council seats
Table 2.1: Population Cutoffs and the Number of Seats.
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Fig 2.2: Average Council and Population size in Hesse. This figure depicts average council and population
sizes in Hessian municipalities during the sample period.
Up until one year before the next local election, the current council is allowed to change
the size of the next council with a two-third majority as long as final council size remains
within the ranges listed in Table 2.1. One way through which the established parties can
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therefore counteract the abolishment of the five percent threshold is to lower the size of
their council within the limits set by the HGO and thereby raise implicit thresholds for the
next council. Figure 2.2 plots the unweighted average council size in Hessian municipalities
over time. There is a clear break in the trend for council size in 1997. Before 1997, average
council sizes increase continuously. The reason for this continuous increase is presumably
that Hessian municipalities were witnessing positive population growth, as depicted in the
second plot in the graph, so that several municipalities were crossing the council size cutoffs
from below and therefore were allowed to adopt larger councils.10 From 1997 onward,
however, council size has been continuously declining even as population size has been
continuing to grow.11
The coinciding of the reform with the start of the decline in council size is suggestive.
However, it cannot be interpreted causally. For example, it is possible that even as av-
erage population size grew after 1997, those municipalities that reduced their council size
witnessed shrinking populations. One way to control for the effect of population growth
on changes in council size is to plot the development of average council size within each
of the population size brackets defined by the HGO. Figure 2.3 shows that before 2001,
essentially all municipalities chose the largest possible council size for their bracket, either
because local politicians wanted to maximize their chances of receiving a seat in the coun-
cil or because the wording in the relevant article of the local government code suggests
the highest possible council size as the default12, or both.13 There were also virtually no
adjustments from 1989 to 1997, which in turn suggests that the increasing average council
size in Hesse as documented in Figure 2.2 was indeed due to increasing population size.
The only exception is a small decline in average council size from 1993 to 1997 in the lowest
bracket. After 2001, however, average council sizes began to decline for all but the three
highest brackets (into which altogether only five large cities fall). For example, average
council sizes in municipalities that have between 50,001 and 100,000 inhabitants is about
3.5 seats smaller in 2011 than in 1997.
10Apart from “natural” demographic developments, the increase in population size of Hessian munici-
palities in the early nineties might be due to immigration from Eastern Germany following the German
Reunification.
11A plot for the weighted average council size, with population size as weights, shows the same pattern.
12Paragraph 1 of the relevant article states that the number of representatives in a municipalities should
be the maximum for each bracket as listed in Table 2.1. Paragraph 2 states that municipalities may choose
the council size listed for the previous bracket, or some uneven number in between.
13Two municipalities had larger council sizes than permissible given their population size (one had 4999
inhabitants and a council size of 31 and the other 9754 and a council size of 37) in 1989. We drop these
two observations from the sample. While we have no definite explanation, we suspect that these two
municipalities made use of an exception defined in the electoral law that allows municipalities that crossed
any of the thresholds from above to keep the council size intended for municipalities in the next higher
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Fig 2.3: Average Council Size in Different Population Brackets. This figure shows the average council size of municipalities in population brackets
1-3000 (1), 3001-5000 (2), 5001-10,000 (3), 10,001-25,000 (4), 25,001-50,000 (5), 50,001-100,000 (6), 100,001-250,000 (7), 250,001-500,000 (8), 500,001-1,000,000 (9) at
the beginning of each legislative period between 1989-2011.
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Yet, it would still be premature to relate the decline in council sizes causally to the
electoral reform. There might have been unobserved trends in Hesse that have caused
municipalities to reduce their council size after 1997 but which were not systematically
related to the electoral reform of 1999. For example, Hessian municipalities may have
encountered fiscal difficulties and cut council sizes to reduce costs. Alternatively, the
belief that smaller councils are more efficient might have gained traction throughout the
state for some unobserved reason after 1997. In short, the presence of unobserved trends
cannot be ruled out. Since all Hessian municipalities were affected by the reform, there
is also no obvious control group that would offer a counterfactual with which the causal
effect of the reform on council size could be easily identified. The following section is




To causally relate the reform of the electoral law to reductions in council size, we focus
on the abolishment of the five percent threshold. In particular, we rely on the fact that
the abolishment did not affect all Hessian municipalities equally. Municipalities that were
affected less offer a reasonable counterfactual for those that were affected more strongly,
as long as it can be ensured that both sets of municipalities were subject to similar trends.
As indicated by our previous discussion on implicit thresholds, municipalities with larger
councils were exposed to a stronger treatment because their implicit thresholds are lower
and thus smaller parties could enter the council more easily. Therefore, after 2001 munic-
ipalities with larger councils should have reduced their council size more than those with
small councils if the local political elite uses adjustments in council size to limit competition
from smaller parties.
In principle, we could compare changes in council size in municipalities that had in the
pre-treatment period large councils with changes in municipalities that had small councils
to uncover how local politicians react to an increase in the competitiveness of small parties.
There are, however, two problems with this approach. The first is that council size is
under the direct control of municipalities and therefore an endogenous variable. It is
hence questionable whether council size in the pre-treatment period can be used as an
exogenous explanatory variable. For example, municipalities where local politicians dislike
political competition might have chosen small councils already in the pre-treatment period
(even though this does not seem to be the case given the evidence in Figure 2.3), making
it more difficult to reduce council size further in the post-treatment period. Another
problem is that municipalities with different pre-treatment council sizes differed in other
characteristics as well, most clearly in their population size. It is hence possible that they
were subject to different trends, either with respect to their council size or with respect
to the political competitiveness of smaller parties. Municipalities that had larger councils
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in the pre-treatment period hence might have lowered their council size more strongly for
reasons unrelated to the reform.
Given these difficulties when using pre-treatment council size to determine treatment
intensity, we adopt the following research design. We rely on the fact that the probability
of a larger council increases discontinuously at the population cutoffs as defined in Table
2.1. Figure 2.3 shows that mean council size is indeed increasing between the different
brackets. Typically, municipalities choose the largest possible council size in the pre-
reform period. Even though the relationship between population size and council size is
fuzzy at the cutoffs, since the council size that municipalities to the left and the right of
each cutoff are allowed to overlap to some extent, it is clear that there is a positive and
discontinuous relationship between both variables. Therefore, the treatment intensity of
abolishing the five percent threshold will, in expectation, increase discontinuously at the
population cutoffs. More specifically, a given municipality with e.g. 3000 inhabitants will
be affected less by the abolishment of the electoral threshold than municipalities with 3001
inhabitants because the former will choose on average smaller councils and thus have larger
implicit thresholds in both the pre- and the post-treatment period.
Since treatment intensity increases in council size, and the probability of a larger council
increases discontinuously in population size, we can implement a fuzzy RDD (Lee and
Lemieux, 2010) using pre- and post-treatment data to identify the causal effect of the
abolishment of the electoral threshold. The basic idea is to estimate the effects of the
population cutoffs on council size for the pre- and post-treatment periods, and then to
observe whether there is a difference in the effect of the cutoffs between the two periods.
If the effect of the cutoffs has changed between the pre-and the post-treatment period, we
can reasonably ascribe the change to the reform of 1999.
In other words, we study whether municipalities that have population sizes barely above
either of the cutoffs defined in Table 2.1, and therefore in expectation discontinuously larger
councils, reduce their council size more strongly than municipalities with population sizes
barely below the cutoffs, and therefore discontinuously smaller councils. Since the RDD
relies on local randomization, this design implicitly accounts for differential trends between
municipalities that were exposed to stronger and weaker treatments.
More formally, the effect of a stronger treatment at M , the natural log of a given






where yi,t is council size in period t and γ̂
M
t is the estimate for the treatment effect.
NLPOP is the normalized value of the natural log of the relevant population figure such
that NLPOP = LPOP −M .




t Di + f(NLPOP ) +Dif(NLPOP ) + ǫi if |NLPOP | < h, (2.2)
where Di is a dummy that is 1 if NLPOP ≥ 0 and 0 else. f(NLPOP ) is a flexible
polynomial of normalized population size which is allowed to have different slopes to the
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left and right of a normalized cutoff M . This type of RDD model can be estimated by
local polynomial regression using different polynomials and bandwidths h.
An estimate for the effect of the abolishment of the electoral threshold on council size
is the difference in the treatment effects in the pre- and post-treatment period:




E[yi,t|NLPOP, t ≥ T ]− lim
NLPOPi↑0





E[yi,t|NLPOP, t < T ]− lim
NLPOPi↑0




where t ≥ T denotes the post- and t < T the pre-treatment period.
The corresponding model in a regression framework is:
yMi,t =f(NLPOP ) +Di(γ
M
t≥T + f(NLPOP )) + It(α + f(NLPOP ))
+Di(δ
MIt + Itf(NLPOP )) + ǫi,t if |NLPOP | < h,
(2.4)
where It is a dummy indicating the post-treatment period.
This specification is an extension of the standard RDD specified in Equation (2.2) and
is labeled diff-in-disc design by Grembi et al. (2015).14 It allows the control function to vary
both to the left and the right of the cutoff M , between the pre- and post-treatment periods,
and within treated municipalities in the pre- and post-reform periods. We are interested
in the estimate for δM which captures the change in the effect of the discontinuity at M
between the pre- and the post-treatment periods.
We motivated the RDD and diff-in-disc models above by referring to a single popula-
tion cutoff M . In our case, there are multiple cutoffs. Rather than analyzing all cutoffs
individually, we follow in the baseline regressions the previous literature that uses the
RDD methodology with multiple population cutoffs, and normalize all observations such
that they are around a single cutoff (Egger and Koethenbuerger, 2010). This approach
has the advantage of a larger sample size. In addition, the results can be presented more
compactly. In robustness tests, however, we also report results for individual cutoffs to
show that these results are consistent with our more compact baseline analysis.
We report results for various bandwidths around the normalized cutoff and polynomials
of the control function. More specifically, we use the following bandwidths: 0.25, 0.2, 0.15,
0.1, and 0.05.15 With respect to polynomials of normalized population size, we use up
to a cubic specification. To control for common trends in the pre- and post-treatment
period, we include legislative term fixed effects (rather than only dummies for the pre-
14Several studies have adopted a diff-in-disc design recently, for example Asatryan et al. (2015) or Gulino
(2014).
15We experimented with the data driven bandwidth selection procedure by Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012). However, this procedure was developed for cross-sectional RDD and may result in inappropriate
suggestions if the arbitrary initial bandwidth is wrong. In our application, it typically suggested unreason-
ably large optimal bandwidths. We therefore establish the robustness of the results by reporting estimates
for different bandwidths, ranging from relatively large (0.25) to relatively small (0.05).
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and post-treatment periods). We also follow the previous literature and include in all
regressions municipality fixed effects to improve efficiency and reduce finite sample bias
(Hoxby, 2000).16
The identifying assumptions in the diff-in-disc design are arguably less strict than in the
RDD. Notably, we do not require that there is no co-treatment at the cutoffs (Eggers et al.
(2015) show that co-treatment can be a major problem in standard RDD with population
thresholds). Instead, we only require that the effect of any co-treatments remains constant
between the pre- and post-treatment periods.17 For example, one particular reason for
potential co-treatment is that several of the cutoffs in Table 2.1 are relevant for equalization
transfers (Baskaran, 2015). However, the stipulations surrounding the intergovernmental
transfer scheme were not changed from the pre- to the post-treatment period, and thus
the effect of different transfers receipts at the population thresholds on council size should
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Fig 2.4: Manipulation of the Running Variable. This figure presents a density plot for the diff-in-disc design in
the spirit of McCrary plots (McCrary, 2008). We first divide normalized log population size in bins of width 0.01. Then we
calculate the change in the total number of observations within each bin from the pre- to the post-treatment period. Finally,
we fit local polynomial plots using a bandwidth of 0.05, a degree of 2, and a rectangular kernel to the number of changes
within bins. 95% confidence intervals are indicated in gray.
16Since the diff-in-disc design relies on local randomization, fixed effects are not necessary to obtain
consistent estimates. We indeed find that omitting fixed effects does not change the results substantively.
The estimates are, however, less significant and less stable across bandwidths, suggesting that including
fixed effects reduces their variability. Our preferred specification therefore includes fixed effects and we
focus on these results in the following.
17A different approach to deal with co-treatment when multiple cutoffs are available would be to rely on
a standard RDD while implementing various robustness tests that deal with potential co-treatment, e.g.
establishing that the results remain robust at those cutoffs where co-treatment can be credibly ruled out
or conducting appropriate placebo regressions (Arnold and Freier, 2015).
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The other crucial assumption is that the ability or incentives of municipalities to ma-
nipulate population size at the cutoff did not change from the pre- to the post-treatment
periods. This assumption appears plausible as it is unlikely that municipalities would
persistently misrepresent their population sizes only to avoid being forced to change their
council sizes. Moreover, given that most municipalities chose the highest possible council
size in the pre-treatment period, they were allowed to reduce their council sizes anyway
and therefore had no incentives for manipulation. Finally, a McCrary (2008) style density
plot18 reported in Figure 2.4 also fails to indicate that incentives for manipulation changed
from the pre- to the post-treatment period at the normalized cutoff.
2.3.2 Difference-in-discontinuities Plots
In addition to regression results, we also present graphical evidence on the treatment effect.
We construct RDD plots for the pre- and post-treatment periods and a diff-in-disc plot by
first dividing the control function, NLPOP , into bins of size 0.01 within a window of 0.25.
Then we calculate average council size y within each bin for the pre- and post-treatment
period, i.e. yb,t with the index b = 1, . . . , 50 denoting the bin and t = 0, 1 denoting the
pre- and the post-treatment period.
For the RDD plots, we smooth the observations with a local polynomial plot of quadratic
degree and a bandwidth of 0.25 at both sides of the normalized cutoff, using a rectangular
kernel. For the diff-in-disc plot, we first obtain the difference within each bin in the pre- and
post-treatment period ∆yb = (yb,1 − yb,0), then plot the differences in y against NLPOP
to the left- and the right of the normalized cutoff, and finally smooth the differences with
a local polynomial plot of quadratic degree and a bandwidth of 0.25 at both sides of the
normalized cutoff, using a rectangular kernel and the number of observations within each
bin as frequency weights.
2.4 Baseline Results
2.4.1 Graphical Evidence
Figure 2.5 presents the graphical evidence. Subfigure (a) shows the effect of the normalized
threshold on council size in the pre-treatment period. There is a large positive disconti-
nuity. Municipalities to the left of the normalized threshold have councils that are about
18Standard McCrary plots are inappropriate for our design as we are interested in the difference of the
effect at the normalized population cutoff in the pre- and the post-treatment period. The idea underlying
our diff-in-disc variant of the McCrary plot is that if either the ability or the incentives for manipulation
changed at the cutoff from the pre- to the post-treatment period, we should observe a discontinuity in the
changes in the number of observations close to the cutoff. More specifically, assume that because of the
treatment, municipalities systematically start to (mis-) report lower population sizes in order to be able to
reduce their council size. Then the increase in observations just below the normalized cutoff from the pre-
to the post-treatment period should be significantly higher than the increase in observations just above
the threshold.
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8.4 seats larger than municipalities to the left. Subfigure (b) shows the effect of the nor-
malized threshold in the post-treatment period. There is still a positive discontinuity, but
it is markedly smaller. Average council size to the right of the threshold is only about 4.7
seats higher than to the right. Finally, subfigure (c) presents the diff-in-disc plot, which
explicitly plots the change in the effect of the normalized threshold from the pre- to the
post-treatment period. There is a negative discontinuity of about 4.1 seats. Hence, mu-










































Fig 2.5: Council Size. This figure shows standard RDD plots for the pre- and post-treatment periods, subfigure (a) and
(b), and a diff-in-disc plot, subfigure (c), for council size. Observations are averaged within bins of size 0.01. The polynomial
plots are constructed using a rectangular kernel, a degree of 2, a bandwidth of 0.25, and the number of observations within
bins as frequency weights. 95% confidence intervals are indicated in gray.
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2.4.2 Regression Results
In Table 2.2 we collect the regression results. Consistent with the graphical evidence,
the effect of abolishment is consistently negative and significant for almost all bandwidths
and polynomials. Council size after the abolishment decreases in municipalities that were
exposed to a stronger treatment by about 3 to 4 seats. The weighted average increase in
treatment strength, i.e. the decline in the implicit electoral threshold, at the normalized
population threshold is around 0.46.19 Scaled by the average increase in treatment intensity,
these estimates imply that municipalities reduce the size of their council by about 7 to 8
seats after the abolishment of the five percent hurdle for every percent point lower implicit
threshold. According to back of the envelope calculations, reducing the council size from
e.g. 23 to 15 members increases implicit thresholds from about 2.2 to about 3.3 percentage
points20, i.e. by about 50%. This increase in implicit thresholds is presumably sufficiently
large to keep several small parties out of the council that would otherwise have been entitled
to a seat.
Table 2.2: Number of Council Seats.
BW=0.25 BW=0.2 BW=0.15 BW=0.1 BW=0.05
Linear -2.361*** -2.607*** -3.227*** -3.937*** -4.309***
(0.389) (0.453) (0.472) (0.592) (0.847)
Quadratic -3.130*** -3.848*** -4.185*** -4.266*** -3.531***
(0.581) (0.634) (0.710) (0.873) (1.239)
Cubic -4.323*** -4.526*** -4.552*** -4.450*** -3.020*
(0.762) (0.823) (0.931) (1.150) (1.656)
N 1770 1416 1079 723 369
Notes: This table presents diff-in-disc regressions for the size of the council (number of seats). All population cutoffs at
which council size is allowed to change are analyzed simultaneously by normalizing population size. Estimates for the average
treatment effect of abolishing the election threshold are reported for different bandwidths (0.25, 0.2, 0.15, 0.1, 0.05) and
increasingly flexible polynomials (linear to cubic) of normalized log population size. All models include municipality and
legislative term fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars
indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
19Crossing the population threshold at 3001 from below implies on average a reduction in the implicit
threshold from about 3.33 to about 2.17 percentage points, assuming that all municipalities choose the
highest possible council size. Hence, the intensity of treatment from abolishing the explicit threshold
increases by around 1.16 percentage points at the 3001 threshold (recall that the implicit threshold for the
first seat is a sufficiently large vote share to gain half a seat) At the next threshold of 5001, the implicit
threshold decreases from around 2.17 to around 1.61 percentage points. The intensity of treatment increases
by around 0.56 percentage points. The same argument applies for all further thresholds. We weight the
increase in treatment strength at each threshold with the number of observations within each population
bracket when calculating the average size of the treatment.
20Note that there is no exact formula for implicit thresholds. For the above calculations, we assume that
parties are entitled to a seat if they have enough votes for “half a seat”.
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2.5 Robustness Tests and Extensions
2.5.1 Placebo Tests
As a first set of placebo tests, we let the treatment set in at fake cutoffs and compare the
estimated effects with those estimated at the correct cutoff. If the coefficient estimates in
these placebo tests are significant, it is possible that municipalities adjusted their council
size for reasons other than that the abolishment of the electoral threshold. We define Di
in Equation (2.4) such that it is 1 if NLPOP = −2,−1, 0, 1, 2 (NLPOP = 0 indicates
the true threshold). We estimate the regressions for all combinations of bandwidths and
polynomials reported in the baseline estimates. To save space, we summarize the results
in graphs.
The structure of the plot in Figure 2.6 is as follows. For each fake cutoff, we plot
the 15 coefficient estimates obtained by combining the bandwidths and bin sizes used in
the baseline regressions and indicate their median value. We find that the placebo tests
confirm the baseline estimates. The average coefficient estimate at the fake cutoffs revolves
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Fig 2.6: Placebo Treatments with Fake Cutoffs. This figure shows coefficient estimates of the diff-in-disc model
for council size with placebo treatments. The size of the dots indicates the standard error of each estimate. The median
estimates are indicated with red dots. The cutoffs are redefined such that treatment sets in at NLPOP= -2, -1, 1, 2. For
comparison, the coefficient estimates at the true threshold of 0 are also indicated.
As a second set of placebo tests, we let the treatment set in at a fake treatment year.
More specifically, we limit the sample to the pre-treatment period (1989-1997) and let the
treatment set in 1993. If the treatment effect in the baseline regressions is not due to
the reform but due to pre-existing trends, these placebo estimates should be significantly
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Fig 2.7: Placebo Treatment for Fake Treatment Year. This figure shows coefficient estimates of the diff-in-
disc model with a placebo treatment defined to set in 1993. The sample covers the period 1989-1997. The size of the dots
indicates the standard error of each estimate. The median estimate at the fake treatment year is indicated with a red dot.
The median estimate at the true treatment year is indicated with a blue dot.
negative. We collect the results in Figure 2.7. The median coefficient at the fake cutoffs is
indicated in red. For comparison, we also indicate the median estimate at the true cutoff
with a blue dot. The estimates at the fake treatment year are close to 0, in contrast to the
median estimate at the true threshold. Hence, these placebo regressions, too, confirm the
baseline results.
2.5.2 Event-study Plot
Another way to evaluate whether the treatment effect found in the baseline regressions
is due to pre-existing trends is to conduct an analysis in the spirit of an event-study.
Consequently, we run traditional RDD regressions for each election year separately and
estimate how the normalized cutoff is related to council size in each year. Given our
baseline results, we expect the RDD coefficients for the 2001 election to be substantially
smaller than the RDD coefficients for the 1997 election. If there were pre-existing trends,
however, we should also observe declining RDD coefficients from 1989 to 1993 and from
1993 to 1997. A persistent decline in the RDD coefficients up to the 2001 election would
suggest that at least part of the estimated treatment effect for the reform in 2001 is due
pre-existing trends.
More formally, we estimate Equation (2.2) separately for t = 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001,
2006, 2011. We estimate the model for the bandwidths and polynomials used for the
baseline estimates. To save space, we again collect the results in a graph. Figure 2.8
reports for each election year the 15 coefficients estimates for the various bandwidths
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and polynomials. The size of circles indicates the standard errors. We indicate the median
coefficient estimate with a red dot. We observe a small decline in the median RDD estimate
from 1989 to 1993. A large number of estimated coefficients for 1989 are also quite large, but
they are estimated imprecisely. The small decline from 1989 to 1993 in the RDD coefficients
is presumably a statistical artifact due to a changing composition of treatment and control
groups between the two elections. Given the substantial change in population size during
this time period in Hesse (see Figure 2.2), some municipalities that were located below the
normalized threshold in 1989 probably transitioned above the threshold in 1993, which in
turn might affect the RDD coefficient estimates. Other explanations, especially deliberate
responses of the established parties to some political events, are less likely because the
descriptive evidence in Figure 2.3 indicates that almost all municipalities chose the highest
possible council sizes both in 1989 and in 1993. That local politicians deliberately reduced
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Fig 2.8: Event-study Plot. This figure shows coefficient estimates of traditional RDD regressions for all elections
from 1989 to 2011. The size of the dots indicates the standard error of each estimate. The median estimate for each election
is indicated with a red dot.
We find no decline in the RDD coefficient from 1993 to 1997. In 2001, there is, as
expected, a substantial drop in the coefficient estimates. This drop persists to the 2006
election. By 2011, however, the RDD coefficient is as large as in 1993 and 1997. Chapter
3, shows that even though selected smaller parties benefited from the abolishment of the
electoral threshold – i.e. they saw a significant increase in their vote and seat shares – over-
all council fragmentation did not increase significantly (Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca,
2014). It is hence possible that the established parties, having observed for two consecutive
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elections that consequences of the electoral reform were manageable, decided to expand
the council size again before the 2011 election.21
Overall, there was a significant decline in the effect of the normalized discontinuity on
council size just around the “event” of the reform in 2001. Furthermore, in the election
immediately before and after the 2001 election, we observe no significant decline in the
RDD coefficients. These results hence indicate that the treatment effect found in the
baseline regressions was not due to pre-existing trends.
2.5.3 Individual Cutoffs
Are the baseline estimates driven by only selected cutoffs? Does the effect of the various
cutoffs on council size differ? To answer these questions, we report results for the four
smallest individual cutoffs. For compactness and since sample sizes are smaller, we only
report results for specifications with a relatively large bandwidth of 0.25.
Table 2.3: Individual Population Cutoffs.
T=3001 T=5001 T=10,001 T=25,001
Linear -0.219 -3.529*** -2.358*** -3.853***
(0.472) (0.707) (0.637) (1.026)
Quadratic -0.484 -4.147*** -3.459*** -6.367***
(0.572) (1.013) (0.886) (1.311)
Cubic 0.847 -5.712*** -3.303*** -8.199***
(0.574) (1.326) (1.176) (1.864)
N 375 571 554 200
Notes: This table presents diff-in-disc regressions at the following individual population cutoffs: 3001, 5001, 10,001, and
25,001. Estimates for the average treatment effect of abolishing the election threshold are reported for a bandwidth of 0.25
and linear to cubic polynomials of normalized log population size. All models include municipality and legislative term
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the municipality and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate
significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
The results are collected in Table 2.3. We find for all cutoffs except the first that the
coefficient estimates are consistently negative and significant. That we observe no effects
at the lowest cutoff is plausible if politicians in smaller municipalities have little leeway or
interest to reduce the council size. In particular, local politicians in small municipalities
might feel that they may harm their own chances of winning a seat too much if they reduce
the size of the council further. At the 5001 and 10,001 cutoffs, we observe significant but
fairly moderate reductions: the coefficient estimates are largely between 2 to 5. At the
25,001 inhabitants threshold, we observe somewhat stronger effects. The treatment effect
is between 4 to 8.
21A much more thorough description of the electoral consequences of the reform can be found in Chapter
3 or Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca (2014).
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2.5.4 Percent Changes
One further concern with the baseline estimates is that municipalities to the right of the
normalized cutoff might appear to cut more seats in absolute terms than those to the left
even if the abolishment of the electoral threshold was irrelevant when there are common
trends that lead to the same relative reductions at the left and the right of the cutoffs.
That is, the relative decline in council size to the left and the right of the normalized
cutoff might be the same even if the decline in absolute terms is larger. To account for
this concern, we estimate the baseline models with the log of council size as dependent
variable, which allows for a percentage interpretation. The results are collected in Table
2.4. They show that the percentage decline at the normalized cutoff, too, is significantly
negative. More specifically, council sizes declined by about 10 to 15 percent more to the
right of the normalized threshold than to the left after the abolishment of the five percent
threshold.
Table 2.4: Number of Council Seats (log).
BW=0.25 BW=0.2 BW=0.15 BW=0.1 BW=0.05
Linear -0.073*** -0.083*** -0.100*** -0.124*** -0.141***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.031)
Quadratic -0.097*** -0.119*** -0.138*** -0.146*** -0.105**
(0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.034) (0.051)
Cubic -0.139*** -0.153*** -0.160*** -0.148*** -0.079
(0.028) (0.031) (0.036) (0.046) (0.065)
N 1770 1416 1079 723 369
Notes: This table presents diff-in-disc regressions for the log of the size of the council (log number of seats). All population
cutoffs at which council size is allowed to change are analyzed simultaneously by normalizing population size. Estimates for
the average treatment effect of abolishing the election threshold are reported for different bandwidths (0.25, 0.2, 0.15, 0.1,
0.05) and increasingly flexible polynomials (linear to cubic) of normalized log population size. All models include municipality
and legislative term fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars
indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
2.5.5 Effect Heterogeneity
An interesting question is whether the treatment effects vary according to the composition
of the council. Do councils where the two large mainstream parties (the CDU and SPD)
together have a majority, either absolute or two-thirds, decrease council sizes more? Does
the difference in the seat share between the two largest parties – whichever they may
be – in the council matter? Do municipalities where the free voters’ associations have a
substantial presence in the council react differently than other municipalities? To explore
these questions, we interact the treatment dummy in Equation (2.4) with various variables
that measure the composition of the current council. The basic model we estimate is as
follows:
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yMi,t =f(NLPOP ) + ζVi,t +Di(γ
M
t≥T + f(NLPOP )) + It(α + f(NLPOP ))
+Di(It(δ
M + κVi,t) + Itf(NLPOP )) + ǫi,t if |NLPOP | < h,
(2.5)
where Vi,t indicates various measures for the composition of the council before the election
held in t. All other variables are defined as in Equation (2.4). If the effect varies with the
composition of the council, the estimate for κ should be significant.
Table 2.5: Heterogeneous Effects.
BW=0.25 BW=0.2 BW=0.15 BW=0.1 BW=0.05
Linear -1.302*** -1.532*** -1.720*** -1.768*** -2.175**
(0.331) (0.364) (0.366) (0.456) (1.090)
Quadratic -1.209*** -1.393*** -1.581*** -1.772*** -2.234**
(0.330) (0.330) (0.361) (0.446) (1.123)
Cubic -1.198*** -1.369*** -1.597*** -1.765*** -2.487**
(0.298) (0.324) (0.353) (0.453) (1.207)
N 1770 1416 1079 723 369
Notes: This table presents estimates from diff-in-disc regressions for an interaction variable between the dummy indicating
the normalized threshold and a dummy indicating whether the CDU and SPD have jointly an absolute majority (i.e. whether
CDU seat share + SPD seat share ≥ 50%) in the council. All population cutoffs at which council size is allowed to change
are analyzed simultaneously by normalizing population size. Estimates for the interaction effect are reported for different
bandwidths (0.25, 0.2, 0.15, 0.1, 0.05) and increasingly flexible polynomials (linear to cubic) of normalized log population
size. All models include municipality and legislative term fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level
and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
As proxies for Vi,t, we have experimented with various variables, including a dummy for
whether the CDU and SPD together have an absolute majority, a dummy for whether these
two parties together have a two-third majority, and whether the free voters’ associations
have a substantial presence. We have also experimented with variables that account for
the difference in the seat share of the two largest parties in the council, whichever they
may be, and variables that capture whether the largest party has an absolute majority.
We found a significant interaction effect only for one specification: when we used a dummy
for whether the CDU and SPD together have an absolute majority. Table 2.5 reports the
estimates for interaction effects for this specification. The results suggest that the decline
in council size is more pronounced when the two large mainstream parties have an absolute
majority.22
It is curious that we find significant interaction effects for joint CDU and SPD absolute
majorities but insignificant ones for two-third majorities, even though a two-third majority
is required to change council size. If there are differences in the size of the treatment effect,
we should expect them to be particularly pronounced at the two-third majority threshold.
It is possible, however, that an absolute majority is already sufficient for the large parties
22Results for the other interaction models are omitted.
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to push through a change in council size. That is, an absolute majority gives the large
parties a veto over council decisions. It is hence possible that the remaining parties are
willing to trade their support for a reduction in council size against concessions in other
areas.23
2.6 Validity of the Identification Strategy
2.6.1 Direct Election of the Mayor
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, another important reform occurred in Hesse at the local
level in the early nineties: the introduction of direct elections for the mayoral office. Before
1993, mayors in all municipalities were appointed by the council. After 1993, municipalities
switched to direct elections of the mayor. The transition to the new system for mayoral
elections was staggered, with some municipalities switching immediately while others re-
taining their appointed mayors for a few years. It is possible that the switch may have
affected municipalities differently along the population thresholds for council size. Hence,
it may not be possible to separately identify the effect of the abolishment of the electoral
threshold from the effect of the electoral rule for the mayor.
However, there is no good reason why the switch in how to choose the mayor should
affect council size, and even less so why any effect should vary along the population thresh-
olds. Second, the mayoral office, as described above, continued to be relatively unimportant
even after the switch to direct elections, and thus any effects of the switch on council size or
other political variables should be limited. Finally, all municipalities had switched to direct
elections of the mayor by 1998. It is therefore unlikely that the effects of the switch to
direct elections, even if they differed between municipalities at the population thresholds,
persisted to the period after the implementation of the Kommunalwahlreform.
2.6.2 Other Elements of the Kommunalwahlreform
Lengthening of the legislative period
We interpret the negative treatment effect as evidence that the mainstream parties reduced
council size to offset a perceived increase in the competitiveness of smaller parties. There
might be other explanations. One possible alternative explanation is that voters demanded
a reduction in council size following the reform because of the lengthening of the legislative
23Another interesting question, as indicated above, is whether municipalities where the free voters’
associations have a substantial presence react differently to the electoral reform than municipalities where
they have only a marginal presence. We explore this issue with the same specification as above. We use
various thresholds to define “substantial presence”, i.e. a seat share of 5%, 10%, 15%, or 20% in the
council. We also estimated models where we simply interacted the seat share of the voter initiatives in
the previous legislative period with the treatment dummy. However, none of these specifications suggest
that municipalities respond differently to the treatment depending on whether the free voters’ associations
have a substantial presence.
29
The Political Economy of Electoral Reforms
period from four to five years. That is, the lengthening of the representatives’ terms of
office may have led to demands for fewer representatives. Politicians, in turn, may have
found it easier to reduce council size if councils were larger to begin with.
While we cannot explicitly test whether the reductions in council sizes are ultimately
due to an attempt by the large parties to limit electoral competition or due to voter
demands since we do not observe voters’ preferences regarding their preferred council size
nor the politicians’ true motive to reduce the number of seats in the council, it is more
plausible that council size was reduced to limit political competition. It is unlikely that
the lengthening of the legislative period, a minor aspect of the reform, would have led to
so much more vociferous calls from voters for council size reductions to the right of a given
population cutoff than to the left, that it would force representatives to implement these
reductions. Second, a two-third majority in the council is necessary for a change in council
size. It seems unlikely that even if the voters demanded a reduction in council size, these
demands were so strong to enforce coalitions across party lines. Third, we observe that
council size already declines in 2001, i.e. the first election after the reform. Given that
the reform law passed the state parliament in 1999, there were at most two years in which
council sizes could be changed. Even if voters demanded smaller councils, it is unlikely
their demands would be sufficiently pronounced and well articulated to effect concrete
actions by the representatives within this relatively short time period.
Further Effects of Kumulieren and Panaschieren
Another, and arguably the most important, element of the Kommunalwahlreform was the
switch to KUP. As discussed above, this switch likely increased the competitiveness of party
rebels and may provide further incentives for the established parties to reduce council size
to limit political competition. However, while the leadership of the established parties
may indeed adopt measures to disadvantage party rebels following the switch to KUP, it is
unlikely that reductions in council size would be one of these measures for reasons outlined
above.
Nevertheless, the switch to KUP entails further aspects which may suggest a different
interpretation for the regression results. First, besides the introduction of open lists, KUP
allowed voters to cast as many votes as seats are available in the council. While the
substantive effect of this second aspect of KUP should be small as the votes per seat
remain constant at the population cutoffs, it may bring the size of their councils to the
voters’ attention. Before the reform, voters may have been unaware how large their council
actually is. Realizing the size of their council due to this second aspect of KUP, voters
may then demand a smaller council, particularly in those municipalities that have large
councils, i.e. that are to the right of the cutoffs.
While this would provide an alternative interpretation for our regression results, it is
unlikely that this is the main reason why council sizes decline more in municipalities with
larger councils. First, established parties could always counter voter complaints about
too large councils by pointing out that they are merely following the HGO. As discussed
above, the wording in the HGO suggests the maximum council size as the default. Second,
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any possible reduction in council size is limited. For example, a municipality with a
population size between 10,001 and 25,000 could at most reduce its council sizes from 37
seats to 31 seats. It is unlikely that such a reduction will mollify those voters who are
sufficiently outraged about the size of their council to have their votes swayed. Finally,
as also mentioned in the previous subsection, it is unlikely that the various parties in
the council agree with a two-third majority to reduce council sizes, thereby reducing the
number of seats they can gain, only due to a diffuse concern that voters may favor smaller
councils.
The second competing explanation for the diff-in-disc results is the following. Given
that voters can cast as many votes as seats are available in the council after the switch to
KUP, municipalities may have tried to provide voters with a “nice” number of votes, i.e.
a number divisible by 10 or 5. But since practically all municipalities chose the highest
possible council size in the pre-treatment period, municipalities had only the option of
reducing council size to get at such “nice” numbers. However, an attempt to achieve a
“nice” number of votes is unlikely the reason for the council size reductions. We find that
there is no clustering at “nice” numbers after the reform. This absence of clustering at
such numbers is in fact expected as according to the HGO, the number of seats in the
council must be uneven.
2.7 Conclusion
We ask in this paper whether politicians from established parties adopt measures to dis-
advantage new political actors once they become a viable political alternative. To study
this question, we exploit a reform in the German federal state of Hesse that improved the
competitiveness of smaller parties and party rebels for exogenous reasons. The impact of
one aspect of the reform, the abolishment of an electoral threshold, varied discontinuously
between municipalities with different population sizes. Thus, we can implement a Diff-
in-Disc design to identify how established politicians responded to the abolishment. One
straightforward measure that established politicians can adopt is to decrease the size of the
council. In smaller councils, implicit thresholds are lower, and hence particularly smaller
parties will find it more difficult to gain legislative representation.24 The results suggest
that municipalities which had on average smaller implicit thresholds because they were to
the right of a certain population cutoff indeed reduced their council size more.
The substantial effects on council size we find are particularly remarkable because local
politicians should typically prefer, in line with the literature on pork barrel politics (Shepsle
and Weingast, 1981), to have large councils in order to maximize their number of seats.
That the established parties in the Hessian setting in principle share this preference is
reflected by the fact that in the pre-treatment period, municipalities consistently chose
24As mentioned above, it is also possible that party rebels are less competitive in smaller councils, thus
potentially providing further incentives for the leadership of the established parties to reduce council size.
However, for reasons also outlined above we believe this is a less plausible reason why council sizes would
decline after the reform.
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the largest possible council size. But it appears that preventing new political actors from
entering the council is even more important to them than maximizing their number of
council seats. There may be various reasons why they may be willing to forgo some seats
only to keep out new entrants. First, they may have genuinely believed that increased
legislative fragmentation due to the entry of new parties may make it harder to govern
a municipality as it becomes more difficult to form stable coalitions. Alternately, they
may have been concerned that any new entrants may disturb “old boys” networks and
complicate rent seeking since the new entrants may become privy to any backroom deals
or other questionable behavior. The established local politicians could have sacrificed a few
seats in order to avoid this type of outside scrutiny. Third, established politicians could
also have been worried that once some small party enters the council with a few seats, it
may use these seats as a platform for future election campaigns, developing in the long-run
into a potent electoral threat. The established parties may have been so worried about
such long-term threats that they were willing to forgo some seats in the short-run.
From a policy perspective, our findings imply that the chances of new political actors
to graduate into the political mainstream are possibly even lower than commonly believed.
Established parties appear to erect additional barriers once new political actors improve
their electoral prospects. Given the potentially positive implications of political compe-
tition, endogenous adjustments of political institutions to disadvantage new actors might
be perceived as problematic.25 On the other hand, of course, it is also possible to make
the case that erecting barriers to entry into the mainstream increases the stability of the
political system. The measures taken by the established parties in Hesse in the aftermath
of the Kommunalwahlreform and, more generally, attempts of established parties to limit
the electoral prospects of new political actors, should ultimately be viewed through the
lens of how political competition affects economic and social outcomes. Theoretically, the
effect seems ambiguous (Lizzeri and Persico, 2005). To further explore this question is an
interesting and important avenue for future research.
25However, we document in the following chapter that the reduction in council sizes did at least not
harm the smaller parties too much (Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca, 2014). Municipalities where implicit
thresholds were lower saw a significant increase in the vote and seat shares of smaller parties.
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Electoral Thresholds and Political Outcomes∗
3.1 Introduction
At the core of any electoral system is a trade-off between political representation and
legislative cohesion. While majoritarian systems often ensure that only a small number of
parties are able to achieve legislative representation, countries with proportional electoral
rules (PR) are by default more prone to fragmented party systems (Duverger, 1954; Rae,
1971). PR systems thus often call for alternative electoral rules to limit the effective
number of parties (Rokkan, 1968). Many countries rely on legal electoral thresholds for
this purpose. Legal thresholds entail that a party may only receive seats in parliament if
its overall vote share is above some fixed and relatively high value.
Recently, many countries have held acrimonious debates about the benefits and draw-
backs of electoral thresholds.1 Against this backdrop, it is important to obtain credible
causal evidence on their political effects. However, existing studies overwhelmingly use
cross-country variation and employ empirical methodologies that rely on selection on ob-
servables which may lead to biased estimates due to omitted variables.2
To fill this gap in the literature, we revisit the question of whether electoral thresholds
have a causal effect on political outcomes relying on credible sources of exogenous variation:
an institutional reform in the German state of Hesse that involved the abolishment of the
five percent legal electoral threshold for local elections as of 2001 combined with a state law
∗This chapter originates from joint work with Thushyanthan Baskaran (see Baskaran and Lopes da
Fonseca (2014)).
1In fact, several countries recently adjusted their thresholds. In 2014, Germany’s federal constitutional
court ruled the three percent electoral threshold for European Union elections unconstitutional. In New
Zealand, the Electoral Commission recommended the party vote share threshold to be lowered from five
to four percent. In Israel, on the other hand, the electoral threshold for the Knesset (national parliament)
continually increased ever since the country was founded; the highest increase occurred as recently as April
2014.
2See e.g. Calvo and Micozzi (2005) Gebethner (1997) or Carey and Hix (2011). An exception is Vatter
(2003) who uses subnational data at the level of the Swiss Cantons and finds that legal electoral thresholds
have no effect on the number of parties represented in parliament. Second, Pellicer and Wegner (2014)
find significant mechanical and psychological effects of local electoral thresholds in Morocco. However, a
limitation of their analysis is that they have only data on seats but not on votes.
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that discontinuously maps population to council size. As implicit electoral thresholds vary
with council size, we can use the heterogeneity in how strongly the abolishment affected
individual municipalities to identify the causal effect of electoral thresholds on party seat
and vote shares with a difference-in-discontinuities design (diff-in-disc) (Grembi et al.,
2015). Our estimates suggest that the vote and seat shares of small parties increased in
municipalities that were affected more strongly by the abolishment while the seat share
of large parties decreased accordingly. These results imply that the reform had strong
psychological effects on voters.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Local Politics
Hesse is divided into 426 municipalities. The most important local political institutions is
the municipal council.3 Municipal council elections take place at the same date statewide
with the electoral districts encompassing municipalities as a whole.
Several parties participate in local elections. We divide the contesting parties into three
categories: large, medium, and small. We define the seat and vote share of large parties
as the aggregate seat and vote share, respectively, of the two largest national parties,
the center-right CDU and the center-left SPD. These two parties usually received around
30% of the votes in national and state elections during the sample period. The seat and
vote shares of medium parties is the aggregate seat and vote share of the smaller national
parties: the market liberal FPD and the environmentalist Green Party. These two parties
usually received up to 10% of the votes in national and state elections during the sample
period and were well established in the political mainstream.
Finally, many local and several very small national parties run in municipal elections.
We refer to this group of parties as small since they often struggled with the five per-
cent threshold. However, among these small parties, municipal specific voter initiatives
(Wahlvereinigigungen), are popular in some municipalities and often receive a substantial
fraction of the votes.4 As there are many small parties, we define in the following the seat
and vote share of small parties simply as 100% minus the seat or vote shares of the large
and medium parties, respectively.
3.2.2 The Kommunalwahlreform
In 1999 the Hessian State Parliament passed a reform that changed the rules governing local
elections from 2001 onwards, i.e. the Kommunalwahlreform. One of the main features of
3The other important institution is the mayor. Even though Hessian mayors are directly elected since
the mid-nineties, the most important municipal decisions are still made by the local council. See Hessami
(2014) for details on the mayoral office in Hesse.
4Note that the label “small” is therefore not always accurate. We use this label for simplicity, but in
some cases the “small” parties, especially the voter initiatives, can be quite large. In fact, “small” should
be understood as a shorthand for “party that is not important at the national level”.
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the reform was the abolishment of the five percent explicit electoral threshold for municipal
council elections. Parties can now enter the council as long as their vote share is sufficient to
gain at least one seat. In addition, the reform entailed the extension of the legislative period
from four to five years and the introduction of a new voting system called Kumulieren und
Panaschieren, which was essentially a shift from closed to open lists.5
Unlike the last two elements of the reform, which arguably affected all municipalities
equally, the abolishment of the threshold had decidedly heterogeneous effects.6 This het-
erogeneity results from the existence of intrinsic implicit thresholds in municipal councils,
as parties still need to gain a minimum vote share in order to gain their first seat. Implicit
thresholds vary throughout municipalities depending on the total number of seats in the
municipal council.7 Council size, in turn, is by law a positive and discontinuous (albeit
“fuzzy”) function of municipal population size (see Table 2.1).8 Consequently, implicit
thresholds decrease and treatment intensity increases in expectation exogenously and dis-
continuously at the population cutoffs. This heterogeneity in treatment intensity forms
the core of our identification strategy.
3.2.3 Hypotheses
It is plausible that the electoral reform benefited the smaller parties, particularly in mu-
nicipalities with lower implicit thresholds. First, abolishing a threshold should have a
5Specifically, in the old system each voter cast one vote for their preferred party list. In the new system,
each voter can cast as many votes as there are seats in the council for individual candidates and thus affect
their within-party list ranking.
6As mentioned previously, the absolute number of votes that can be cast increases with the number of
seats in the council. One important assumption for our empirical design is that the increase in the number
of available votes as council sizes increase has no significantly heterogeneous effects on voters’ incentives.
This is a plausible assumption as the number of votes per seat, which is arguably a more important variable
for voters than the total number of votes, remains constant across municipalities with different council
sizes. Moreover, any heterogeneous effect of the different number of votes is arguably less important than
the heterogeneous effect arising from the different implicit thresholds.
7The actual value of an implicit threshold for a given party is endogenous and depends inter
alia on the vote shares of all other parties and the seat allocation formula. In this context, the
seat allocation formula is the largest remainder method (Hare-Niemeyer). Thus, a vote share that
is sufficiently large for half a seat typically entitles a party to a full seat in the council. See
http://www.wahlrecht.de/kommunal/hessen.html. Taagepera (2007, p. 243) presents formulas for
implicit thresholds, deriving in particular inclusion (minimum vote share necessary to gain the first seat)
and exclusion thresholds (maximum vote share until which the first seat can be denied), for various seat
allocation formulas. He also presents a formula for an overall average estimate of an implicit threshold,
i.e. : T = 75%/(M + 1), with M being the number of seats in a district (Taagepera, 2007, p. 241).
Accordingly, as the whole municipality is a district in Hessian municipalities, the implicit threshold in
municipalities with councils that have 15 seats is about 4.7% and in municipalities with 93 seats about
0.8%.
8The fuzziness of the relationship between population size and council size is due to the legal stipulation
that municipalities may choose the (smaller) council size intended for the previous population bracket.
However, in practice we observe discontinuously increasing council sizes at the cutoffs (see Section 3.A.1
of the Appendix to Chapter 3 for details).
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mechanical effect on the seat share of smaller parties. That is, assuming that voting pat-
terns remain the same, the absence of an explicit threshold should allow more marginal
parties to enter the council in municipalities with more council seats and thus lower im-
plicit thresholds. Taagepera (2007, 2008), for example, shows theoretically that implicit
thresholds and the number of effective parties depends systematically on the size of the
legislature.
Yet, there may be further effects. With a threshold, supporters of smaller parties may
have preferred to vote for a larger party as a second best option, i.e. they may have
anticipated that their vote would be effectively lost if they cast it for a smaller party
that was unlikely to pass the electoral threshold (Perea, 2002). Once the legal threshold
was abolished, smaller parties may have become a more viable electoral alternative in
municipalities with lower implicit thresholds. Thus, a section of voters may have switched
allegiance from a less-preferred large to their preferred small party for psychological reasons
(Moser and Scheiner, 2004; Fiva and Folke, 2014), thereby amplifying any mechanical
effects. In addition, individuals that previously abstained, anticipating that their preferred
small party would not enter the council, might now participate in the election, increasing
the vote and seat shares of smaller parties further (Perea, 2002). Overall, such psychological
effects may be very important – indeed, legal thresholds and other electoral rules that
increase the disproportionality of a voting system and thereby mechanically disadvantage
smaller parties are introduced not only for their mechanical effects as such, but also because
they are expected to possibly have even larger psychological effects (Moser and Scheiner,
2012).9
On the other hand, countervailing psychological effects may be also at work. With
respect to voter participation, some supports of smaller parties might now lack the incentive
to go to the polls, as smaller parties no longer need to overcome the five percent threshold
to enter the council. Such a response would reduce the vote shares of smaller parties.
Furthermore, voters may be less likely to engage in certain types of strategic voting in
the absence of an electoral threshold. For example, before the reform, if supporters of a
large party anticipated that it would not receive an absolute majority and would thus have
to form a coalition with a smaller party, they might have voted for their preferred small
coalition partner in order to help it overcome the electoral threshold. Without a threshold,
the need to engage in such strategic voting is smaller, and thus the vote share of smaller
parties may decline. Another example relates to how explicit thresholds might affect the
structure of the party system (Cox, 1997). For instance, when there is a legal threshold,
voters who are not satisfied with the established parties have an incentive to implicitly
coordinate on one or a few smaller parties in order to gain legislative representation. Thus,
9In fact, it is difficult to disentangle mechanical and psychological effects. Moser and Scheiner (2012),
for example, point out that the psychological effect may mask the size of the perceptible mechanical effect
if a substantial number of voters respond to the disproportionality caused by a electoral rule by switching
to a less favored larger party. That is, if voters who actually support smaller parties react to e.g. a high
electoral threshold by switching their vote to larger parties, the disproportionality induced by the threshold
may seem low as the large parties will have both a large seat and a large vote share. Thus, ultimately
mechanical and psychological effects work in concert.
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those small parties that benefit from any implicit coordination will receive a relatively large
vote and a correspondingly large seat share. Without a legal threshold, the need for such
coordination is lower. Thus, more non-mainstream formations may enter the council, but
their aggregated seat share may decline because some non-mainstream formations may not
receive sufficient votes to gain legislative representation. More generally, as Moser and
Scheiner (2012) argue, the effects of electoral rules can be context-specific, and thus the
strategic effects of the abolishment of a legal threshold on the party system are difficult
to predict and arguably depend on many idiosyncrasies of a specific context, such as the
extent of accurate information voters have on the electoral chances of smaller parties or
the strategic calculus of local political elites.
3.3 Empirical Design
3.3.1 Difference-in-discontinuities Design
To identify the causal effect of abolishing the explicit electoral threshold, we implement a
diff-in-disc design using a sample consisting of all 426 Hessian municipalities from 1989 to
2011 that encompasses three local elections prior and three after the electoral reform. This
design combines regression discontinuity (RDD) and difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff)
methodologies. Due to the RDD aspect of the design, it is robust against violations of
the common trend assumption of standard diff-in-diff approaches. The diff-in-diff aspect
in turn, makes it robust against specific violations of the RD assumptions, such as co-
treatment and manipulation of the running variable.10
In our implementation of the diff-in-disc design, we exploit the fact that the abolishment
of the electoral threshold had heterogeneous effects across municipalities with different
population sizes. Specifically, as noted in Table 2.1, the number of seats in the council is
a discontinuous function of population size. Implicit thresholds, in turn, vary with council
size. The larger a council, the lower the implicit threshold: in a council with 10 seats, the
implicit threshold is about 5% and thus as high as the previous explicit threshold. In a
council with 100 seats, the implicit threshold is only about 0.5%, and thus much smaller
than previously. As a result, at the council size cutoffs, the effect of abolishing the explicit
threshold changes discontinuously. We exploit this discontinuity to identify the causal
effect of the abolishment on vote and seat shares.
Following previous RDD with multiple population cutoffs, we normalize all observations
such that they are around a single population cutoff denoted M (Egger and Koethen-
buerger, 2010). Specifically, we normalize the running variable, i.e. population size, by
subtracting the log of each cutoff from the log of population lpop, i.e. npop = lpop −M .
The empirical model we estimate is:
yMi,t = npop
κ +Di(γ + npop
κ) + It(α + npop
κ +Di(δ + npop
κ)) + ǫi,t (3.1)
10See Grembi et al. (2015) or Section 3.A.1 of the Appendix to Chapter 3 for a more comprehensive
discussion of the diff-in-disc design .
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where yi,p is either the vote or seat share of a small, medium, or large parties and Di and
It are dummy variables indicating the assignment to treatment and the post-treatment
period, respectively. We include a flexible polynomial of the running variable, npopκ, and
estimate the model for various bandwidths around the normalized cutoff |npop| < h, with
h = 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7. We also follow the previous literature and include in all regressions
municipality and election year fixed effects to improve efficiency and reduce finite sample
bias (Hoxby, 2000). We are interested in the estimate for δ, which captures the change in
the effect of the discontinuity at the normalized population cutoff between the pre- and
the post-treatment periods.
3.3.2 Difference-in-discontinuities Plots
As a complement to our regression results, we present graphical evidence on the treatment
effect. We construct the diff-in-disc plots by first dividing normalized population size into
bins of size 0.001 within a window of 0.2. Then we calculate the average of the relevant
outcome variable y within each bin for the pre- and post-treatment period, i.e. yb,t with the
index b = 1, ..., 200 denoting the bin and t = 0, 1 denoting the pre- and the post-treatment
period. Then we obtain the difference within each bin in the pre- and post-treatment
period ∆yb = (yb,1 − yb,0). Finally, we plot ∆yb against npop to the left- and the right of
the normalized cutoff.
To observe whether there is a discontinuity at the normalized cutoff, we smooth ∆yb
with a local polynomial plot of quadratic degree and a bandwidth of 0.1 at both sides of
the threshold, using a rectangular kernel and the number of observations within each bin
as frequency weights. For presentational purposes, we use the average of the differences
for bins of width 0.01 (rather than for the original bin widths). The smooth is constructed
based on the original ∆yb.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Vote and Seat Shares
Figure 3.1 shows the diff-in-disc plots for the aggregate seat and vote shares of the small,
medium, and large parties. There is a noticeable discontinuity at the normalized population
cutoff in subfigures (a) and (b) suggesting a causal increase in the seat and vote shares
of the small parties due to the abolishment. Subfigures (c) and (d) show no discontinuity
at the normalized population cutoff for the medium parties while subfigures (e) and (f)
show a negative discontinuity at the normalized cutoff for the large parties. The graphical
evidence suggests that small parties gained seat and vote shares mainly at the expense of
large parties.
The coefficient estimates are collected in Table 3.1. For both seat and vote shares
of small parties, we find that the these are consistently positive and always significant
across bandwidths and of a magnitude between 3 and 4. Accordingly, coefficient estimates
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(f) Vote shares of large parties
Fig 3.1: Seat and Vote Shares. This figure shows diff-in-disc plots for the change in the seat and vote shares of
small, medium, and large parties from the pre- to the post-treatment periods. Observations are averaged within bins of size
0.001. The polynomial plots are constructed using a rectangular kernel, a degree of 2, a bandwidth of 0.1, and the number
of observations within bins as frequency weights. 95% confidence intervals are indicated in gray.
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are consistently negative for both the seat and vote shares of medium as well as large
parties, even if not always significant. Coefficient estimates are generally larger for the
large than the medium parties. These results suggest that small parties benefited from
the abolishment of the electoral threshold primarily at the expense of the large parties.
As shown in Section 3.A.2 of the supplementary material, these results survive various
robustness tests.11
Table 3.1: Seat and Vote Shares.
BW=0.4 BW=0.5 BW=0.6 BW=0.7
Small parties
Seat Share 4.913** 3.711* 3.682** 3.027*
(2.387) (2.250) (1.807) (1.742)
Vote Share 5.028** 3.834* 3.690** 3.143*
(2.333) (2.206) (1.773) (1.706)
Medium parties
Seat Share -2.152 -1.315 -0.589 -0.504
(1.539) (1.369) (1.212) (1.189)
Vote Share -1.493 -0.490 -0.022 0.070
(1.418) (1.257) (1.118) (1.092)
Large Parties
Seat Share -2.761 -2.395 -3.093* -2.523
(2.253) (2.138) (1.742) (1.673)
Vote Share -3.536 -3.345 -3.669** -3.213**
(2.208) (2.092) (1.700) (1.623)
N 2797 3496 4208 4917
Notes: This table presents diff-in-disc regressions for the seat and vote shares of the small, medium and large parties in
Hessian municipal councils. All population cutoffs at which council size is allowed to change are analyzed simultaneously
by normalizing population size. Estimates for the average treatment effect of abolishing the election threshold are reported
for different bandwidths (0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7) and a cubic polynomial of normalized log population size. All models include
municipality and legislative term fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and robust to het-
eroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
A follow-up question is whether the change in seat and votes shares is mainly due to
the mechanical effects of the reform or if psychological effects are also at play. While
the mechanical effect should automatically increase the seat share of small parties at a
given vote share, the total effect also depends on whether voting patterns changed to the
benefit or detriment of the smaller parties.12 The evidence presented above shows that the
11In particular, we report regression results using different bandwidths, various placebo tests, and esti-
mates for individual cutoffs.
12As discussed above, mechanical and psychological effects are closely related. We interpret in the
following any changes in vote shares as psychological effect and any changes in seat shares at given vote
shares as mechanical effect. However, in view of the previous discussion, it is possible to argue that changes
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vote share of smaller parties increased significantly. Hence, the abolishment of the legal
threshold had indeed strong psychological effects in favor of smaller parties.
Furthermore, note that the estimated treatment effects for the small parties’ vote shares
are slightly larger than for their seat shares. This suggests that the purely mechanical
effects of the reform, i.e. any increase in seat shares of smaller parties at given vote shares,
in voting patterns, too, are ultimately a consequence of the mechanical effect, i.e. the reduction in the
disproportionality of the electoral system.
Table 3.2: Seat and Vote Shares of Individual Parties.
BW=0.4 BW=0.5 BW=0.6 BW=0.7
CDU
Seat share -2.134 -1.824 -2.199* -1.746
(1.453) (1.372) (1.166) (1.117)
Vote share -3.022** -2.724** -2.945*** -2.450**
(1.400) (1.319) (1.134) (1.087)
SPD
Seat share -0.627 -0.571 -0.893 -0.777
(1.627) (1.547) (1.275) (1.223)
Vote share -0.514 -0.621 -0.725 -0.764
(1.571) (1.482) (1.215) (1.159)
FDP
Seat share -1.312 -0.995 -0.709 -0.416
(0.879) (0.786) (0.681) (0.675)
Vote share -0.657 -0.289 -0.187 0.122
(0.732) (0.649) (0.549) (0.553)
The Greens
Seat share -0.840 -0.320 0.120 -0.088
(1.104) (0.984) (0.870) (0.842)
Vote share -0.836 -0.202 0.165 -0.052
(1.054) (0.941) (0.834) (0.808)
Voter Initiatives
Seat share 4.266* 2.993 2.888 2.296
(2.432) (2.258) (1.828) (1.763)
Vote share 4.250* 3.033 2.829 2.300
(2.376) (2.213) (1.789) (1.722)
N 2797 3496 4208 4917
Notes: This table presents diff-in-disc regressions for the seat and vote shares of individual parties. All population cutoffs
at which council size is allowed to change are analyzed simultaneously by normalizing population size. Estimates for the
average treatment effect of abolishing the election threshold are reported for different bandwidths (0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7) and
a cubic polynomial of normalized log population size. All models include municipality and legislative term fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels at
10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
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were small. As we show in a companion paper, one reason for these limited mechanical
effects may be that municipalities exposed to stronger treatments decreased council sizes
and thus increased implicit thresholds, thereby counteracting the mechanical effects of the
abolishment of the explicit threshold (Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca, 2016).
3.4.2 Seat Shares of Individual Parties
We report in Table 3.2 the effect of the abolishment of the electoral threshold on individual
parties’ seat shares. As expected, the coefficient estimates for the large parties, CDU and
SPD, are consistently negative. Yet, they are only significant and of a large magnitude
for the CDU. The coefficient estimates for the medium parties, FDP and the Greens, are
also negative, but of a much smaller magnitude than for the CDU and never significant.
It appears that the CDU was the main loser from this reform.
Finally, we look at municipality-specific voter initiates. The estimated coefficients for
the vote shares of voter initiatives are consistently positive and of a similar magnitude as
those obtained for the vote shares of the small parties in the baseline regressions. Voter
initiatives, already popular in Hesse, appear thus to have gained the most from the abol-
ishment of the legal electoral threshold, even if the estimated coefficient is only significant
for a relatively narrow bandwidth of 0.4.
3.4.3 Election-specific Vote and Seat Shares
In this section, we report election-specific estimates for the aggregated vote and seat shares
of the small, medium, and large parties. That is, we estimate how the vote and seat
shares of the three groups of parties compares to the pre-reform period in each post-reform
elections separately. The results are collected in Tables 3.3 to 3.5. They suggests that the
vote and seat shares of the large parties increased in municipalities exposed to stronger
treatments in the 2001 elections relative to the pre-reform elections. Correspondingly, the
vote and seat shares of small parties decreased. In the 2006 elections, however, the effect
was reversed – the vote and seat shares of small parties increased and those of the larger
parties decreased. This pattern prevails in the 2011 elections, causing the “average effect”
estimated in Table 3.1 for the small parties to be positive.
These results suggest that smaller parties benefited from the reform, but only with a
certain delay. A possible explanation for this pattern, following Cox (1997) and Moser and
Scheiner (2012), is that in an environment where it is unclear which non-mainstream parties
will manage to enter the legislature, i.e. when there is little information about electoral
prospects of smaller parties, it makes sense for voters to vote for their most preferred large
party as that party will definitely gain legislative representation. As it becomes clearer
which of the smaller parties are competitive, strategic voters are likely to switch to one of
the smaller parties.
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Table 3.3: Small Parties.
BW=0.4 BW=0.5 BW=0.6 BW=0.7
Panel A: 1989-1997 & 2001
Seat Share -3.024 -3.090 -1.895 -1.725
(3.133) (2.780) (2.292) (2.204)
Vote Share -3.445 -3.353 -2.239 -2.013
(2.984) (2.665) (2.184) (2.102)
N 1861 2345 2802 3269
Panel B: 1989-1997 & 2006
Seat Share 8.930** 7.876* 7.800** 6.277**
(4.519) (4.196) (3.113) (2.782)
Vote Share 9.570** 8.432** 8.121*** 6.675**
(4.377) (4.054) (3.019) (2.699)
N 1865 2347 2803 3267
Panel C: 1989-1997 & 2011
Seat Share 6.632* 5.541 4.667* 3.827
(3.849) (3.579) (2.833) (2.797)
Vote Share 6.976* 5.862 4.863* 4.166
(3.801) (3.571) (2.811) (2.780)
N 1853 2339 2802 3264
Notes: This table presents diff-in-disc regressions for the seat and vote shares of the small parties in Hessian municipal
councils. All population cutoffs at which council size is allowed to change are analyzed simultaneously by normalizing
population size. Estimates for the average treatment effect of abolishing the election threshold are reported for different
bandwidths (0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7) and a cubic polynomial of normalized log population size. All models include municipality
and legislative term fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars
indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
3.5 Extensions
3.5.1 Council Fragmentation
To complement the analysis on the impact of electoral thresholds on the seat and vote share
of the different parties, we study the effects of the treatment on council fragmentation. For
the purpose we rely on three different fragmentation measures: the number of parties in
the municipal council, the seat share held by the largest party in the council, and the
inverse Herfindahl index.
The regression results are collected in Table 3.6. Panel A collects the results for a sample
that covers the entire sample period, i.e. 1989-2011. The results suggest no significant
impact of the abolishment of the legal electoral threshold on council fragmentation. In
other words, council fragmentation in municipalities exposed to a stronger treatment was
on average not higher in the three post-reform elections than in the three pre-reform ones.
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Table 3.4: Medium Parties.
BW=0.4 BW=0.5 BW=0.6 BW=0.7
Panel A: 1989-1997 & 2001
Seat Share -2.727** -1.448 -0.416 -0.633
(1.351) (1.220) (1.092) (1.026)
Vote Share -1.401 -0.242 0.412 0.130
(1.174) (1.051) (0.963) (0.895)
N 1861 2345 2802 3269
Panel B: 1989-1997 & 2006
Seat Share -1.760 -1.543 -0.774 -0.449
(2.104) (1.851) (1.582) (1.480)
Vote Share -0.672 0.009 0.338 0.649
(1.926) (1.690) (1.452) (1.359)
N 1865 2347 2803 3267
Panel C: 1989-1997 & 2011
Seat Share -1.476 -1.021 -0.585 -0.601
(2.829) (2.465) (2.049) (2.014)
Vote Share -1.055 -0.361 -0.321 -0.246
(2.586) (2.263) (1.876) (1.835)
N 1853 2339 2802 3264
Notes: This table presents diff-in-disc regressions for the seat and vote shares of the medium parties in Hessian municipal
councils. All population cutoffs at which council size is allowed to change are analyzed simultaneously by normalizing
population size. Estimates for the average treatment effect of abolishing the election threshold are reported for different
bandwidths (0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7) and a cubic polynomial of normalized log population size. All models include municipality
and legislative term fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars
indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
However, it is possible that the effect of the reform differed across the post-reform
elections. The uncertainty associated with the reform, especially the difficulty in knowing
which parties had a realistic chance of entering the council, may have led voters to coordi-
nate at first on a few established parties, maybe even leading to a decline in the degree of
fragmentation in the 2001 election. As experience with the new voting system increased,
voters were arguably able to determine which smaller parties were competitive and may
have switched their vote accordingly (Cox, 1997; Moser and Scheiner, 2012). Consequently,
council fragmentation may have increased in the long-run while remaining unaffected or
even declining in the short-run. Panel B to D explore this possibility.
In Panel B, we report regressions where the sample is restricted to the period 1989-2001,
i.e. we only study the effect of the reform on the three measures of council fragmentation
in the first post-reform elections. The results indicate that compared to the pre-reform
period, council fragmentation decreased slightly in 2001, even if the estimated coefficients
are mostly insignificant.
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Table 3.5: Large Parties.
BW=0.4 BW=0.5 BW=0.6 BW=0.7
Panel A: 1989-1997 & 2001
Seat Share 5.752** 4.538* 2.311 2.358
(2.894) (2.625) (2.179) (2.065)
Vote Share 4.842* 3.590 1.820 1.875
(2.817) (2.563) (2.112) (2.006)
N 1861 2345 2802 3269
Panel B: 1989-1997 & 2006
Seat Share -7.169 -6.333 -7.026** -5.828**
(4.435) (4.102) (3.080) (2.832)
Vote Share -8.894** -8.438** -8.455*** -7.321***
(4.271) (3.942) (2.953) (2.712)
N 1865 2347 2803 3267
Panel C: 1989-1997 & 2011
Seat Share -5.156 -4.520 -4.082 -3.225
(3.628) (3.428) (2.768) (2.734)
Vote Share -5.928* -5.506* -4.545* -3.922
(3.482) (3.308) (2.672) (2.650)
N 1853 2339 2802 3264
Notes: This table presents diff-in-disc regressions for the seat and vote shares of the large parties in Hessian municipal
councils. All population cutoffs at which council size is allowed to change are analyzed simultaneously by normalizing
population size. Estimates for the average treatment effect of abolishing the election threshold are reported for different
bandwidths (0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7) and a cubic polynomial of normalized log population size. All models include municipality
and legislative term fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars
indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
Panel C reports results where the sample is restricted to the three pre-reform elections
(1989-1997) and the 2006 elections, i.e. the second post-reform elections. The results
suggest that compared to the pre-reform period, council fragmentation has noticeably
increased in 2006, though the coefficients are not significant. Finally, Panel D reports
results for a sample restricted to the three pre-reform elections and the 2011 elections.
We observe that the degree of council fragmentation increased even further in the 2011
elections compared to the 2006 ones. The coefficients are positive and typically significant
for the number of parties and Herfindahl index regressions. Overall, it appears that the
abolishment of the electoral threshold increased council fragmentation in the long-run.
3.5.2 Turnout
As a final extension, we explore the effect of the abolishment of the explicit threshold on
turnout as one of the aims of the reform was to increase voter participation in local elections.
The expectation was that the abolishment of the electoral threshold would increase the
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Table 3.6: Council Fragmentation.
BW=0.4 BW=0.5 BW=0.6 BW=0.7
Panel A: Full sample
Nr. of parties -0.031 0.025 0.147 0.093
(0.226) (0.201) (0.187) (0.170)
Max. share -0.035 0.660 -0.129 -0.281
(1.925) (1.714) (1.413) (1.389)
Herfindahl index 0.461 0.268 1.255 1.142
(1.414) (1.277) (1.073) (1.081)
N 2323 2909 3510 4112
Panel B: 1993-1997 & 2001
Nr. of parties -0.501** -0.441* -0.223 -0.227
(0.254) (0.226) (0.208) (0.194)
Max. share 2.461 2.897 1.687 1.047
(2.148) (1.968) (1.588) (1.549)
Herfindahl index -2.060 -2.335 -0.749 -0.456
(1.662) (1.525) (1.272) (1.254)
N 1385 1758 2104 2464
Panel C: 1993-1997 & 2006
Nr. of parties 0.077 0.043 0.177 0.080
(0.322) (0.279) (0.245) (0.231)
Max. share -0.903 0.153 -1.276 -1.672
(3.115) (2.632) (2.166) (2.104)
Herfindahl index 0.956 0.696 2.024 1.774
(2.333) (1.979) (1.604) (1.595)
N 1389 1760 2105 2462
Panel D: 1993-1997 & 2011
Nr. of parties 0.637* 0.691** 0.708*** 0.607**
(0.373) (0.322) (0.273) (0.247)
Max. share -2.886 -2.258 -2.399 -2.107
(2.665) (2.380) (1.904) (1.879)
Herfindahl index 2.967 3.359* 3.234** 3.039**
(2.124) (1.915) (1.543) (1.540)
N 1381 1752 2104 2459
Notes: This table presents diff-in-disc regressions for the different measures of fragmentation in Hessian municipal councils.
All population cutoffs at which council size is allowed to change are analyzed simultaneously by normalizing population size.
Estimates for the average treatment effect of abolishing the election threshold are reported for different bandwidths (0.4,
0.5, 0.6, 0.7) and a cubic polynomial of normalized log population size. All models include municipality and legislative term
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance
levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
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ability of voters to vote according to their true preference and thus make it worthwhile to
go to the polls.
Table 3.7: Turnout.
BW=0.4 BW=0.5 BW=0.6 BW=0.7
Panel A: Full sample -0.141 -0.271 0.119 1.029
(0.802) (0.740) (0.657) (0.668)
N 2797 3496 4208 4917
Panel B: 1993-1997 & 2001 -0.636 -0.887 -0.259 0.754
(1.288) (1.166) (0.951) (0.965)
N 1861 2345 2802 3269
Panel C: 1993-1997 & 2006 -0.351 -0.370 -0.050 1.296
(1.546) (1.370) (1.198) (1.134)
N 1865 2347 2803 3267
Panel D: 1993-1997 & 2011 1.400 1.476 1.444 2.124*
(1.547) (1.366) (1.137) (1.139)
N 1853 2339 2802 3264
Notes: This table presents diff-in-disc regressions for turnout in Hessian municipal councils. All population cutoffs at which
council size is allowed to change are analyzed simultaneously by normalizing population size. Estimates for the average
treatment effect of abolishing the election threshold are reported for different bandwidths (0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7) and a cubic
polynomial of normalized log population size. All models include municipality and legislative term fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*),
5%(**) and 1%(***).
The results are collected in Table 3.7. As for council fragmentation, we differentiate
between the average effect over the entire post-reform period (Panel A), and effects in
each of the post-reform elections separately (Panel B to D). We find the average effect to
be insignificant. Similarly, the election specific estimates in Panels B and C also suggest
that turnout did not increase in the 2001 and 2006 elections compared to the pre-reform
elections. However, the estimated coefficient is larger in Panel D, where we focus on
the 2011 election, and once significant. Therefore, there is some, albeit relatively weak,
evidence that the reform increased turnout in the long-run.
3.6 Conclusion
We study the effect of abolishing an electoral threshold on vote and seat shares of small
parties, thereby drawing conclusions regarding the mechanical and psychological effects
of explicit electoral thresholds. Our results indicate that abolishing an explicit electoral
threshold increases the seat shares of smaller parties at the expense of more established
larger parties. We also find that the increase in the small parties’ seat shares is due to
changes in voting patterns, which suggests that the reform had substantial psychological
effects.
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Overall, electoral thresholds appear to have a substantial causal effect on political
outcomes. In particular, they seem to be a suitable means to achieve legislative cohesion
by ensuring that non-mainstream parties receive only a relatively small share of the seats in
the legislature. By the same token, however, electoral thresholds reduce the legislative voice
of minorities. Policy makers and voters should therefore be aware that electoral thresholds
entail a strong trade off between legislative cohesion and political representation.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A.1 Empirical Methodology
This section collects further details on the empirical methodology. Two features of our
setting make the identification particularly credible. First, according to a state law, council
size in Hesse is a positive discontinuous fuzzy function of municipal population size. As
can be seen in Figure 2.1 our sample of 426 municipalities exhibits substantial variation in
population sizes.13 The law states that council size brackets are determined by the latest
available population data when the date for next local election is fixed.14 Figure A.3.1
plots mean council size for each of the population brackets in the pre- and post-treatment
period. It is obvious that mean council size is increasing between the different brackets,
with municipalities typically choosing the largest possible council size in the pre-treatment
period.15 More generally, the probability of a larger council increases discontinuously at
the population cutoffs. Consequently, the treatment intensity of abolishing the five percent
legal threshold also increases discontinuously. Thus, a given municipality with e.g. 3000
inhabitants will be less affected by the abolishment of the legal electoral threshold than
municipalities with 3001 inhabitants because the former will choose on average smaller
councils and thus have larger implicit thresholds.
The second feature that we use for identification is that given the nature of the electoral
reform, we have a pre- and post-treatment period. Since the legal electoral threshold
existed only before 2001, we can rely on within- in addition to between-variation along the
population brackets for identification.
The presence of these features in our setting, the discontinuities at population cutoffs
combined with the electoral reform, enables us to focus on changes in political outcomes
at the population cutoffs between the pre- and post-treatment periods, thereby effectively
combining RDD and diff-in-diff methods. The RDD aspect of this approach allows us to
control for observable as well as unobservable characteristics of municipalities that may
result in differential trends and thereby invalidate a traditional diff-in-diff design. The diff-
in-diff aspect addresses concerns regarding co-treatment and manipulation at the relevant
population cutoffs which may invalidate a standard RDD (Eggers et al., 2015). Combining
the RDD and diff-in-diff designs results in a diff-in-disc design, that leads to a “as good
13In fact, the smallest municipality in terms of population has as few as 638 inhabitants and the largest
669,992 inhabitants (see summary statistics in Table A.3.3).
14 This population data is not the same as the annual data published by the state statistical office. For
the 2006 and 2011 elections, we obtained the relevant data from the homepage of the statistical office.
For the previous elections, we collected the data by hand from various issues of the Hessian government
gazette.
15Two municipalities in 1989 have larger council sizes than permissible given their population size (one
had 4999 inhabitants and a council size of 31 and the other 9754 and a council size of 37). We dropped
these two observations from the sample. While we have no definite explanation, we suspect that these two
municipalities made use of an exception defined in the Hessian law for local elections that allows munici-
palities that crossed either of the thresholds from above to keep the council size intended for municipalities
in the next threshold for another legislative period.
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Fig A.3.1: Average Council Size Before and After 2001. This figure shows the average council size of
municipalities in population brackets 1-3000 (1), 3001-5000 (2), 5001-10,000 (3), 10,001-25,000 (4), 25,001-50,000 (5), 50,001-
100,000 (6), 100,001-250,000 (7), 250,001-500,000 (8), 500,001-1,000,000 (9) prior and after the 2001 elections.
as random” analysis even in settings where either differential trends or co-treatment and
manipulation at the population cutoffs cannot be ruled out (Grembi et al., 2015).
In addition, as the abolishment of the legal electoral threshold was the only aspect of
the reform having a different impact on municipalities with different population sizes, we
are able to isolate its causal effect from the impact of the other changes included in the
Kommunalwahlreform. Specifically, the estimates are robust to heterogeneous responses
to the other changes in the electoral law. Since the analysis is confined to municipalities
that are above and below the respective cutoffs, the response to the other changes in
“treatment” and “control” municipalities will be identical in expectation.
Finally, a crucial assumption that must hold is that the ability or incentives of mu-
nicipalities to manipulate population size at the cutoff did not change over the pre- to
post-treatment period. This assumption is plausible as it is unlikely that municipalities
would persistently misrepresent their population sizes only to avoid being forced to change
their council sizes. This is tested in the McCrary (2008) style density plot reported in
Figure 2.4. The idea underlying this plot is that if either the ability or the incentives for
manipulation changed at the cutoff from the pre- to the post-treatment period, we should
observe a discontinuity in the changes in the number of observations close to the cut-
off. More specifically, assume that because of the treatment, municipalities systematically
start to (mis-) report lower population sizes in order to be able to reduce their council size.
Then the increase in observations just before the normalized cutoff from the pre- to the
post-treatment period should be significantly higher than the increase in observations just
after the cutoff. As the plot shows, there is no evidence that incentives for manipulation
changed from the pre- to the post-treatment period at the normalized cutoff.
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3.A.2 Robustness Tests
3.A.2.1 Polynomials and Bandwidths
In order to test the robustness of the baseline results we re-estimate our model relying on
smaller bandwidths h (0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.1, 0.2) and a linear polynomial. Regression
results are grouped in Table A.3.1. Coefficient estimates for the seat and vote shares of
small parties remain consistently positive and are always significant. Conversely, coefficient
estimates for the seat and vote shares of medium and large parties are always negative.
This robustness test hence supports and reinforces our baseline results. Not only we find
significant effects for the average change in vote and seat shares of small and large parties,
but also the results remain stronger and of a higher magnitude for vote rather than seat
shares.
Table A.3.1: Smaller Bandwidths.
BW=0.06 BW=0.07 BW=0.08 BW=0.09 BW=0.1 BW=0.2
Small Parties
Seat Share 4.060 4.817* 4.592* 5.154** 3.634* 3.546**
(2.982) (2.766) (2.396) (2.220) (2.101) (1.664)
Vote Share 4.686 5.303** 5.093** 5.368** 3.843* 3.580**
(2.931) (2.700) (2.356) (2.188) (2.091) (1.639)
Medium Parties
Seat Share -0.665 -1.138 -1.646 -1.422 -1.201 -1.485
(1.986) (1.816) (1.669) (1.569) (1.513) (1.105)
Vote Share -0.995 -1.013 -1.551 -1.103 -0.601 -0.777
(1.832) (1.655) (1.531) (1.457) (1.408) (1.007)
Large Parties
Seat Share -3.395 -3.679 -2.946 -3.731* -2.433 -2.060
(2.936) (2.634) (2.336) (2.105) (1.988) (1.617)
Vote Share -3.687 -4.290* -3.541 -4.265** -3.243* -2.803*
(2.819) (2.554) (2.275) (2.045) (1.952) (1.562)
N 442 523 591 655 723 1416
Notes: This table presents diff-in-disc regressions for the seat and vote shares of the different groups of parties in Hessian
municipal councils. All population cutoffs at which council size is allowed to change are analyzed simultaneously by nor-
malizing population size. Estimates for the average treatment effect of abolishing the election threshold are reported for
different bandwidths (0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.1, 0.2) and a linear polynomial of normalized log population size. All models
include municipality and legislative term fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to
heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
3.A.2.2 Placebo Tests
As a first set of placebo tests, we let the treatment set in at fake cutoffs and compare
the estimated effects with the ones obtained for the correct cutoff. More specifically, we
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(f) Vote shares of large parties
Fig A.3.2: Placebo Treatments with Fake Cutoffs. This figure shows coefficient estimates of the diff-in-disc
model for the seat and vote shares of small, medium, and large parties with placebo treatments. The size of the dots
indicates the standard error of each estimate. The cutoffs are redefined such that treatment sets in at npop = −2,−1, 1, 2.
For comparison, the coefficient estimates at the true threshold of 0 are also indicated.
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define Di in Equation (3.1) such that it is 1 if npop = −2,−1, 0, 1, 2 (npop = 0 indicates
the true cutoff). To save space, we summarize the results in graphs. The structure of the
plots in Figure A.3.2 is as follows. For each fake cutoff, we plot the four coefficient esti-
mates obtained by combining the bandwidths and polynomial degree used in the baseline
regressions. We also indicate the mean value of the coefficient estimates with a red dot.
In Figure A.3.2, we present the placebo estimates for the seat and vote shares of the
small, medium, and large parties. For the small parties, subfigures (a) and (b), the mean
coefficient estimates revolve around zero at every fake cutoff. At the true cutoff, however,
there is a large positive jump of the mean coefficient of the seat and vote shares of the small
parties. Subfigures (c) and (d) in turn, show that the mean coefficient estimates for the
medium parties revolve around zero for the fake and true cutoffs. Finally, both subfigures
(e) and (f), for the large parties, show evidence of a noticeable negative jump in the mean

























Coefficient Placebo Treatment 1993 Treatment 2001
Fig A.3.3: Placebo Treatment for Fake Treatment Year. This figure shows coefficient estimates of the
diff-in-disc model with a placebo treatment defined to begin in 1993. The sample covers the period 1989-1997. The size of
the dots indicates the standard error of each estimate. Coefficient estimates are reported for small party seat share (SS),
small party vote share (VS), medium party seat share (MS), medium party vote share (MV), large party seat share (LS) and
large party vote share (LV). The mean estimate at the fake treatment year is indicated with a red dot. The mean estimate
at the true treatment year is indicated with a blue dot.
As a second set of placebo tests, we let the treatment begin at a fake treatment year.
That is, we limit the sample to the pre-treatment period (1989-1997) and let the treatment
begin in 1993. Figure A.3.3 collects the results. The mean coefficient at the fake cutoffs for
each of the outcome measures is indicated with a red dot. For comparison, we indicate the
mean estimate at the true cutoff with a blue dot. Again, we find that the mean coefficient
estimates for the seat and vote shares of the medium parties are around zero both at the
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fake and the true treatment year. For the remaining variables, the graph shows that mean
estimates for the fake treatment year are always close to zero, whereas estimates for the
true treatment year are further away from zero. Overall, both the placebo test for the fake
cutoffs and for the fake treatment year provide further robustness to our baseline estimates.
3.A.2.3 Individual Cutoffs
In order to assess whether the baseline results are driven by selected cutoffs, we report
results for individual cutoffs. For compactness and since sample sizes are smaller in these
regressions we only report results for specifications with a relatively large bandwidth of
0.5 and a quadratic control function. Even though treatment increases with council size,
it is at the smallest population brackets that increase in treatment intensity is the largest.
Also, the number of observations in the larger brackets is limited. Therefore, here we focus
on the first four population cutoffs.
Table A.3.2: Individual Population Cutoffs.
T=3001 T=5001 T=10,001 T=25,001
Small parties
Seat share 6.285 3.805 0.798 0.645
(4.139) (2.842) (2.489) (4.407)
Vote share 5.973 3.919 0.926 0.482
(4.060) (2.868) (2.409) (4.300)
Medium parties
Seat share -0.498 -1.399 0.646 -1.374
(2.386) (1.810) (2.024) (2.181)
Vote share -0.243 -1.011 0.625 0.543
(2.292) (1.680) (1.858) (2.058)
Large parties
Seat share -5.787 -2.405 -1.443 0.730
(4.173) (2.874) (2.321) (3.543)
Vote share -5.736 -2.907 -1.548 -1.023
(4.155) (2.761) (2.202) (3.640)
N 625 1105 1122 430
Notes: This table presents diff-in-disc regressions at the individual cutoffs. Estimates for the average treatment effect of
abolishing the election threshold are reported for a 0.5 bandwidth and a quadratic polynomial of normalized log population
size. All models include municipality and legislative term fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level
and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels at 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
The results are collected in Table A.3.2. Results for the seat and vote shares of small,
medium and large parties follow in general the baseline results. These results are never
significant at conventional values, but this is presumably due to the smaller sample size
in these regressions since the estimated coefficients are numerically large. According to
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Baskaran and Lopes da Fonseca (2016) council sizes in municipalities falling into the first
population cutoff did not decrease significantly (only larger municipalities reduced their
council sizes). It is thus interesting to see that at that same cutoff the increase in the seat
share of small parties is more than proportional to the increase in the vote share. The same
holds for the decrease in the seat share of large parties which is higher than the decrease
in vote share, though to a smaller degree. In the remaining cutoffs where council sizes did
significantly decrease we see the contrary.
This analysis for individual cutoffs allows us to interpret the magnitude of the treatment
effect. For example, crossing the population threshold of 3001 from below implies on
average a reduction in the implicit threshold of about 3.33 to 2.17 percentage points,
assuming all municipalities choose the highest possible council size. Hence, the intensity of
treatment from abolishing the explicit threshold increases by around 1.16 percentage points
at the 3001 threshold. Since the estimate for the treatment effect is around 6 percentage
points, a percentage point decrease in the implicit threshold increases the vote share of
smaller parties by about 5 percentage points. These values suggest that the psychological
effects of electoral thresholds can be substantial.
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Table A.3.3: Summary Statistics.
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. N
Turnout overall 64.540 12.911 31 93.606 2554
between 5.560 49.514 79.837 426
within 11.654 42.579 87.954 5.995
Small party seat share overall 18.336 15.348 0.000 100.000 2554
between 13.746 0.000 100.000 426
within 6.854 -16.447 57.659 5.995
Small party vote share overall 18.428 15.212 -0.100 100.000 2554
between 13.645 -0.017 100.000 426
within 6.754 -16.904 56.178 5.995
Medium party seat share overall 8.177 7.842 0.000 45.946 2554
between 6.751 0.000 31.532 426
within 4.009 -10.318 33.853 5.995
Medium party vote share overall 8.582 7.771 0.000 46.400 2554
between 6.823 0.000 30.766 426
within 3.739 -10.819 33.727 5.995
Large party seat share overall 73.487 14.434 0.000 100.000 2554
between 12.594 0.000 100.000 426
within 7.068 34.164 99.043 5.995
Large party vote share overall 72.990 14.296 0.000 100.000 2554
between 12.551 0.000 100.000 426
within 6.862 35.240 98.373 5.995
Nr. parties overall 3.782 0.990 1.000 10.000 2554
between 0.834 1.000 6.833 426
within 0.535 1.282 7.616 5.995
Max. seat share overall 47.891 10.314 26.667 100.000 2554
between 8.828 32.040 100.000 426
within 5.347 29.612 72.529 5.995
Herfindahl index overall 62.871 9.335 0.000 100.000 2555
between 8.448 0.000 100.000 427
within 4.294 29.601 82.531 5.984
Council size overall 31.211 9.753 11.000 93.000 2554
between 9.604 13.667 93.000 426
within 1.736 24.211 38.211 5.995
Inhabitants overall 13931.84 36795.72 638 669992 2554
between 36801.83 727.5 648056.5 426





Electoral accountability is often pointed as the foremost reason for holding periodical elec-
tions. The rationale is that the regular assessment of an incumbent’s performance provides
more than a chance to reward or punish an officeholder’s conduct, it gives the possibility to
constrain opportunistic behavior. Institutional barriers to re-election such as term limits
may appear at odds with this theory of electoral accountability. Lame ducks, i.e. elected
officials reaching the end of their tenure, are not electorally held accountable leaving voters
unable to exert the appropriate control. It often follows that term-limited incumbents have
less incentives to be responsive towards the electorate or responsible in performing their
duties. A theory corroborated to some extent by empirical evidence inasmuch as Besley
and Case (1995, p. 793) wonder “... why term limits exist at all”.
However, and as recent literature suggests, by decreasing the value of holding office
term limits may also provide the incentives for more truthful political behavior leading to
a better selection effect of elections and a more qualified pool of politicians in the long-run
(Smart and Sturm, 2013). The key distinction between the two theories is that one focuses
on moral hazard whilst the other is concerned with the problem of adverse selection. By
distinguishing politicians solely on the basis of their ability, the first looks at elections as
a disciplining device and at term limits as the root of distortionary behavior while the
second acknowledges a certain degree of heterogeneity in preferences and motivations and
regards term limits as disciplinary.
The conflicting views on the role of elections and politicians’ motivations make the quest
of identifying the impact of term limits an empirical one. Still, there are only few empirical
studies on the impact of gubernatorial term limits on fiscal policy and the existing evidence
is shaped mainly by the U.S. experience. This paper attempts to broaden this literature
by being one of the first micro-analysis on the impact of gubernatorial term limits on local
policy choices in a context other than the U.S. institutional setting. The identification
strategy relies on a natural experiment, a recent constitutional reform introducing mayoral
∗This chapter originates from work previously circulated as “Lame but loyal ducks” (see Lopes da
Fonseca (2015b)).
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term limits at the Portuguese municipal level, and a difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff)
quasi-experimental approach. The methodological approach is subject to a number of tests
that validate its reliability in causally identifying the impact of term limits.
Regression results suggest a significant reduction in the property tax rate as well as
a decrease in total current expenditures. Heterogeneous effects of the treatment in turn,
indicate that results hinge on partisan affiliation suggesting that officeholders’ motivations
underlie the fiscal response to term limits. Furthermore, incumbents stop engaging in
fiscal policy cycles once they are ineligible for re-election in contrast to eligible mayors who
continue to pursue expansionary policies before the elections.
This analysis contributes to the literature by challenging previous results on the impact
of term limits on fiscal policy. Results show that officeholders do behave systematically
different in view of a binding term limit, but not in a manner indicating lack of effort or
opportunism. By providing evidence consistent with distortionary elections and emerging
policy preferences in face of ineligibility for re-election, this study suggests a new interpre-
tation of previous evidence in light of Smart and Sturm’s (2013) model of truth-inducing
term limits.
4.2 Term Limits and Political Incentives
There are two distinct views on the role of competitive elections that produce disparate
predictions in the term limits debate. The mainstream view is that elections are a dis-
ciplining mechanism that is disrupted by re-election constraints leading to situations of
moral hazard (e.g. Barro (1973); Ferejohn (1986)). A different perspective deems elections
as distortionary due to myopic or career concerned officeholders. This leads to adverse
selection, warranting the introduction of term limits (Chari et al., 1997).
Political agency models capturing the key features of a representative democracy illus-
trate both views depending on the underlying assumptions on officeholders’ characteristics
or motivations.1 Borrowing the principal-agent terminology, the political agent is com-
pelled to act, or build a reputation of acting, in behalf of the principal, i.e. the electoral
district, who since Ferejohn (1986) is generally modeled as a performance-oriented elec-
torate, by the democratic institutional mechanism of periodic elections and thereby increase
the probability of re-election.
In the context of disciplining competitive elections, fiscal policy outcomes are assumed
to measure an incumbent’s ability or competence. Attributing a finite and commonly
known time horizon to officeholders, determined by the existence of term limits, creates a
last-term effect where there is no control over the officeholder’s behavior due to the lack
of re-election incentives (Barro, 1973). This results in a departure from the optimal policy
choice from the voters’ perspective.
However, if politicians behave opportunistically in order to be re-elected, in line with
reputation-building models predicting potentially negative effects of career concerned and
1For a review of political agency models see e.g. Besley (2006).
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myopic agents (Morris, 2001; Ely and Välimäki, 2003), elections are distortionary. In this
context, a system of judicial power where no officeholder may be re-elected, i.e. a one-term
limit, can dominate other forms of government (Maskin and Tirole, 2004).
The two theories boil down to one testable hypothesis: that ineligible and eligible
incumbents behave differently. Moreover, being fiscal policy the instrument used by politi-
cians to maximize re-election prospects implies that term limits are liable of having an
impact on fiscal performance.
Empirical evidence, mostly based on the U.S. experience, appears to support the disci-
plining effect of elections and the existence of a term-limits-induced moral hazard (Besley
and Case, 1995, 2003; Crain and Tollison, 1993; Crain and Oakley, 1995).2 There is,
nonetheless, one relevant exception: List and Sturm (2006) provide significant evidence of
distorting policy choices for a sample of U.S. governors between 1970 and 2000 showing
that environmental policy is substantially different in years where a governor may or may
not run for re-election, with policy changes strategically hinging on the composition of the
electorate.
More recently, the discussion has focused on determining the optimal length of term
limits. Results support, in general, longer average tenures. Alt et al. (2011) show that
from the perspective of disciplining elections, increasing average tenure matters as voters
become able to weed out good from bad politicians. Smart and Sturm (2013) in turn,
propose a model with a pool of public-spirited and biased politicians, where even the
former are inclined to implement distorted policies in order to increase their re-election
probability. In this context, term limits are welfare improving as they decrease the value
of holding office, aligning officeholders’ incentives and thereby inducing truthful behavior,
again enabling voters to better select re-eligible candidates. They support a mix of electoral
accountability and judicial power, i.e. two-terms or longer term limits.
This study fits the model of distortionary elections and public-spirited politicians by
Smart and Sturm (2013). In addition, it tries to reconcile the early reputation-building
models of moral hazard inducing term limits with the present evidence on ideologically
driven politicians. Instead of a lack of effort, previous evidence could be interpreted in
light of different preferences by politicians and voters that emerge in face of binding term
limits. The problem at hands appears to be one of distortionary elections and adverse
selection. Incumbents distort fiscal policy in pursue of pleasing the electorate and securing
re-election, ambitions that become unimportant upon ineligibility. Lame duck terms thus
show the incumbents true colors and distortions to the local economy cease. This reasoning
is consistent with the electorally-induced political business cycles (PBC) literature.
2Recent evidence on the disciplining effect of elections relies on outcomes other than fiscal policy. See
e.g. Ferraz and Finan (2011) and Janvry et al. (2012), that find less corruption and a more effective
implementation of a decentralized conditional cash transfer program aimed at reducing school dropout,
respectively, in Brazilian municipalities governed by re-eligible mayors.
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4.3 Institutional Details
4.3.1 Local Politics and Finances
This paper relies on the Portuguese first sub-national level of government, i.e. munici-
palities, as a laboratory to study the impact of introducing mayoral term limits on local
public accounts.3 In Portugal, there are in total 308 municipalities, the equivalent to a U.S.
town/city. The focus is upon the 278 mainland municipalities for increased comparability
and due to different institutional details regulating the autonomous regions of Azores and
Madeira.
Municipalities are responsible for several aspects of the local public administration from
the supply of public goods to territorial organization, promotion of local development and
external cooperation.4 For the purpose, there are two political institutions at this level,
the executive municipal council and the legislative municipal assembly.
The mayor is the top chief executive position in a municipality. He is the head of the
municipal council, which is composed by an additional four to ten councilmen depending on
the municipality’s population size.5 The three-terms limitation introduced by the electoral
reform concerns the mayoral position. In Portugal however, there are no explicit direct
mayoral elections. Instead, the mayor is the first name on the winning list running for the
municipal council elections.6 For this reason, these are the relevant election results used in
the empirical analysis.
Elections for the municipal council are defined exogenously from the perspective of
the local authorities. They take place simultaneously countrywide every four years with
a proportional representation system of closed lists in place. Parties and independent
lists of organized registered electors may contest the elections with seats being distributed
according to the D’Hont method. Local politics are dominated by the local branches of
the main parties represented in the national parliament. From left to right in the political
spectrum these are the Communist Party (PCP), the center-left Socialist Party (PS), the
center-right Social-Democrats (PSD) and the right-of-center Popular Party (CDS-PP).
On the financial side, the laws regulating local governments in Portugal are bound by
the principle of decentralization. Municipalities have their own assets, finances and per-
sonnel. Still, and as is the case with several local governments across Europe, spending
decentralization outweighs revenue decentralization. Conditional and unconditional trans-
fers from higher levels of government still represent the main source of municipal funding.
However, despite the reduced fiscal autonomy, in the past years there has been an increase
in the relative importance of both local taxes and user charges.
3There is a second level of local administrative units in Portugal, the parishes. Currently, there are
3,902 parishes with each municipality consisting of at least one parish.
4Law no. 159/99 in Diário da República 215, Series I-A, 14th September 1999.
5Two exceptions are the Lisbon and Oporto municipalities with 16 and 12 councilmen, respectively.
6Even though votes are cast for the party, the electoral campaign is led by the mayoral candidates who
are the faces of the different parties.
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Municipalities publish their current and capital accounts yearly. The empirical analysis
investigates the impact of term limits on the former as these are of an operative and year-
by-year nature.7 On the revenue side the focus is on the few items entirely under the
control of the municipality: user charges and the local property tax rate.8 User charges
are set on a yearly basis by the municipality. However, the scope of services provided
by the municipalities is very heterogeneous with no systematic records on the type of
service and prices charged. Relying on revenues from fines and fees as a proxy gives the
possibility to indirectly infer upon the impact of term limits on the level of user charges
in the municipality. The local property tax rate for urban properties in turn, is since a
reform in 2003 set within a range of 0.3% to 0.5% at the beginning of each year by the
municipality.9 Additionally, local tax revenues as a whole are also analyzed in order to
determine whether any change to the local property tax rate had an effect on the overall
tax collection. Finally, on the expenditure side, the focus is on the impact of a binding
term limit on current aggregate expenditures which primarily encompass expenditures with
personnel and current transfers to parishes.
4.3.2 Electoral Reform
On July 25th 2005, the draft Law on the implementation of term limits for local office-
holders was discussed and approved in Parliament leading up to the Law no. 49/2005 from
August 29th 2005, which entered into force on January 1st 2006. The law sets a three con-
secutive terms limit for mayors after which they are not allowed to rerun for the mayoral
position in the same municipality. However, upon entering into force it established that
all incumbent mayors could rerun in the following 2009 elections. As a result, term limits
were only first binding in the 2013 local elections for incumbent mayors serving their at
least third consecutive term. In total, 150 mayors were in this situation in 2013 leaving
the same number of municipalities to have exogenously determined open-seat elections for
the municipal council.
The timeline of the reform creates an interesting natural experiment. First, the law
was voted right before, and came into force right after, the 2005 local elections held in
October. Second, upon entering into force in 2006 it allowed all incumbent mayors one
last chance at re-election in the 2009 local elections, creating a stand-by period where the
law was already in existence but not yet effective. Third, it was finally binding in the 2013
local elections in 150 municipalities. As only around half of the mayors were bound by
a term limit it is possible to rely on both between- and within-municipality variation to
identify the impact of gubernatorial term limits on local policy choices.
7Capital accounts often involve long-term commitments and are thus less susceptible to change.
8Mayors also set the local corporate income tax in a range of 0-1.5% since a reform in 2007. However,
due to the small time span of data available this outcome is not considered in the empirical analysis. For
the remaining municipal taxes the rate and/or base is set by higher tiers of government and thus exogenous
to local authorities.
9The local property tax rate for rural properties is fixed at 0.8%.
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4.4 Data
This analysis relies on a dataset combining fiscal variables and electoral results at the
Portuguese municipal level for the past three complete electoral terms, i.e. 2002-2005,
2006-2009 and 2010-2013.10 The National Electoral Commission’s (Comissão Nacional de
Eleições) and the General Directorate for Internal Affairs’s (Direcção Geral da Adminis-
tração Interna) websites provide the data on electoral results. Data are provided at the
party level per municipality and consist on the number of votes and seats allocated to
each party. In order to ascertain the incumbency status of the mayor the data on electoral
results was manually matched to the names of the members of the municipal council – in
particular the mayor – provided in the Official Map by the National Electoral Commission
published in Diário da República.
Data on local public finances are publicly available and can be retrieved from the Gen-
eral Directorate for Local Authority’s (Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais) website for
the years from 2003 onward. For the previous years it is provided in the institution’s annual
publication entitled Municipal Finances (Finanças Municipais). The variables measuring
tax revenues, revenues from fines and fees and aggregate current expenditure are deflated
to the year 2005 by the national consumer price index from the World Economic Out-
look Database of the International Monetary Fund. Per capita values are obtained relying
on resident population per municipality from the Portuguese National Statistics Institute
(INE).
For robustness, the analysis relies on a number of control variables. The vector of
control variables includes measures of municipal population size and municipal economic
activity, as well as political dummies indicating whether there is a majority in the municipal
assembly, whether the same party controls both the council and the assembly and if the
mayor if left-leaning.11 The political variables are constructed based on the local electoral
results for both the municipal council and assembly from the sources mentioned above.
Municipal population size coincides with the resident population per municipality series
from INE and the measure for municipal economic activity is proxied by night light output
over the years under study for each municipality. This variable is constructed by combining
the following two databases in ArcGis: geodata on Portuguese municipal boundaries and
location from The Global Administrative Areas database GADM, i.e. a spatial database
collecting the location of the world’s administrative boundaries, and data on night light
output collected by the Defense and Meteorological Satellite Program satellites and treated
10The decision to analyze this period relates to the nature of the reform that determines a clear pre-
treatment period, before 2005, a stand-by period between 2006 and 2009 and a post-treatment period, the
electoral term 2010-2013 leading up to the term limited elections. Including only the three electoral terms
from 2002 onward, is on the one hand enough to perform the intended analysis and on the other hand
more robust to long term issues of co-treatment and past dynamics. Results relying on all electoral periods
since 1994 support the evidence presented in the following sections. Before 1994 there is no systematic
data on the composition of the municipal council.
11The mayor is considered left-leaning if he is a representative of either the PS or PCP, or smaller parties
known to be on the left side of the political spectrum.
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and made available by the Earth Observation Group from the National Geophysical Data
Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
4.5 Methodology
4.5.1 Empirical Model
The variation in eligibility for re-election introduced by the law limiting the number of con-
secutive mandates is susceptible of causing an exogenous variation in short-term electoral
incentives. Provided that treatment and control municipalities are comparable, it is possi-
ble to capture this variation and identify the causal impact of term limits on policy choices
simply by assessing the difference in the change in fiscal outcomes for the two groups of
municipalities from the pre- to the post-treatment period. Evidence of significant post-
treatment group-specific fiscal policy choices points to a causal effect of treatment that
resulted in a systematically different behavior between term-limited and re-eligible incum-
bents.
The nature of the constitutional reform under study establishes pre- and post-treatment
periods that allow for a quasi-experimental diff-in-diff approach. As of now, there is only
one wave of term limited elections. These took place in municipalities re-electing incum-
bents into office in the 2009 elections to serve their at least third electoral term. As the
focus is on implementation effects, i.e. the impact of a binding term limit, treatment is
implicitly assigned by the 2009 local elections results.
Let Ci be the dummy indicating treatment, equal to one for all municipalities that
elected a lame duck in 2009 and zero otherwise.12 Treatment assignment occurs at t0,
corresponding to the 2009 local elections. Yet, 2009 is still part of the pre-treatment
period as fiscal policy is decided in the yearly budget prepared at the beginning of each
year. The post-treatment period starts in 2010, with the new local executive taking office
and passing the first budget. Accordingly, let dt be a time dummy that switches to one the
year after treatment assignment, i.e. dt = 1[t > t0]. Meaning dt indicates the four years of
the 2010-2013 electoral term.
Inference on the average treatment effect of term limits on local policy choices is based
on the following general diff-in-diff regression model:
Yit = γi + γt + δ (Ci · dt) + Z
′
itβ + ǫit (4.1)
where Yit is any of the outcome variables under study, Bit = (Ci · dt) indicates a binding
term limit and Z ′it is the vector of socio-economic and political control variables described
in the previous section. The parameter δ measures the average treatment effect of term
limits on the different outcome variables for the entire electoral term.
The model is fully identified by including municipality and year fixed effects, γi and
γt, respectively. For robustness, more conservatives versions of the baseline model include
12In the following treatment is assumed to fall upon the mayor, council or municipality interchangeably.
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district trends, γs ·t, and district-year fixed effects, γst.
13 The former to control for district-
specific trends and the latter to allow for unobservable district-specific variables to vary
over time. Particular validity and robustness tests also include a linear time trend, t, and
a treatment group specific time trend, Ci · t.
In addition, the pattern of lagged effects is also of interest as it often provides further
and more insightful information on the dynamics of the treatment effects. Therefore,
average annual treatment effects are assessed through the following extension of the baseline
regression model:




δ−τ Bi,t−τ + Z
′
itβ + ǫit (4.2)
where the sum allows for m lags or post-treatment effects. The number of lags is m = 4,
one for each of the four years of the 2010-2013 electoral term. The remaining variables are
defined as before.
Finally, for the purpose of studying heterogeneous treatment effects the regression mod-
els in Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are extended to encompass both a second dummy variable
and its interaction with the binding term limit. Average term effects are obtained within
the following regression framework:
Yit = γi + γt + δ Bit +Hit(α + ρBit) + Z
′
itβ + ǫit (4.3)
where Hit is the additional dummy variable. Average yearly effects in turn, are estimated
in the context of the regression model in Equation (4.4), with all variables defined as before.








ρ−τ Bi,t−τ ) + Z
′
itβ + ǫit (4.4)
This study focuses on one source of heterogeneous effects. In order to identify possi-
ble mechanisms behind any significant effect of the term limits treatment on local fiscal
policy, partisan affiliation is introduced in the analysis with Hit indicating left-leaning
mayors. Additionally, the heterogeneous effects regression models above are also estimated
as an extension of the baseline results in Section 4.7.2 to analyze the resigning mayors
phenomenon taking place in the electoral term 2010-2013.
4.5.2 The Common Trends Assumption
Internal validity of a diff-in-diff framework hinges on the common trends assumption. In
short, the trend in each of the dependent variables under study must be the same for all
municipalities in the absence of treatment. This assumption can be tested through different
procedures. For the purpose, in the following, the sample is restricted to the pre-treatment
period, i.e. 2002-2009.
13Municipalities are classically grouped into 18 districts created in 1835. Districts are not an official
local administrative unit. Still, they group to a certain extent similar municipalities.
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One common approach is to compare the evolution of the different outcome variables
in treated and control municipalities during the pre-treatment period (Angrist and Pis-
chke, 2009, p. 231). Figure 4.1 provides mean plots for the four fiscal variables under
study: revenue from fines and fees, the property tax rate, tax revenues and total current
expenditure. With the exception of the initial distinct trends in the collection of revenue
from fines and fees, the graphs do not provide substantive evidence of differential trends
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Fig 4.1: Mean Plots. This figure provides plots depicting the logarithm of the mean of each of the fiscal outcomes
under study in treated (square) and control (triangle) municipalities for the pre-treatment period, 2002-2009. Data on the
local property tax rate is only available from 2003 onward due to a fiscal reform.
A second approach consists in regressing the different outcome variables on yearly dum-
mies indicating the treatment group (Moser and Voena, 2012). Similar to Equation (4.2)
yet, instead of lags, this test estimates leads of the treatment variable, i.e.
∑q
τ=1 δ+τ Bi,t+τ .
The number of leads, q = 8, corresponds to each year of the pre-treatment period. The
omitted category is 2004, the year before the law limiting mayoral terms came to a vote in
Parliament, and the model specification includes municipality and year fixed effects. Coef-
ficient estimates in Figure 4.2 measure how outcome variables differ between treatment and
control municipalities. As suggested by the previous test, the only significant difference
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relates to the revenues from fines and fees for the year 2002. Evidence on the remaining
outcome variables shows that, on average, treatment and control councils did not execute
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Fig 4.2: Yearly Dummies. This figure provides plots depicting the coefficient estimates for yearly dummy variables
indicating the treatment group for the pre-treatment period, 2002-2009. Data on the local property tax rate is only available
from 2003 onward due to a fiscal reform. Coefficients are obtained in a model controlling for municipality and year fixed
effects. Caped lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Finally, Figure 4.3 provides a third and last standard test of the common trends as-
sumption. Each outcome variable is regressed on a linear time trend and a group-specific
trend (De Jong et al., 2011). As before, the model specifies both year and municipality
fixed effects. Coefficient estimates assess the existence of a pre-existing differential trend
in municipalities subject to treatment. All estimates are insignificant.
All in all, the three tests support the assumption of common trends in the fiscal out-
comes under study for treatment and control municipalities. In light of these tests however,
results on the impact of term limits on the revenues from fines and fees should be taken
with a grain of salt whenever the model does not control for differential trends. For the re-
maining fiscal variables, diff-in-diff coefficient estimates are assumed to capture the causal
effect of treatment.
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Fig 4.3: Group-specific Trends. This figure provides a plot depicting the coefficient estimates for a variable
capturing group-specific trends in the pre-treatment period, 2002-2009. Coefficients are obtained in a model controlling for
a linear time trend and municipality and year fixed effects. Caped lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
4.6 Empirical Evidence
4.6.1 Electoral Term and Yearly Effects
Table 4.1 collects the diff-in-diff results for the average treatment effect of term limits on
fiscal policy decisions for the whole 2010-2013 electoral term. Coefficient estimates are
obtained from estimating different variations of the diff-in-diff model in Equation (4.1).
Model (1) provides the baseline relying solely on municipality and year fixed effects, while
models (2) and (3) test the robustness of the results to district-specific time trends and
district-year fixed effects. Specifications (4), (5) and (6) replicate (1), (2) and (3) including
the vector of control variables. Both the magnitude and significance of the coefficient esti-
mates is consistent across all specifications indicating their robustness to omitted variables
(Altonji et al., 2005).
Results suggest that lame ducks, on average, significantly reduce both the local prop-
erty tax rate and aggregate current expenditures. Coefficient estimates point to a 0.013
percentage points reduction in the tax rate and a decrease of 3.6% (approx. $ 780.000 for
the average municipality) in total current spending.14
Accordingly, the average treatment effect on tax revenues is consistently negative. Esti-
mates are however never significant. Tax revenues depend on a number of other municipal
taxes and therefore do not mimic the movements of the property tax rate alone. Increases
or decreases in this tax are thus susceptible of having no significant impact on the whole
of tax revenue collection.
User charges also appear to decrease in the aftermath of treatment. Revenues from fines
and fees, used as a proxy for the change in user charges, are negative though insignificant.
It can be that lame ducks changed specific user charges with not enough economic impact
14See summary statistics in Table 4.11.
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Table 4.1: Term Treatment Effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fines & fees -0.079 -0.056 -0.054 -0.078 -0.060 -0.059
(0.058) (0.054) (0.055) (0.058) (0.008) (0.055)
Tax rate -0.014** -0.012** -0.012** -0.014** -0.012** -0.013**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Tax revenues -0.029 -0.013 -0.018 -0.026 -0.013 -0.016
(0.030) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020)
C. Expenditure -0.036** -0.034** -0.034** -0.036** -0.036*** -0.036***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
District trends No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
District x year No No Yes No No Yes
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3333 3333 3333 3297 3297 3297
Notes: This table presents the baseline results on the average treatment effect of a binding term limit on fiscal policy. The
left column lists the dependent variables. Results are obtained from the estimation of Eq. (4.1). All estimates include
municipality and year fixed effects. Model (2) adds district-specific time trends and model (3) district-year fixed effects.
Models (4), (5) and (6) replicate (1), (2) and (3), respectively, adding the vector of control variables. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels of 10%(*), 5%(**) and
1%(***).
on the entire revenue item, similar to the relation between the property tax rate and the
resulting collected tax revenues. On the other hand, the overall revenue from fines and fees
is already small when compared to other sources of municipal funding, not leaving much
leeway for incumbents to significantly decrease it further given the available instruments.
The annual average treatment effects in Table 4.2 in turn, obtained from estimating
Equation (4.2) for the most conservative specification, i.e. model (6), are in line with the
previous assessment and provide additional information as to the timing of the mayoral
response to term limits.15 The yearly treatment effects show that the significant drop in
the property tax rate occurs in the last two years of the electoral term, whilst the drop in
current expenditure happens throughout the first three years. In fact, in the election year
lame ducks no longer spend significantly less than re-eligible mayors. Either all mayors
choose to spend less in the year leading up to the election or lame ducks use the cushion
created in the preceding years to restore expenditure levels right before the election.
In addition, although the average electoral term treatment effect on tax revenues is
insignificant, the study of annual effects provides evidence of a significant decrease in
tax revenue collection in the election year. This comes presumably as a result of the
significantly lower property tax rate in the later years of the electoral term.
Overall, the present results appear in contrast to previous evidence in the literature.
Rather than having a positive and significant effect on spending (Besley and Case, 1995,
2003) and tax revenues (Alt et al., 2011), term limits lead to a general reduction in current
15Results are robust to the different specifications.
68
The Political Economy of Electoral Reforms
Table 4.2: Annual Treatment Effects.
Fines Property Tax Current
& Fees Tax Rate Revenues Expenditure
2010 -0.020 -0.004 0.004 -0.030*
(0.051) (0.006) (0.022) (0.016)
2011 -0.029 -0.007 0.007 -0.044***
(0.061) (0.007) (0.023) (0.016)
2012 -0.069 -0.019** -0.009 -0.036**
(0.067) (0.007) (0.023) (0.015)
2013 -0.116 -0.020** -0.065** -0.033
(0.073) (0.008) (0.030) (0.020)
District trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
District x year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3297 3025 3297 3297
Notes: This table presents the baseline results on the annual treatment effect of a binding term limit on fiscal policy.
The first row lists the dependent variables. Results are obtained from the estimation of Eq. (4.2). All estimates include
municipality and year fixed effects, district-specific time trends, district-year fixed effects and the vector of control variables.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels of
10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
expenditure and the property tax rate, with lame ducks pursuing a more conservative fiscal
policy. Still, evidence indicates a possible term-limits-induced fiscal policy cycle as argued
in Besley and Case (1995). Section 4.7.1 studies whether that is the case in the present
institutional setting. Nevertheless, average electoral term effects show that overall, both
spending and tax rates are on average significantly lower in treated municipalities.
There are multiple possible explanations for the more conservative behavior exhibited
by lame ducks. Even though certain hypothesis coming from the standard literature on
term limits such as lack of effort or opportunistic behavior do not appear to fit the present
evidence, theories base on the increased experience of long-term officials could motivate
the assessed outcomes. It is however not clear what would be the incentives behind such
commitment in the face of a binding term limit except for perhaps party loyalty or repu-
tational concerns. In fact, 97 of the 150 termed-out mayors continued to pursue a political
career closely related to public administration. The study of heterogeneous effects in the
following section is meant to clarify the mechanisms behind these results.
4.6.2 Heterogeneous Effects
In order to identify the motivation behind the lame ducks’ response to term limits, this
section analyzes the presence of heterogeneous effects. For the purpose, inference is based
on the estimation of both Equations (4.3) and (4.4) with Hit identifying different non-
overlapping groups, in particular left- from right-leaning lame ducks.
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Testing for ideologically motivated treatment effects provides a solid ground to infer
upon a number of possible mechanisms beyond political preferences. If left- and right-
leaning term-limited officeholders behave differently, encompassing explanations, as ex-
perience, party loyalty, or lack of effort, do not justify the treatment effects adequately.
Indeed, in case any of these mechanisms is behind the assessed results, these should on
average not significantly hinge on partisan affiliation. If there are significant heterogeneous
effects however, the causal effect of term limits is presumably working through politicians’
intrinsic preferences or motivations.
Results collected in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show significant evidence of heterogeneous effects
contingent on party affiliation. The fiscal policy choices of right-leaning ineligible mayors
appear to be driving the baseline results, with coefficient estimates for left-leaning lame
ducks being either insignificant, in the case of the property tax rate, or symmetric to the
previously assessed results.
Table 4.3: Heterogeneous Term Treatment Effects.
Fines Property Tax Current
& Fees Tax Rate Revenues Expenditure
2010-13 -0.071 -0.0106 -0.00522 -0.0598***
(0.061) (0.00709) (0.0244) (0.0149)
Hit -0.006 0.0152** 0.0144 -0.0117
(0.037) (0.00731) (0.0161) (0.00994)
Hi,t>t0 0.032 -0.00169 -0.0190 0.0510***
(0.075) (0.00731) (0.0281) (0.0162)
District trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
District x year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3297 3025 3297 3297
Notes: This table presents the results on average heterogeneous treatment effects of a binding term limit on fiscal policy
when a lame duck is left leaning. The first row lists the dependent variables. Results are obtained from the estimation of Eq.
(4.3). All estimates include municipality and year fixed effects, district-specific time trends, district-year fixed effects and
the vector of control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars
indicate significance levels of 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
That right-leaning lame ducks are responsible for the fiscally conservative response
to term limits identified in the baseline results is consistent with the findings in Besley
and Case (1995) attributing the loose fiscal policy caused by binding term limits to the
Democrats. Taken together, one possible explanation for both results is that when reputa-
tion becomes less important due to ineligibility, rather than less effort as suggest in Besley
and Case (1995), officeholders act more truthfully as modeled in Smart and Sturm (2013).
Ideology may show once mayors are no longer electorally held accountable.
This possible mechanism is in addition, in line with evidence suggesting that the U.S.
electorate is fiscally conservative (Peltzman, 1992). The rationale is as follow, given a
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Table 4.4: Heterogeneous Annual Treatment Effects.
Fines Property Tax Current
& Fees Tax Rate Revenues Expenditure
2010 -0.006 0.000 0.028 -0.054***
(0.054) (0.006) (0.025) (0.019)
2011 -0.055 -0.002 0.014 -0.073***
(0.069) (0.007) (0.028) (0.018)
2012 -0.079 -0.020** 0.004 -0.059***
(0.073) (0.009) (0.027) (0.018)
2013 -0.145* -0.021** -0.067* -0.054**
(0.082) (0.010) (0.035) (0.025)
Hit -0.006 0.015** 0.014 -0.012
(0.037) (0.007) (0.016) (0.010)
Hi,2010 -0.021 -0.008 -0.048 0.051***
(0.068) (0.007) (0.031) (0.018)
Hi,2011 0.063 -0.010 -0.011 0.064***
(0.084) (0.007) (0.031) (0.021)
Hi,2012 0.028 0.004 -0.025 0.048**
(0.092) (0.010) (0.031) (0.020)
Hi,2013 0.061 0.007 0.009 0.041
(0.096) (0.011) (0.040) (0.025)
District trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
District x year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3297 3025 3297 3297
Notes: This table presents the results on annual heterogeneous treatment effects of a binding term limit on fiscal policy
when a lame duck is left leaning. The first row lists the dependent variables. Results are obtained from the estimation of Eq.
(4.4). All estimates include municipality and year fixed effects, district-specific time trends, district-year fixed effects and
the vector of control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars
indicate significance levels of 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
conservative electoral district, re-eligible incumbents choose on average more conserva-
tive policies to boost their re-election probability. Once faced with binding term limits,
Democrats choose unconstrained optimal fiscal policies that are on average looser than
Republicans’. By the same token and relying on the evidence above, the Portuguese elec-
torate appears to be fiscally liberal. Thus right-leaning ineligible incumbents feel free to
pursue a more conservative fiscal policy. Furthermore, this theory would also be in line
with the fact that the median voter in Portugal is likely poorer than in the U.S. and thus
more prone to favor redistributive policies.
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4.7 Extensions
4.7.1 Political Business Cycle
Evidence from the PBC literature usually identifies an electorally induced expansionary
policy in the year(s) preceding the election financed by a recessionary beginning of the
term. Even though the baseline results in the previous section provide evidence of a
similar pattern for aggregate current expenditures, in order to assess whether term limits
introduced a fiscal cycle in the current accounts of treated municipalities it is necessary
to identify the general fiscal policy pattern in control municipalities. Hence, this section
re-analyzes the impact of term limits on fiscal outcomes controlling for the specific year of
the electoral term so that it is possible to identify any significant changes to the pattern of
fiscal policy in treated municipalities. Inference is based on the following regression model:








δ−τ Bi,t−τ ) + Z
′
itβ + ǫit (4.5)
where j = 1, . . . , 4 indexes the four years in an electoral term. The dummy variables eyj
indicate each year of the electoral term and the resulting γj parameter estimates can be
thought of as electoral year fixed effects. The second interaction controls for group-specific
patterns in fiscal policy decisions for each specific year of the electoral term. Finally, the
third interaction identifies the change in decision patterns from pre- to post-treatment
period in treated municipalities controlling for the electoral year. In other words, the δ
parameters estimate how policy decisions of lame ducks compare with the ones of re-eligible
incumbents for the same year of the electoral term.
Regression results obtained from estimating Equation (4.5) indicate whether term limits
introduced or simply altered a pre-existing cycle in fiscal policy. Table 4.5 collects the
coefficient estimates for the most conservative specification.16 The first year of the electoral
terms is the omitted category.
Altogether, results suggest that rather than introducing a fiscal cycle, term limits
mainly induce a change in how the increase in current aggregate expenditure in election
years is financed. Evidence points to the existence of a PBC in both treated and control
municipalities, with mayors increasing expenditures in election years independently of el-
igibility for office. However, re-eligible officeholders finance this increase in expenditure
through higher tax revenues whilst lame ducks appear to rely on the cushion created by
lower spending on the first years of the electoral term.
4.7.2 Mayoral Resignation
In the 2010-2013 electoral term, as in previous terms, a number of mayors resigned from
office. Yet, during this particular term 24 mayors stepped down in comparison to five and
16Results are robust to the different specifications.
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Table 4.5: Political Business Cycle.
Fines Property Tax Current
& Fees Tax Rate Revenues Expenditure
γ2 -0.064 0.067* -0.057 0.009
(0.125) (0.036) (0.036) (0.023)
γ3 -0.050 -0.040 -0.070 -0.047
(0.082) (0.034) (0.044) (0.029)
γ4 -0.017 0.089* 0.167*** 0.082***
(0.064) (0.050) (0.042) (0.028)
γ2 · Ci -0.064* -0.001 -0.005 0.007
(0.037) (0.005) (0.020) (0.010)
γ3 · Ci -0.045 -0.005 0.006 -0.007
(0.036) (0.005) (0.016) (0.009)
γ4 · Ci -0.037 0.004 0.010 -0.001
(0.036) (0.003) (0.015) (0.009)
γ2 ·Bit 0.005 -0.006 0.014 -0.047***
(0.070) (0.008) (0.029) (0.018)
γ3 ·Bit -0.055 -0.014* -0.013 -0.027
(0.068) (0.008) (0.025) (0.016)
γ4 ·Bit -0.109 -0.024*** -0.073** -0.029
(0.072) (0.008) (0.029) (0.019)
District trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
District x year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3297 3025 3297 3297
Notes: This table presents the results on the treatment effect of a binding term limit on the pattern of fiscal policy. The first
row lists the dependent variables. Results are obtained from the estimation of Eq. (4.5). All estimates include municipality
and year fixed effects, district-specific time trends, district-year fixed effects and the vector of control variables. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels of 10%(*), 5%(**)
and 1%(***).
eleven during the previous 2006-2009 and 2002-2005 electoral terms, respectively. More-
over, all resigning mayors were lame ducks.
It appears as though a number of officeholders, faced with the impossibility of running
for re-election, strategically decided to resign and give their successor in the party list
a chance to take the lead. In fact, when a mayor resigns, the vice-president, a fellow
councilman often from the same party, steps in and assumes office until the next election.
In 20 out of the 24 municipalities where a lame duck resigned, the substitute mayor ran
for the top chief executive position in the 2013 local elections.
Including this strategic response by officeholders into the analysis as a second treatment
shows whether results are somehow driven by this small sample of municipalities or if there
are significant heterogeneous effects that can shed more light into the underlying mechanics
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of term limitations. By letting Hit in Equations (4.3) and (4.4) indicate every municipality-
year observation where a mayor resigned from office, it is possible to compare fiscal policy
decisions by re-eligible incumbents, lame ducks, and eligible substitute officeholders.
Most resignations took place in the year preceding the election meaning that up to
that point all term-limited municipalities were under the control of a lame duck, while
in the election year substitute mayors were already in office. Thus in the following it is
assumed that coefficient estimates for the first three years of the electoral term provide
heterogeneous effects for resigning lame ducks, and election year coefficient estimates refer
to policy choices by substitute eligible mayors.
Term and annual average treatment effects are collected in Tables 4.6 and 4.7, respec-
tively. Eligible substitute mayors behave no different than the average re-eligible mayor.
Their incentives should indeed be the same provided eligible officeholders on average run
for the elections, as is most often the case. Also resigning and non-resigning term-limited
incumbents appear to face similar incentives inasmuch as both significantly decrease aggre-
gate current expenditure. Resigning mayors however, do it to a larger extent. This result
is presumably due to the fact that the majority of resigning lame ducks belong to parties
on the right side of the political spectrum.
Table 4.6: Resigning Mayors – Term Treatment Effects.
Fines Property Tax Current
& Fees Tax Rate Revenues Expenditure
2010-13 -0.058 -0.013** -0.006 -0.032**
(0.057) (0.006) (0.021) (0.013)
Hit -0.063 0.001 -0.015 0.014
(0.073) (0.012) (0.038) (0.019)
Hi,t>t0 0.070 0.003 -0.051 -0.041
(0.135) (0.015) (0.049) (0.029)
District trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
District x year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3297 3025 3297 3297
Notes: This table presents the results on average heterogeneous treatment effects of a binding term limit on fiscal policy
when a lame duck resigns. The first row lists the dependent variables. Results are obtained from the estimation of Eq. (4.3).
All estimates include municipality and year fixed effects, district-specific time trends, district-year fixed effects and the vector
of control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate
significance levels of 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
Furthermore, evidence shows that lame ducks incur significantly lower current expen-
ditures also in the election year. The insignificance of the baseline coefficient estimates
is thus likely driven by the increased expenditure of substitute mayors. In fact, evidence
suggests that term-limited incumbents on average pursue a consistent low spending policy
combined with reduced tax rates throughout the whole electoral term whilst substitute
mayors engage in a fiscal policy cycle as does the average re-eligible mayor.
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Table 4.7: Resigning Mayors – Annual Treatment Effects
Fines Property Tax Current
& Fees Tax Rate Revenues Expenditure
2010 -0.014 -0.004 0.009 -0.027
(0.051) (0.006) (0.023) (0.017)
2011 -0.021 -0.007 0.019 -0.037**
(0.064) (0.007) (0.024) (0.016)
2012 -0.085 -0.020** -0.000 -0.029*
(0.070) (0.008) (0.024) (0.016)
2013 -0.110 -0.022*** -0.052* -0.035*
(0.076) (0.008) (0.031) (0.021)
Hit -0.063 0.001 -0.015 0.014
(0.073) (0.012) (0.038) (0.019)
Hi,2010 0.037 -0.005 -0.017 -0.035
(0.170) (0.015) (0.046) (0.031)
Hi,2011 0.019 0.000 -0.070 -0.064*
(0.135) (0.015) (0.051) (0.033)
Hi,2012 0.188 0.002 -0.042 -0.068**
(0.140) (0.016) (0.055) (0.033)
Hi,2013 0.035 0.014 -0.076 0.004
(0.158) (0.019) (0.063) (0.048)
District trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
District x year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3297 3025 3297 3297
Notes: This table presents the results on annual heterogeneous treatment effects of a binding term limit on fiscal policy
when a lame duck resigns. The first row lists the dependent variables. Results are obtained from the estimation of Eq. (4.4).
All estimates include municipality and year fixed effects, district-specific time trends, district-year fixed effects and the vector
of control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate
significance levels of 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
4.8 Robustness Checks
4.8.1 Selection Bias
The first robustness test tackles a potential problem with diff-and-diff regressions that
relates to issues of selection bias. In principle, municipalities are exogenously assigned to
treatment and control group. Only then can a differential change in the outcome variables
from pre- to post-treatment period be attributed to the change in treatment assignment.
If that is not the case there may be intrinsic differences between the two groups that are
affecting the results which can no longer be interpreted as causal effects of treatment.
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It is possible to test for selection bias in a number of ways. The second test on pre-
existing group-specific trends in section 4.5.2 for example, also serves the purpose of testing
for selection. The fact that year dummies indicating treatment municipalities during the
pre-treatment period are insignificant points to an exogenous treatment assignment. More-
over, the fact that coefficient estimates remain consistent both in terms of magnitude and
significance after the introduction of a vector of variables controlling for a number of ob-
servables asserts their robustness not only to selection on observables but also to selection
on unobservables as proposed in Altonji et al. (2005).
The most common approach in the context of a diff-in-diff framework however, is to
devise placebo tests. Placebo tests for diff-in-diff methodologies usually consist on re-
estimating the baseline results relying on a placebo treatment setting in at a fake treatment
year (De Jong et al., 2011). Here, the sample is restricted to the pre-treatment period, i.e.
2002-2009, and the regression model in Equation (4.1) is re-estimated with dt indicating
a placebo treatment setting in after the 2005 election, for the 2006-2009 electoral term.
As Table 4.8 shows, estimates are close to zero and always insignificant dismissing any
remaining concerns of a possible selection bias.
Table 4.8: Placebo Treatment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fines & fees 0.025 0.041 0.043 0.031 0.049 -0.051
(0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044)
Tax rate -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Tax revenues -0.022 -0.006 -0.005 -0.021 -0.005 -0.006
(0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020)
C. Expenditure -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
District trends No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
District x year No No Yes No No Yes
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2221 2221 2221 2197 2197 2197
Notes: This table presents the results of a placebo treatment on fiscal policy. The left column lists the dependent variables.
Results are obtained from the estimation of Eq. (4.1) with dt indicating a placebo treatment for the electoral year 2006-2009.
All estimates include municipality and year fixed effects. Model (2) adds district-specific time trends and model (3) district-
year fixed effects. Models (4), (5) and (6) replicate (1), (2) and (3), respectively, adding the vector of control variables.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels of
10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
4.8.2 Controlling for Anticipation Effects
As suggested in Malani and Reif (2015), often pre-trends can and should be interpreted as
anticipation effects. In the context of the reform under study, controlling for anticipation
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effects is of particular interest as the law limiting consecutive mayoral mandates established
a stand-by period of one electoral term before becoming effective.
It is possible that forward-looking officeholders reacted to the now limited perspectives
of long-term mayorships already in the 2006-2009 electoral term. If that was the case,
credibly identifying the treatment effect involves controlling for anticipation effects. Fol-
lowing Malani and Reif (2015) and taking into account that the stand-by period during
which anticipation effects may occur is known and finite, inference is based on the following
quasi-myopic model:




δ+τ Bi,t+τ + Z
′
itβ + γi + γt + γs · t+ γst + ǫit (4.6)
where the sum allows for q leads or anticipation effects with the dummies Bi,t+τ equal to
one if the reform takes place in year t+ τ . The number of leading indicators that address
anticipation is q = 4, the four years of the electoral term 2006-2009.
Table 4.9: Quasi-myopic model.
Fines Property Tax Current
& Fees Tax Rate Revenues Expenditure
Term limit -0.031 -0.016* -0.018 -0.038**
(0.066) (0.009) (0.026) (0.016)
Ex ante effect (t+ 1) 0.060 -0.009 -0.021 -0.017
(0.061) (0.008) (0.025) (0.018)
Ex ante effect (t+ 2) -0.059 -0.015** -0.012 -0.019
(0.058) (0.008) (0.027) (0.014)
Ex ante effect (t+ 3) 0.057 0.002 0.012 0.005
(0.053) (0.007) (0.032) (0.019)
Ex ante effect (t− 4) 0.042 -0.001 0.003 0.008
(0.043) (0.006) (0.022) (0.009)
District trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
District x year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3297 3025 3297 3297
Notes: This table presents the quasi-myopic results on the average treatment effect of a binding term limit on fiscal policy.
The first row lists the dependent variables. Results are obtained from the estimation of Eq. (4.6). All estimates include
municipality and year fixed effects, district-specific time trends, district-year fixed effects and the vector of control variables.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels of
10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
Results in Table 4.9 are in line with the baseline average treatment effects. There is
a significant anticipation effect for the property tax rate series in the year 2008 in line
with the actual treatment effect for the year 2012. This effect suggests that strategic
decisions already took place in anticipation of treatment. Still, the magnitude of the
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average treatment effect on the property tax rate even after controlling for anticipation
effects remains basically unchanged. So does the magnitude of the average treatment
effect on current expenditures.
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Fig 4.4: Yearly Effects. This figure provides plots depicting the coefficient estimates for yearly dummy variables
indicating the treatment group for the whole sample period 2002-2013. Data on the local property tax rate is only available
from 2003 onwards due to a fiscal reform. Results are obtained from the estimation of Eq. (4.7). All estimates include
municipality and year fixed effects, district-specific time trends, district-year fixed effects and the vector of control variables.
Dashed lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.
Finally, although the pre-trends analysis in section 4.5.2 does not provide evidence of
differential trends – except for the revenues from fines and fees item that is insignificant
throughout the regression results – and the previous section shows that results are robust
to anticipation effects, this section re-estimates the treatment effects controlling for pre-
existing time trends. Group-specific trends are controlled for in two ways based on the
second and third tests in section 4.5.2 and the focus here is on the annual treatment effects.
The first approach combines Equations (4.2) and (4.6) in a regression model allowing
for leads, or group-specific differential outcomes, and lags, or annual treatment effects
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(Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Autor, 2003; Reber, 2005). In particular, coefficient estimates









δ+τ Bi,t+τ + Z
′
itβ + γi + γt + γs · t+ γst + ǫit (4.7)
where the sums specify m lags and q leads. Whilst the number of lags is again m = 4, one
for each year of the 2010-2013 electoral term, the number of leads is q = 8, as in section
4.5.2 instead of q = 4 as before. Each lead corresponds to one year of the pre-treatment
period, from 2002 to 2009. Again, 2004 is the omitted category.
Table 4.10: Group-specific Trends.
Fines Property Tax Current
& Fees Tax Rate Revenues Expenditure
2010 0.009 -0.010 0.006 -0.041*
(0.086) (0.013) (0.035) (0.024)
2011 0.000 -0.013 0.009 -0.055**
(0.092) (0.014) (0.036) (0.021)
2012 -0.040 -0.025* -0.007 -0.047**
(0.095) (0.014) (0.036) (0.022)
2013 -0.087 0.026* -0.064 -0.043
(0.099) (0.014) (0.042) (0.027)
District trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
District x year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3297 3025 3297 3297
Notes: This table presents the results on the annual treatment effect of a binding term limit on fiscal policy controlling
for group-specific pre-existing trends. The first row lists the dependent variables. Results are obtained from the estimation
of an extended version of Eq. (4.2) including a linear time trend and a treatment group specific time trend. All estimates
include municipality and year fixed effects, district-specific time trends, district-year fixed effects and the vector of control
variables. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance
levels of 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
For simplicity and compactness evidence is presented in the form of a graphical analysis.
Figure 4.4 shows a graph for each outcome variable under study. The first plot shows that
even when controlling for pre-existing group-specific trends, revenues from fines and fees
are not affected by the introduction of term limits.
Graphs for the remaining outcome variables show insignificant coefficient estimates for
the whole duration of the pre-treatment period and depict, for the post-treatment years,
a path in line with the results obtained for the baseline annual treatment effects. The
average property tax rate is significantly lower in treatment municipalities for the last two
years of the 2010-2013 electoral term, tax revenues are significantly lower in 2013 and the
meaningful drop in current expenditure occurs in the early years of the term, even when
controlling for pre-existing differential trends.
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In the second approach, Equation (4.2) is re-estimated for a specification including,
in addition, both a linear time trend and a treatment group specific pre-trend (Moser
and Voena, 2012). Table 4.10 collects the coefficient estimates. These too, are in line
with the previously assessed results lending increased robustness to the baseline estimates.
Altogether, the various tests validate the reliance on the diff-in-diff approach as a suitable
identification strategy.
4.9 Conclusion
The introduction of term limits at the Portuguese local elections level provides an oppor-
tunity to analyze the economic consequences of an exogenous variation in eligibility for
re-election. Using electoral and fiscal data on the 278 municipalities in continental Portu-
gal for the past 12 years encompassing the last three complete electoral terms, inference is
based on a quasi-experimental diff-in-diff approach that allows for a causal interpretation
of the estimated treatment effects.
In contrast to the U.S. centered literature, results provide robust evidence of a decrease
in the local property tax rate and aggregate current expenditure in treated municipalities
with lame ducks engaging in a more conservative fiscal policy driven by a lack of re-election
incentives. Significant heterogeneous effects indicate that political preferences are behind
the change in fiscal policy choices of ineligible mayors. Results fit a model of distortionary
elections predicting a more truthful behavior of politicians bound by term limits as in Smart
and Sturm (2013). Not only do fiscal cycles pre-date the introduction of term limits, but
also only eligible officeholders, rather than lame ducks, appear to engage in distortionary
policies. Furthermore, despite the long tenures of the present lame ducks there is no clear
evidence of their relatively higher experience.
This study challenges the standard approach of disciplining elections, opportunistic
lame ducks and term limits induced fiscal cycles established by Besley and Case (1995).
However, even the results therein could fit a model predicting a more candid behavior
by term limited incumbents as Democrats are responsible for the identified loose fiscal
policy of lame ducks. This theory is in turn consistent with the evidence of a conservative
electorate in the U.S. (Peltzman, 1992) and is consistent with distortionary elections and
the existence of electorally driven PBC instead of disciplining elections and undesirable
term limitations.
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Table 4.11: Summary Statistics.
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. N
Fines and Fees overall 16.572 18.088 .741 589.077 3333
between 13.183 2.526 113.342 278
within 12.404 -69.329 492.308 11.989
Property Tax overall .380 .085 .2 .5 3058
between .064 .218 .464 278
within .056 .143 .607 11
Tax revenues overall 140.068 124.081 6.582 1312.731 3333
between 117.361 36.677 811.033 278
within 40.725 -134.751 660.493 11.989
Current Expenditures overall 554.899 272.574 85.451 2007.682 3333
between 254.888 211.185 1650.912 278
within 97.580 110.862 1311.723 11.898
Resignation rate overall .050 .219 0 1 3336
between .126 0 .667 278
within .179 -.616 .717 12
Aligment overall .976 .152 0 1 3336
between .087 .417 1 278
within .125 .0597 1.560 12
Left overall .511 .500 0 1 3336
between .434 0 1 278
within .249 -.405 1.428 12
Local Economy overall 283.503 214.436 12.073 3792.383 3300
between 193.111 12.286 2498.046 275
within 93.890 -677.495 1577.84 12
Inhabitants overall 36165.72 57587 1634 549766 3336
between 57607 1768.083 514263 278
within 2939.726 -8588.284 83074.13 12
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Chapter 5
Identifying the Source of Incumbency
Advantage through a Constitutional Reform∗
5.1 Introduction
Incumbency advantage, generally defined as the returns from holding office, has long been
regarded exclusively as a personal affair. The early literature focuses on the role of the
officeholder as the driver of the incumbency effect, offering several reasons for its exis-
tence, such as name recognition and media exposure (Erikson, 1971), the performance of
constituency services (Fiorina, 1989), the control over relevant resources and institutional
privileges (Mayhew, 1974), the conviction that incumbency works rather as a voting cue
(Kostroski, 1973), the ability to scare-off high quality challengers (Jacobson, 1978) or the
officeholder’s quality and experience (Cox and Katz, 1996).
This “direct officeholder benefit” (Levitt and Wolfram, 1997) or “personal vote” (An-
solabehere et al., 2000) is referred to in the following as the personal incumbency advantage.
A quantity scholars repeatedly tried to credibly identify often running into issues of selec-
tion on observables and endogeneity. While early estimates of the effect rely on variants of
two popular measures, the sophomore surge (Erikson, 1971) and the retirement slump (Al-
ford and Brady, 1989), simply opposing vote margins in open versus incumbent-contested
seats, testing and controlling for each of the different explanations above eventually led
to the use of increasingly more sophisticated methodologies.1 Still, only recently was the
non-randomness of incumbency advantage systematically addressed with Lee (2008) ap-
plying a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to the analysis. This methodological
breakthrough came, however, at the expense of an abstraction from the standard concept
of incumbency advantage. Rather than analyzing the extent to which a candidate bene-
fits by virtue of being the incumbent, the new framework tries to assess the benefits that
∗See Lopes da Fonseca (2015a).
1 Some examples include explicitly or implicitly addressing challenger quality following the paper by
Jacobson (1978). Later, Gelman and King (1990) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997) also control for the
normal vote and partisan tides. In Ansolabehere et al. (2000) and Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004),
endogeneity concerns are first tackled using decennial redistricting as a natural experiment and an IV
approach aimed at correcting for strategic retirement, respectively.
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accrue to a candidate from running for the incumbent party, i.e. the partisan incumbency
advantage.
Despite the breach with the previous literature, exploring the existence of a partisan
incumbency advantage is of relevance.2 Just as parties benefit from running an incumbent
officeholder, it is also reasonable to assume that a candidate benefits from running for
an incumbent party. In fact, many of the explanations for the existence of a personal
incumbency advantage may also justify a partisan one. Parties are likewise in control of
institutional resources and may have access to privileges, as well as benefit from media
exposure and attested quality. Moreover, studies show that parties introduce strategic
changes to the political system in order to maximize their electoral success (Trebbi et al.,
2008). In addition, it is well-established that parties enjoy loyalty from voters (Aldrich
and Rohde, 2001) and their relevance as political representatives is latent in the main role
they play in Downs’s (1957) theory of democracy. Still, only putting the emphasis on the
candidate can explain certain phenomena such as the successful re-election of candidates
who “cross the floor”.3 These can be found even in the setting at the genesis of the
incumbency advantage literature: the U.S. House of Representatives.4
Therefore, instead of focusing on either the candidate or the party, credibly estimating
the incumbency effect implies that both sources of incumbency advantage are taken into
account. By overlooking this aspect, Lee’s (2008) framework fails to provide an unbiased
estimate of either. Hence, the objective of this paper is to causally estimate the personal
and the partisan effects that contribute to an incumbent’s advantage at the ballot box.
Put differently, this paper measures to what extent being the incumbent officeholder, or
alternatively being the incumbent party, has a causal impact on electoral success.
The identification strategy relies on two quasi-experimental methods, the RDD and the
difference-in-discontinuities (diff-in-disc) design, and on a natural experiment, the intro-
duction of mayoral term limits in Portuguese municipalities. In Portugal, mayoral elections
correspond to the proportional elections for the local council, the municipality’s executive
organ, with the first name on the wining list becoming the mayor. As each mayoral can-
didate represents a party, there is a need to dissociate the two in order to assess their
independent returns to incumbency. This is only possible due to the recent introduction of
term limits. The diff-in-disc design captures the second source of variation resulting from
the exogenous heterogeneity in the implementation of term limits and combines it with the
exogenous variation in incumbency status captured by the RDD focus on close elections.
2 The partisan incumbency advantage as defined in Lee (2008) is different from the partisan strength
present in the previous literature on incumbency where it usually refers to the normal vote and/or national
tides (see e.g. Kostroski (1973)).
3 This term originates from the British House of Commons where an MP would have to literally cross
the floor in order to join the opposition. The term has two different interpretations. Firstly it can refer to
voting against party lines. Secondly and of relevance here, it refers to switching parties altogether.
4 Recent examples include: Philip Gramm, a Texas Congressman, who resigned his seat in the House
as a Democrat in 1983 and was re-elected as a Republican a month later; Rodney Alexander, who first won
his seat as a Democrat in 2002 and later as a Republican in the following five elections; Virgil Goode, a
member of the House from 1979 to 2009, serving as a Democrat until 2000 and as a Republican thereafter.
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Finally, a system of equations relating partisan to personal incumbency advantage in the
spirit of Fowler and Hall (2014) provides credible estimates of the two quantities.
This paper primarily contributes to the incumbency advantage literature, by providing
one of the first causal estimates of both the personal and partisan effects, and to the liter-
ature on voting behavior to the extent that it provides evidence on the relative importance
of party versus candidate for electoral success. To my knowledge the only study offering
causal evidence on the disentangled partisan and personal incumbency effects is Fowler
and Hall (2014). Their findings, based on a sample of U.S. state legislative elections, show
that incumbency is personal.
The main differences of this study consist of its reliance on a recent natural experiment
that introduces a second source of exogenous variation into the analysis and on a novel
identification strategy that uses the diff-in-disc design to disentangle the personal and
partisan effects. In addition, this paper contributes to the discussion by extending Fowler
and Hall’s (2014) result in three ways. First, this study looks at a different country in what
is a very American-centric topic. Second, it investigates an executive rather than legislative
position. Despite the greater visibility of an executive position, most explanations for a
positive personal incumbency advantage are usually linked to the role of a legislator. Third,
it deals with a proportional representation (PR) system. Even though a significant partisan
effect is more likely in a PR system, as the focus is most often directed to the parties and
the cost of updated political information increases with increasing electoral candidates,
results still support the early focus on candidates.
5.2 Incumbency Advantage and the Electoral Process
Whilst it may simply convey an electorate’s satisfaction with the elected representative, the
existence of an incumbency advantage can also pose a threat to equality of opportunities
jeopardizing the competitiveness of electoral races and political accountability (Carson
et al., 2007). Identifying the source of the incumbency effect not only unveils who is held
responsible in the eyes of the voters but also provides a better general understanding of
voting behavior, eventually leading to better policy choices.
The literature on voting behavior offers four standard explanations on how people vote:
retrospectively, according to partisan affiliation, and based on candidates’ issue positions
or likeability. Evidence on the first is largely inconclusive. Peltzman (1987), for example,
shows that voters in U.S. gubernatorial elections respond to economic conditions while
Oliver and Ha (2007) find no relation between voters’ ratings of government performance
and actual votes for a sample of U.S. municipalities. It is often argued that, at the local
level, retrospective voting is made difficult by the wide range of responsibilities accruing
to the officeholders. In general, evidence suggests that retrospective voting hinges on the
extent to which information is available to the electorate (Brender, 2003; Berry and Howell,
2007).
Also scant evidence shows voters basing their decisions on candidates’ issue positions
(Oliver and Ha, 2007). Indeed, information on candidates’ stances is arguably hard to ob-
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tain (Conover and Feldman, 1989) and assuming an at large informed electorate is unlikely
to hold in most political contexts (Downs, 1957). Therefore, information may well lie at
the core of voting behavior, with better informed voters being less likely to be swayed by
party loyalty or incumbency status (Bartels, 1996), and the average uninformed electorate
relying heavily on partisan or incumbency cues.
Accordingly, several studies across different levels of government demonstrate the im-
portance of party affiliation and partisan endorsements on voting behavior (Lee et al.,
2004; Snyder and Groseclose, 2000) as well as the relevance of candidates’ characteristics
and likeability (Lieske, 1989). The latter to the extent that inferences of competence from
candidates’ facial appearance correctly predict actual election outcomes of French parlia-
mentary and U.S. congressional elections (Antonakis and Dalgas, 2009; Todorov et al.,
2005). This is in line with evidence in Oliver and Ha (2007) that shows that, contrary to
the standard view that incumbency is an advantage particularly in smaller settings due
to increased visibility and familiarity, incumbency rather becomes more important with
increasing population size as access to detailed information diminishes.
Yet, there is no conclusive evidence on whether the partisan or the candidate cue holds
a higher electoral strength. Inasmuch as incumbency shapes voting behavior, identifying
the driver of incumbency advantage can provide the means to infer upon the relative
importance of each. A significant personal (partisan) effect means the candidate (party) is
guiding voter’s decisions by being ultimately held accountable at the ballot. The effect can
be either positive or negative, and any but a similar personal and partisan effect implies
an uneven balance of powers between the officeholder and the party.
Whether the incumbency advantage is personal, partisan or a combination of the two
has different implications for politics at large. If the personal effect overrides the partisan
one, parties have an incentive to renominate officeholders as well as to acquiesce to their
demands. This may result in political dynasties and the capture of the political system by
individual politicians. Electoral mechanisms such as term limits may be useful in this case
to stimulate competition.
If, on the other hand, parties benefit solely by virtue of their incumbency status, this
means they retain a political advantage even when officeholders retire allowing for more
room to nominate candidates conditional on their alignment with the party and impose the
partisan ideals leading to a centralization of political decisions. Just as before, electoral
competition is threatened, in particular taking into account the evidence on the endogeneity
of political institutions. The introduction of term limits does not imply an increase in
political competition in this case but electoral rules benefiting minority parties could be a
solution.
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5.3 Institutional Background
5.3.1 Local Politics
The institutional setting encompasses all 278 municipalities in continental Portugal for in-
creased comparability.5 Municipalities have two local political institutions: the municipal
council and the municipal assembly. The former and subject of the analysis is the collegial
executive organ accountable to the assembly, the legislative organ with decision-making
power. It is composed by the mayor and other four to ten councilmen depending on the
municipality’s population size.6 With regards to electoral proceedings and term responsi-
bilities, the mayor may be regarded as a local Prime-Minister and the municipal council
as a small parliament. Elections occur simultaneously countrywide every four years. A
PR system of closed lists is in place with seats being distributed according to the D’Hont
method. The first name on the winning list becomes the mayor.
Local politics are dominated by the four largest national parties that generally run a list
in every municipality. From left to right in the political spectrum, these are the Communist
Party (PCP), the center-left Socialist Party (PS), the center-right Social-Democratic Party
(PSD) and the right-of-center Popular Party (CDS-PP). Winning on average over 100
municipalities each, the two major parties, PS and PSD, are responsible for over two thirds
of the municipal mayorships. Despite the high level of centralization and party discipline,
municipal electoral campaigns are locally-oriented featuring the regional branches of the
different political parties and are led by the mayoral candidates themselves.
5.3.2 Constitutional Reform
For decades, there were no limits to the number of times local politicians could run for
re-election. This changed on January 1st, 2006, upon the entry into force of Law no.
46/2005.7 This law establishes a three consecutive terms limit for incumbent mayors after
which they cannot rerun for the municipal council.8 It was introduced as means to void
unconstrained overstays in office, not unusual at the Portuguese local level, and was first
implemented in the 2013 local elections and binding for 150 municipalities.
Table 5.1 shows that re-election rates are very high at the Portuguese local level render-
ing a particularly interesting setting to investigate the magnitude and source of incumbency
advantage. Before 2013, parties were re-elected on average in 81% of the municipalities.
On the other hand, the absence of term limits enabled a rerunning rate of mayoral can-
didates of 83%, of which over 86% were on average re-elected. In 2013, while only 75%
of the municipalities re-elected the incumbent party, 83% out of 91% of the mayors who
5The 30 municipalities comprising the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira are not included in
the analysis due to different institutional details.
6Two exceptions are the Oporto and Lisbon municipalities with 12 and 16 councilmen, respectively.
7Law no. 46/2005 in Diário da República 165, Series I-A, 29th August 2005.
8Upon entering into force in 2006, the law stipulated a stand-by period of one election, the 2009
elections, where no mayor was termed-out.
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Table 5.1: Rerunning & Success Rates.
1997 2001 2005 2009 2013
Panel A: Officeholder
Rerun N 218 227 233 238 117
% 79 83 84 86 42
Win N 186 188 211 205 97
% 85 83 91 86 83
Panel B: Party
Win N 219 211 234 230 208
% 80 76 84 83 75
Obs. 275 278 278 278 278
Notes: Rerunning and success rates of incumbent officeholders and parties.
stood for re-election won.9 In addition, there is considerable inter-party mobility, with
candidates changing parties or running as independents, with relatively few costs of shift-
ing allegiances. In fact, 24 municipalities have consecutively re-elected mayors upon their
crossing the floor.
5.3.3 Data
The analysis is based on the electoral results of all 278 municipal councils in mainland
Portugal in the past 20 years. Data on local elections are available at the National Electoral
Commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições) and the General Directorate for Internal
Affairs (Direcção Geral da Administração Interna) websites.10 The identity of mayoral
candidates, obtained in the Official Map from the National Electoral Comission published
in Diário da República, is only available from the 1993 local elections onwards. As such,
the underlying dataset collects complete information on electoral results at the party and
mayoral candidates level for the past six elections taking place in 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005,
2009 and 2013.
5.4 Methodology
5.4.1 Incumbency Advantage and the RDD
The two effects that this study quantifies can be formally defined as follows. The personal
incumbency advantage is the difference in vote share received by a candidate running for
9 The incumbent mayor stood for re-election in 117 out of the 128 municipalities without a binding
term limit, being successful in 97.
10http://www.cne.pt and http://www.dgai.mai.gov.pt
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the incumbent party as an incumbent and as a non-incumbent in an open-seat election in
the same municipality i at the same time t. The partisan incumbency advantage, in turn, is
the difference in vote share received by a non-incumbent candidate running in an open-seat
election for the incumbent party and for the same party but with a non-incumbent status
in the same election, i.e. same municipality i at time t.
As can be understood from the above definitions, assessing incumbency advantage is a
classical example of an attempt of causal estimation with missing data as in the context of
a Rubin Causal Model with potential outcomes (Rubin, 1974; Holland, 1986). In an ideal
setting one would be able to compare the above outcomes, in reality only part of these are
observable. Lee (2008) proposes the implementation of an RDD due to its focus on close
elections in order to overcome this difficulty. The rationale runs as follows. Characterized
by a small vote margin, i.e. difference in vote share between the winner and runner-up, close
elections can be thought of as a mechanism simulating a randomized experiment. Parties
with a positive vote margin run as incumbents in the next election whilst parties with
a negative vote margin are non-incumbents. The zero threshold splits the treatment and
control group. In a neighborhood of this threshold, comprising bare winners and bare losers,
all variables determined prior to the election are independent of the resulting incumbency
status. Consequently, any discontinuous jump in the vote share in the neighborhood of the
threshold is entirely attributable to the change in treatment assignment and interpreted
as a causal effect of the treatment, i.e. incumbency.
However, the focus on party-level variables does not by itself imply an unbiased esti-
mation of the partisan incumbency effect as suggested in Lee (2008). Let the treatment
dummy dit denote whether a specific party is the incumbent. Underlying this dummy
variable is the party’s vote margin in the preceding election, the running variable vi,t−1,
with treatment deterministically depending on the value of the running variable as follows
dit = 1 [vi,t−1 > 0]. According to Fowler and Hall (2014), estimating the following general
RDD model
yit = γ0 + γ1vi,t−1 + ρ0dit + ρ1dit · vi,t−1 + ǫit (5.1)
where yit is the outcome variable measuring electoral success and ρ0 the average treat-
ment effect, provides a combination of personal and partisan incumbency advantage as in
Equation (5.2).
ρ0 = 2 · Partisan Adv. + 2 · Prob(Incumbent Reruns) · Personal Adv. (5.2)
Since the incumbency status is always working for one party while harming the other the
RDD estimate double counts both sources of incumbency advantage (Erikson and Titiunik,
2015).11 Additionally, the personal incumbency advantage is multiplied by the probability
that the incumbent is rerunning as this is often, but not always, the case. Parties, on the
contrary, always field a candidate and therefore their probability of rerunning equals one.
11In other words, the incumbent enjoys not only the partisan and personal advantage coming from the
incumbency status, but also the foregone partisan and personal advantage of the competing party had
it won the election. Intuitively, as the vote shares always sum up to 100%, whatever gain an incumbent
collects must be lost by a non-incumbent.
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As a starting point, it is useful to assess this combined effect. For this purpose, inference
is based on two estimation methods. First, a non-parametric local linear regression restricts
the sample in intervals vi,t−1 ∈ [−h, h] to estimate Equation (5.1) (Hahn et al., 2001). For
transparency, in addition to the use of the optimal bandwidth h, selected as in Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012), two other intervals are considered: [−5, 5] and [−10, 10].12 Second,
a spline polynomial approximation of order p in vi,t−1 as in Equation (5.3) estimates the













i,t−1 + ǫit (5.3)
The reliance on both estimation methods attempts to reinforce the robustness of the
results and balance the usual trade-off between precision and bias.13 Nevertheless, results
should be interpreted with caution as observations move away from the zero threshold.
Unlike the U.S., there are a myriad of parties in Portugal, which poses a challenge in
defining the variables at large.14 The strategy employed attempts to take into account
regional heterogeneity and relevant political developments. As such, the 18 Portuguese
districts are treated as 18 independent regions. Upon assessing the strongest party within
each district over the entire sample period, the outcome and the running variables are
constructed accordingly.15 This approach not only maximizes the number of observations
around the zero threshold but also enables a similar interpretation of the coefficient esti-
mates as in a bi-partisan system. Even though the identity of the two major parties differs
significantly by region, it is quite homogeneous within a district and particularly within
a municipality. In fact, it is rare that a municipality has more than two different par-
ties in control of the municipal council during the sample period and elections are usually
effectively fought between these two. Following the literature on incumbency advantage,
the main outcome variable is the baseline party vote share and a second outcome variable
measuring the probability of winning conditional on the incumbency status – a dummy
variable indicating whether the party wins the election at time t – serves as a robustness
test.
In a second step, it is necessary to disentangle the partisan from the personal effect given
by the RDD estimates. Partisan and personal incumbency are, often and non-randomly,
jointly assigned but term limits are a reliable instrument in disentangling the two (Fowler
and Hall, 2014). The following approach relies on the implementation of term limits as
a natural experiment that keeps the incumbency status of the party constant but creates
an exogenous variation in the incumbency status of the candidate. Using a diff-in-disc
design to capture this variation provides for a new method to separate the personal from
the partisan incumbency effect on electoral success.
12 Results are robust to the use of alternative bandwidth selectors proposed in the literature, namely in
Ludwig and Miller (2007) and Calonico et al. (2014). Results are also robust to the interval [−2.5, 2.5].
13For a discussion on the advantages and drawbacks of the different estimation methods see e.g. Imbens
and Lemieux (2007) or Lee and Lemieux (2010).
14 Over 40 different parties and coalitions ran for local elections during the sample period.
15 In practice, different regions have a different baseline party against which incumbency is measured.
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5.4.2 Identification Strategy
The reform introduces a difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff) aspect to the analysis, with
term limits as a second treatment applied in 2013 to municipalities whose incumbent
officeholder has served as a mayor for the past three consecutive terms, loosely defining
a pre- and post-reform period.16 Given the heterogeneity in treatment assignment, it
is possible to rely on both between- and within-municipality variation in estimating the
treatment effect of introducing term limits on electoral success.
Combining this diff-in-diff setting with the RDD methodology in the previous section
results in an extended version of the RDD known as the diff-in-disc design (Grembi et al.,
2015). As the name suggests, the diff-in-disc design estimates the difference between the
two discontinuities in the observed outcome, the one after and the one before the reform.
In its essence, it applies a diff-in-diff to two RDD estimations.
Formally, let Yit(d, b) and Ỹit(d, b), with d = 0, 1 and b = 0, 1, define the potential
outcomes before and in 2013, respectively. The parameter bit indicates a binding term
limit and dit indicates incumbency as before. The RDD estimator in the previous section
is defined as ρ̂0 = Y (1, 0)−Y (0, 0) and identifies the average treatment effect of incumbency
at the threshold as in Equation (5.2). The diff-in-disc estimator in turn, explores the two
discontinuities in the outcome variable as follows:
β̂0 = (Ỹ (1, 1)− Ỹ (0, 0))− (Y (1, 0)− Y (0, 0)) (5.4)
and identifies the difference in the average incumbency effect between term-limited and re-
eligible incumbents at the threshold. Moreover, in the context of the diff-in-disc regression
Ỹ (0, 0) = Y (0, 0) as the control group is the same for the two assessed discontinuities.
Hence, β̂0 = Ỹ (1, 1) − Y (1, 0), clearly defining the diff-in-disc estimator as the change in
an incumbents’ electoral success when facing a term limit. Following the same rational
as in obtaining Equation (5.2), the first bracket on the right-hand-side of Equation (5.4)
provides the following combination of partisan and personal advantage:
Ỹ (1, 1)− Ỹ (0, 0) = 2 · Partisan Adv. + Prob(Incumbent Reruns) · Personal Adv. (5.5)
since the term-limited incumbent enjoys only a partisan incumbency advantage but in
addition benefits from the foregone partisan and personal advantages of the counterfactual
winner of the election at time t− 1. The personal incumbency advantage coming from the
incumbency status is eliminated as the rerunning probability of a ineligible incumbent is
zero.
Empirically, the treatment effect is obtained simply by adding the second treatment
variable, bit, and the appropriate interactions to Equations (5.1) and (5.3) above. Likewise,
it is estimated in the context of a local linear regression model as the following:
yit = γ0 + γ1vi,t−1 + dit(ρ0 + ρ1vi,t−1) + bit [α0 + α1vi,t−1 + dit(β0 + β1vi,t−1)] + ǫit (5.6)
16As not every incumbent is exposed to a term limit, t = 2013 does not clearly divide the sample into pre-
and post-reform periods. Effectively, in 2013 there are three different groups of parties: the incumbents
(all parties that won the election in 2009), the double-treated (the parties that in addition to holding the
incumbency status also face a term limit), and the control.
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restricting the sample to the same bandwidths h around the zero threshold as before, and





























The parameter β0 combines both treatments giving the average treatment effect as in
Equation (5.4). Substituting Equations (5.2) and (5.5) into (5.4) defines the diff-in-disc
estimator as follows
β0 = −Prob(Incumbent Reruns) · Personal Advantage (5.8)
assuming that partisan and personal incumbency advantage remain on average identical
across all election years. Solving the system of two equations and two unknowns given by
Equations (5.2) and (5.8) gives the following expressions:








that allow for identifying the partisan and personal independent returns to incumbency.
In the last step of the analysis, the RDD and diff-in-disc estimates are substituted into this
system of equations to solve for the two quantities of interest. The regressions and system
of equations are re-estimated simultaneously 100,000 times in a non-parametric bootstrap
with replacement clustered at the municipal level, in order to obtain a credible uncertainty
measure for the resulting estimates.
5.5 Empirical Results
5.5.1 RDD and Diff-in-disc Estimates
As is standard in the literature, a first assessment of the results is based on graphical
evidence on the treatment effects. All graphs are constructed by first dividing the running
variable into bins of size one within a bandwidth of [−40, 40]. The outcome variables –
vote share and probability of winning – are then averaged within each bin for the pre- and
post-reform period, i.e. ȳnp with the subscripts n and p indexing bin and period. The RDD
graphs display these observations fit by a local polynomial plot of quadratic degree on each
side of the threshold, relying on a triangular kernel. To obtain the diff-in-disc graphs it is
necessary to first calculate the difference within each bin between the post- and pre-reform
period, ∆yn = (ȳn,1 − ȳn,0), to then plot these differences against the running variable and
fit the observations with a polynomial plot in the same fashion as before.
Figure 5.1 provides the RDD and the diff-in-disc graphs depicting the vote share and
probability of winning in period t against the vote margin in t − 1. All graphs show a
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Fig 5.1: Vote Share and Winning Probability. Graphs plot the vote share at time t against the vote margin at
t − 1. Observations in a bandwidth of [-40, 40] are averaged within bins of size 1% and second degree polynomial plots are
constructed using a triangular kernel. 95% confidence intervals are indicated in gray.
sizable jump around the zero threshold providing evidence of a significant incumbency
effect. For the main outcome variable, the RDD graph suggests a combined personal and
partisan incumbency advantage of around 8 to 10 percentage points, while the diff-in-disc
graph shows a negative discontinuity amounting to 15 percentage points for municipalities
affected by the term limit. The latter plot suggests that in case there exists a partisan
effect, it is not as large as the personal one. The graphs depicting the probability of winning
at time t against the vote margin at t− 1 are in line with this assessment.
Coefficient estimates in Table 5.2 support the graphical evidence. Estimates follow a
similar pattern across specifications with the ones for the spline polynomial approximation,
which were obtained relying on a cubic specification of the running variable in the models
in Equations (5.3) and (5.7), suggesting in general larger treatment effects.17 The choice
of which estimates to substitute into the expressions quantifying the personal and partisan
incumbency advantages is therefore inconsequential. In the following, results are discussed
17Results are robust to different order polynomials.
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Design IK h = 5% h = 10%
Panel A: Vote Share
RDD 0.090*** 0.067** 0.071*** 0.097***
(0.014) (0.028) (0.021) (0.016)
Diff-in-disc -0.154*** -0.207** -0.193*** -0.205***
(0.050) (0.089) (0.065) (0.063)
Obs. 728 207 397 1384
Panel B: Winning Probability
RDD 0.386*** 0.224 0.322*** 0.393***
(0.059) (0.138) (0.098) (0.072)
Diff-in-disc -1.155*** -0.772* -1.159*** -1.160***
(0.253) (0.460) (0.399) (0.314)
Obs. 791 207 397 1384
Notes: IK stands for the bandwidth selected as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). The spline polynomial regression
estimates are obtained relying on a third-order approximation. All models include election term fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. Stars indicate significance levels of 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
for the specification relying on the bandwidth selected as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) due its conventional use in the RDD literature.
5.5.2 Partisan and Personal Incumbency Advantages
In addition to the RDD and diff-in-disc estimates, a third input is necessary in order to
obtain the personal and partisan incumbency advantages: the probability that an incum-
bent reruns. This is obtained by simply regressing a dummy variable indicating whether
the incumbent officeholder is running for re-election on a linear function of the running
variable.
The first three rows of Table 5.3 show the estimates of the three inputs required to
compute the incumbency effects. These are substituted into Equations (5.9) and (5.10) and
95% bias-corrected confidence intervals are obtained relying on a non-parametric bootstrap
with replacement clustered at the municipal level. This involves repeatedly re-estimating
the three inputs and substituting them into the equations in a simultaneous fashion using
different random samples from the original dataset.
The last two rows of the table provide the estimates for the personal and partisan
incumbency advantage with and without fixed effects. The personal effect has a positive
causal impact on electoral success. A party benefits by up to 17 percentage points from
running an incumbent officer. The incumbency status of the party, however, is not sta-
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Table 5.3: Personal and Partisan Incumbency Advantage.
Vote Share Winning Probability
RDD 0.090 0.111 0.386 0.227
[0.063, 0.118] [0.084, 0.139] [0.262, 0.503] [0.087, 0.362]
Diff-in-Disc -0.154 -0.184 -1.154 -1.557
[-0.259, -0.043] [-0.295, -0.084] [-1.655, -0.592] [-2.153, -0.888]
Prob. 0.922 0.979 0.830 0.886
[0.627, 1.213] [0.589, 1.381] [0.569, 1.091] [0.515, 1.277]
Incumbency Advantage
Personal 0.167 0.188 1.391 1.758
[0.048, 0.322] [0.076, 0.372] [0.693, 2.348] [0.893, 3.446]
Partisan -0.109 -0.129 -0.961 -1.444
[-0.021, 0.003] [-0.239, 0.026] [-1.456, -0.390] [-2.063, -0.797]
FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: The first three rows provide the inputs for the system of equations relating personal to partisan incumbency advantage.
The last two rows provide the estimates of personal and partisan incumbency advantage. Bias-corrected confidence intervals
in brackets. FE indicates whether municipality fixed effects. All models include election term fixed effects.
tistically different from zero thus having no sizable causal impact on the resulting vote
share.
The results for the probability of winning, in turn, identify statistically significant
personal and partisan effects but of opposite signs. These results are presumably rooted
in the high magnitude and significance of the personal incumbency effect on the resulting
vote share. Arguably, based on the descriptive evidence in Table 5.1, being the incumbent
is a sure win. By ascribing this effect to the candidate rather than the party, it follows that
running a new candidate undermines a party’s electoral prospects. The high magnitude of
the effect is likely due to the significant loss in vote share that led to a considerable reduction
in the party re-election rate in 2013 in term-limited elections.18 Still, the significantly
negative partisan effect should not be interpreted as a partisan incumbency disadvantage
but rather as the disadvantage of not running an incumbent candidate.
5.5.3 Explanatory Hypotheses
This section tests two possible explanations for the baseline results. First, whether there
exist ruling costs, as suggested by a strand of the literature on the effects of political
representation on electoral outcomes (Paldam, 1986). Second, whether the fact that a
challenger is rerunning for the election matters. Results are based on re-estimations of the
18Parties were re-elected in around two thirds of the 150 term limited elections compared to an average
of above 80% in the pre-reform period.
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diff-in-disc models with the dummy variable bit indicating mayors that did not run for re-
election after at least three consecutive terms in office in the first case, and municipalities
with a binding term limit where no challenger is rerunning for the election in the second.





Design IK h = 5% h = 10%
Panel A: Ruling Costs
Diff-in-disc -0.087** -0.091 -0.073 -0.092**
(0.038) (0.062) (0.050) (0.043)
Obs. 506 170 331 1106
Panel B: Challenger
Diff-in-disc -0.090*** -0.128*** -0.118*** -0.110***
(0.025) (0.043) (0.025) (0.029)
Obs. 728 207 397 1384
Notes: The outcome variable is the vote share of the baseline party. In Panel A the sample is restricted to the pre-treatment
period. IK stands for the bandwidth selected as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). The spline polynomial regression
estimates are obtained relying on a third-order approximation. All models include election term fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels of 10%(*),
5%(**) and 1%(***).
Coefficient estimates collected in Table 5.4 suggest no consistently significant ruling
costs despite the almost professionalization of the mayor-career that characterized the pre-
reform period. On the other hand, incumbent challengers appear to be driving part of
the effect. The diff-in-disc estimates remain significantly negative but their magnitude is
down by half of the baseline estimates. This result is presumably due to the fact that the
major opposition party nominee running as an incumbent challenger is not unknown to
the electoral district. In fact, he was most likely part of the municipal council and the
closest to the mayor figure in terms of public recognition. Accordingly, in more than half
of the 2013 term limited elections where the incumbent challenger or a former mayor reran,
they won the mayorship. The relevance of the candidates thus transpires even through the
success of rerunning challengers once the incumbent mayor is excluded from the electoral
race. This result reinforces the baseline findings and lends increased support to the thesis
that incumbency is personal and parties play only a secondary role.
5.6 Internal Validity
The validity of an RDD hinges on fulfilling the continuity assumption that implies no
sorting around the zero threshold. This assumption is satisfied as long as individuals are
not able to precisely manipulate their location relative to the threshold. This is plausible
in the context of competitive elections as parties cannot precisely manipulate their vote
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shares and even to a lesser extent the resulting vote margin between winner and runner-
up. Two methods can be used to validate this assumption: testing for discontinuities in
the density of the running variable through a McCrary (2008) plot, and checking for any
significant differences in baseline characteristics between the treatment and control groups,
i.e. incumbents and non-incumbents. The McCrary (2008) plot on the left side of Figure
5.2 and the graphs collected in Figure 5.3 testing for differences on six pre-determined
characteristics – the parties’ vote share and winning probability in t−1, whether the party
is one of the two major center-left or -right parties, if it is a coalition, whether the candidate
is male or female and his or her previous experience – show no significant discontinuities




























Vote Margin (t −1) −− Diff−in−disc
Fig 5.2: Manipulation of the Running Variable. The McCrary plot on the left graphs the density of the
running variable. The McCrary style plot on the right graphs the change in the density of the running variable from the pre-
to the post-treatment period.
The diff-in-disc design, in turn, is superior to the RDD as it captures a second source
of variation combining diff-in-diff and RDD methodologies. The diff-in-diff aspect of the
approach addresses any concerns with the continuity assumption described above. The
RDD aspect controls for differential trends and unobservable municipal characteristics.
Still, one assumption must be fulfilled in order to validate a diff-in-disc design: that the
ability or incentives to manipulate the vote margin did not change from the pre- to the
post-treatment period. This is tested relying on a variant of the McCrary (2008) plot that
depicts the change in the number of observations around the threshold from one period to
the other. There is no reason to suspect that parties are now able to manipulate their vote
shares as the right hand side graph in Figure 5.2 shows no discontinuity in the change in
the number of observations close to the cutoff from pre- to post-treatment period.
In addition, in order to be able to identify the partisan and personal effects relying
on the proposed approach, these two effects are assumed unchanged from pre- to post-
treatment period. There is no obvious reason why this should not be the case. Still, this
assumption can be verified by restricting the analysis to the 2005 and 2009 elections, when
the law establishing term limits already exists but is not applied, to compare expiring to
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Fig 5.3: Selection Bias. Graphs test for selection into treatment for six different pre-determined characteristics
indicated on the y-axis. Observations in a bandwidth of [-40, 40] are averaged within bins of size 1% and second degree
polynomial plots are constructed using a triangular kernel. 95% confidence intervals are indicated in gray.
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non-expiring mayors.19,20 This test involves restricting the sample size, therefore inference
relies on the three data driven bandwidth selectors suggested in the literature: Ludwig and
Miller (2007), Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and Calonico et al. (2014).
Results are collected in Table 5.5 and are obtained relying on a local linear regression
as in Equation (5.1) for all bandwidths above including half and two times the bandwidth
selected as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). The RDD estimates suggest a positive and
significant combined partisan and personal effect for all incumbents in line with the baseline
estimates. The diff-in-disc estimates, obtained by defining bit in Equation (5.6) as to
indicate expiring officeholders, provide no evidence of a significantly different incumbency
effect between the two groups.
Table 5.5: Diff-in-disc Assumption.
Local Linear Regression
Design CCT 1/2 IK IK 2 IK CV
RDD 0.123*** 0.116*** 0.114*** 0.076*** 0.118***
(0.024) (0.036) (0.022) (0.016) (0.021)
Diff-in-disc 0.039 0.088 0.051 0.029 0.066
(0.066) (0.126) (0.057) (0.035) (0.051)
Obs. 270 149 299 494 332
Notes: The outcome variable is the vote share of the baseline party. CCT, IK and CV stand for the bandwidths selected as
in Calonico et al. (2014), Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and Ludwig and Miller (2007), respectively. All models include
election term fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate
significance levels of 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
Overall, this section validates each of the assumptions underlying the proposed ap-
proach. There exists no manipulation at the zero threshold neither in the pre- nor in the
post-treatment period, there is no evidence of selection bias and both the personal and
partisan incumbency advantage are unchanged by the electoral reform introducing term
limits. Baseline results are, therefore, susceptible of causal interpretation.
5.7 Conclusion
The aftermath of a constitutional reform introducing term limits at the local level elections
is the perfect laboratory to identify the personal and partisan returns to incumbency. The
institutional setting, comprising 278 homogenous municipalities, an exogenous constitu-
tional reform, heterogeneity in treatment resulting from the law ruling the application of
term limits and the verified comparability between bare winners and bare losers, allows
for the implementation of both RDD and diff-in-disc design providing coefficient estimates
suitable of causal interpretation.
19The law was voted and approved in Parliament before the 2005 local elections.
20 This terminology is borrowed from Fowler and Hall (2014). Expiring mayors are the ones running for
their last possible term in office. Non-expiring mayors have no short-term perspectives of being termed-out.
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Results show that the original definition of incumbency advantage purposely focuses on
the candidate rather than the party. Positive returns accrue to the rerunning officeholder by
virtue of his incumbent status independently of the incumbency status of the party. Even
though it would be reasonable to assume that parties play a significant role in attracting
and retaining votes, particularly in a multi-party context with a PR system of closed lists
(Shugart et al., 2005), fact is that the assessed partisan effect is indistinguishable from
zero.
The magnitude of the effect conditional on the institutional setting in which it emerges,
together with the evidence on the importance of incumbency and personal characteristics
in explaining voting behavior at various levels of government motivate the external validity
of the results. These reinforce the relevance of candidates vis-a-vis parties in politics at
large.
Conceivably both voters and politicians will over time adapt to the new institutional
setting. Preliminary assessments show e.g. an increase in candidates’ mobility between
municipalities whereas traditionally it followed a bottom-up pattern. This is in line with
the theory of political ambition and its interaction with the political structure in shaping
incentives and provides an interesting avenue for further research (Schlesinger, 1966; Black,
1972).
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Appendix to Chapter 5
5.A.1 Robustness tests
This section offers a variety of tests checking for the robustness of the baseline estimates to
the inclusion of control variables and municipality fixed effects, other bandwidths and poly-
nomial functions of the running variables and different specifications of the main variables.
First, using the same specifications as in the baseline results, all regression models are
re-estimated including the following nine municipality-specific control variables: municipal
population size and municipal population size squared, a measure of municipal economic
activity proxied by night time light satellite observations, the level of current and capital
expenditures in the election year and three political dummy variables indicating whether
the mayor’s party is also in control of the central government, whether the incumbent party
is on the left side of the political spectrum and whether the Prime Minister is from the
center-right PSD. Results are collected in Table A.5.1. Second, still using the same baseline
specifications, instead of control variables, results are re-estimated including municipality
fixed effects in addition to election year fixed effects. This implies the resulting estimates
capture only within- but no longer between-variation, possibly compromising the signifi-
cance of the estimates for smaller samples. Results are collected in Table A.5.2. Overall,
coefficient estimates in both tables reinforce the robustness of the baseline estimates.





Design IK h = 5% h = 10%
Panel A: Vote Share
RDD 0.089*** 0.066** 0.072*** 0.096***
(0.014) (0.028) (0.021) (0.016)
Diff-in-disc -0.159*** -0.261*** -0.178*** -0.226***
(0.051) (0.096) (0.064) (0.067)
Obs. 720 204 393 1369
Panel B: Winning Probability
RDD 0.379*** 0.190 0.309*** 0.389***
(0.059) (0.140) (0.097) (0.072)
Diff-in-disc -1.081*** -0.578 -1.140*** -1.115***
(0.250) (0.507) (0.397) (0.313)
Obs. 781 204 393 1369
Notes: All models include the vector of control variables. IK stands for the bandwidth selector proposed by Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). The spline polynomial regression estimates are obtained relying on a third-order approximation. All
models include election term fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity.
Stars indicate significance levels of 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
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Design IK h = 5% h = 10%
Panel A: Vote Share
RDD 0.111*** 0.059* 0.094*** 0.103***
(0.014) (0.034) (0.024) (0.016)
Diff-in-disc -0.184*** -0.133 -0.179*** -0.250***
(0.047) (0.103) (0.068) (0.054)
Obs. 689 127 327 1384
Panel B: Winning Probability
RDD 0.227*** -0.202 0.097 0.233***
(0.069) (0.191) (0.136) (0.081)
Diff-in-disc -1.557*** -0.690 -1.769*** -1.650***
(0.298) (0.494) (0.376) (0.335)
Obs. 759 127 327 1384
Notes: IK stands for the bandwidth selector proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). The spline polynomial regression
estimates are obtained relying on a third-order approximation. All models include election term fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels of 10%(*), 5%(**) and
1%(***).
The third robustness check involves re-estimating the baseline results for different band-
widths and polynomials of the running variable. Using a local linear regression, estimates
are obtained for three additional bandwidths: two data driven bandwidth selectors in the
literature, the Calonico et al. (2014) and the Ludwig and Miller (2007) optimal bandwidth
selectors, and a more conservative bandwidth restricting the sample to the interval [-2.5,
2.5]. The spline polynomial regression model in turn, is re-estimated relying on second-
and fourth-order approximations. Results collected in Table A.5.3 are also in line with the
baseline estimates.
Finally, the last robustness test makes use of different specifications of the main vari-
ables to ascertain that the baseline results are not contingent on how variables are measured
nor on the particular treatment year. Following the approach in Uppal (2009) the RDD
is re-estimated relying on variables structured at the candidate level. Since rerunning de-
cisions are systematically different between incumbents and non-incumbents the analysis
is conditional on incumbents rerunning the election to prevent overestimating the effect.
This should provide a similar combination of personal and partisan incumbency advantage
as the baseline results. However, in contrast to Equation (5.2), here the probability of an
incumbent rerunning equals one and the partisan incumbency advantage is multiplied by
the probability of a candidate being loyal, i.e. not crossing the floor. But first, condition-
ing on re-running may introduce a selection bias if rerunning decisions are systematically
different between rerunning and non-rerunning losers. Testing for differences in the four
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Table A.5.3: Different Bandwidths and Polynomials.
Spline Polynomial
RegressionLocal Linear Regression
Design CCT CV h = 2.5% Quadratic Quartic
Panel A: Vote Share
RDD 0.077*** 0.087*** 0.076** 0.093*** 0.084***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.036) (0.013) (0.020)
Diff-in-disc -0.155** -0.125*** -0.238*** -0.124** -0.193***
(0.061) (0.046) (0.063) (0.050) (0.071)
Obs. 582 1054 100 1384 1384
Panel B: Winning Probability
RDD 0.388*** 0.370*** 0.159 0.356*** 0.386***
(0.066) (0.043) (0.189) (0.050) (0.094)
Diff-in-disc -1.148*** -0.669*** 0.056 -0.940*** -1.220***
(0.252) (0.159) (0.203) (0.245) (0.376)
Obs. 835 1381 100 1384 1384
Notes: CCT and CV stand for the optimal bandwidth selectors suggested in Calonico et al. (2014) and Ludwig and Miller
(2007), respectively. All models include election term fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and
robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels of 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
pre-determined baseline characteristics in Table A.5.4 shows no evidence that this is the
case. This approach is therefore a valid robustness test and coefficient estimates on Panel
A of Table A.5.5 are in all likelihood similar to baseline estimates, reinforcing the results.
Table A.5.4: Internal Validity: Losers Self Selection.
h = 1% h = 5% h = 10% Full Sample
Vote Share t− 1 -0.014 0.002 0.004 0.001
(0.014) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003)
Affiliation -0.018 -0.006 -0.002 -0.011
(0.104) (0.060) (0.043) (0.027)
Coalition 0.065 0.001 0.030 0.012
(0.055) (0.030) (0.024) (0.015)
Female 0.032 0.042 0.031 0.021
(0.039) (0.032) (0.024) (0.017)
Obs. 52 238 449 1471
Notes: This table depicts differences between rerunning and non-rerunning losers for the variables on the left column. The
first row indicates the intervals which the sample is restricted to. The second column provides only a difference in means.
The remaining columns show the regression of each characteristic on a dummy that takes value one if the candidate reruns in
the next election and zero otherwise, the running variable and an interaction between these two for the intervals defined on
the first row. The last column includes in addition a third-order polynomial of the running variable and interaction terms.
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels of 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
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To test the diff-in-disc results, the sample is reduced to the pre-treatment period and
the dummy variable bi,t is constructed to indicate first, any election where the incumbent
mayor is not rerunning, i.e. open seat elections, and second, elections the incumbent mayor
is not rerunning due to death, promotion or suspension. The first specification tests how
incumbent parties that nominate a new candidate fare against the ones that run with the
incumbent mayor for elections from 1993 through to 2009. And the second focuses on a
subset of these, where the incumbent mayor did not complete the whole term. This may
be the case for four different reasons: death, promotion, suspension or personal motives.
Whilst the latter may be closely related to strategic retiring the remaining reasons are
assumed exogenous. Given that the number of mayors in these situations is reduced, all
are taken together to compare incumbent parties whose mayor stepped down for justified
reasons against incumbent parties whose mayor deliberately chose whether to rerun or
not. Contrary to the baseline diff-in-disc estimates here there is no systematically credible
second source of exogenous variation. Results from these two tests should thus be taken
with a grain of salt.





IK h = 5% h = 10%
Panel A: RDD
Candidate 0.090*** 0.045* 0.080*** 0.087***
(0.016) (0.026) (0.019) (0.015)
Obs. 618 257 471 1394
Panel B: Diff-in-disc
Open Seats -0.112*** -0.134 -0.197*** -0.169***
(0.024) (0.088) (0.063) (0.052)
Subset -0.026 -0.040 -0.021 -0.173*
(0.050) (0.102) (0.048) (0.089)
Obs. 506 170 331 1106
Notes: Outcome variable is the vote share of the baseline party. IK stands for the bandwidth selector proposed by Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). The spline polynomial regression estimates are obtained relying on a third-order approximation. All
models include election term fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity.
Stars indicate significance levels of 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***).
Results are collected in Panel B of Table A.5.5. Coefficient estimates for all open
seat elections are in line with baseline estimates, negative, mostly significant but of a
smaller magnitude. As in Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004), when strategic retirement
is controlled for as in the baseline estimates, the effect is of a higher rather than of a
smaller magnitude. As discussed in the same paper, the importance of strategic retirement
appears to be overestimated in the literature. Results for the sample of suspended, deceased
and promoted mayors are consistently negative but only twice significant, for the largest
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bandwidths. This could be due to the small amount of mayors in these situations. For
the whole sample, 24 mayors were promoted mid-term, six passed away and two were
suspended. Still, it is remarkable to see that results are still in line with baseline estimates
even though in the majority of cases parties can publicize the promotion, or voters are
mourning the death, of a previous mayor. All in all, voters show a coherent response to
a new mayoral candidate running for the incumbent party reinforcing the robustness and
validity of the baseline estimates.
5.A.2 Heterogeneous Effects





IK h = 5% h = 10%
Panel A: Central Government
Aligned -0.032* 0.002 -0.023 -0.029
(0.019) (0.033) (0.024) (0.021)
Panel B: Party
PS -0.013 -0.024 -0.010 -0.014
(0.020) (0.033) (0.026) (0.023)
PSD 0.018 0.016 0.003 0.011
(0.020) (0.034) (0.025) (0.023)
PCP -0.015 0.021 0.003 -0.023
(0.020) (0.034) (0.027) (0.022)
CDS 0.017 0.015 0.013 0.011
(0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.028)
Panel C: Region
North 0.022 -0.011 0.032 0.011
(0.021) (0.034) (0.027) (0.024)
Center 0.006 0.061* 0.011 0.017
(0.019) (0.033) (0.024) (0.022)
Alentejo -0.023 -0.014 -0.025 -0.018
(0.019) (0.032) (0.025) (0.022)
Algarve -0.032 -0.181** -0.051 -0.035
(0.042) (0.086) (0.049) (0.060)
Obs. 728 207 397 1384
Notes: IK stands for the bandwidth selector proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). The spline polynomial regression
estimates are obtained relying on a third-order approximation. All models include election term fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Stars indicate significance levels of 10%(*), 5%(**) and
1%(***).
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This section analyzes three possible channels of heterogeneous effects. First, the focus
is upon political alignment and thus whether incumbency advantage hinges on the mayor
being from the same party as the Prime Minister. Second, whether candidates of any of
the four major national parties enjoy a distinguishing incumbency advantage. Third, the
concern is geographical and whether incumbency advantage is specific of any given region
in Portugal.
Results are obtained relying on the diff-in-disc models with bi,t indicating every of the
two different and non-overlapping groups for the bandwidths and polynomial used in the
baseline estimates. Coefficient estimates are collected in Table A.5.6. Overall there is
no consistent pattern of statistically significant results. Coefficient estimates suggest that
incumbency effects are stronger than alignment effects, and that incumbency advantage
is not particular of neither a party nor a region. This test for heterogeneous effects can
instead be taken as another robustness test of the consistency of the incumbency advantage
effect across parties and regions.
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